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You will not grasp her with your mind or 
cover with a common label, for Russia is one of a kind – 
believe in her, if you are able…
Fyodor Tyutchev
Th e United States Congress’ sanctions are 
squeezing Russia out from Europe.
Vladimir Putin, Valdai Discussion Club, 2017 
In Europe we were Tatars, 
while in Asia we can be Europeans.
Fyodor Dostoevsky 
To stand up for truth is nothing. 
For truth, you must sit in jail.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Candle in the Wind 
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Brigadier General Ilmar Tamm, 
Commandant of the Baltic Defence College
Th e security of a state is the key to its wealth, stability, and welfare. As per 
the words of former Estonian President Lennart Meri during the College’s 
inaugural ceremony on 25th of February 1999, 
“Security is precious, and there is never too much of it. Security is an indivisible 
wealth, and it must be cultivated in the spirit of close regional concord. Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania have the task to ensure, to the best of their ability, the 
security of the Baltic region, which is a necessary precondition to stability in 
Europe.” 
All three Baltic states historical path reverted to freedom and independence 
just a little more than 30 years ago. With the support of Allies, fostering 
regional security has been the top priority of the Baltic Defence College for 
more than 20 years. Our College delivers professional military education 
to senior staff  offi  cers and civil servants. Th e College’s core task is to invest 
in human capital to ensure peace dividends for future generations and the 
shared security of the Baltic sea region. 
For more than two decades since the inauguration, the civilian and mili -
tary leadership of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and our partners have conti-
nuously recognized the importance and quality of our work. One of the 
most prominent fl agship educational events of the College is our annual 
Conference on Russia. Th is international and renowned project commenced 
in 2014 and has been primarily aimed at our military and civilian students 
but also the broader community  – civilian and military security experts, 
academics, media, and think tanks, and policy makers. Th e purpose of 
our Conferences is to focus on and study Russia, from within and without, 
especially concerning the Baltic, European, and transatlantic perspectives. 
Th is year, we are proud to release the Conference’s papers to unveil 
how both the international community and Russians see the Russian Fede-
ration as apart or a part of the world order. We are questioning if Russia is 
a tentative partner or a strategic challenge for the West, or is it a historical 
phenomenon that cannot separate itself from the demons of the past? 
Moreover, the publication allows us to better understand if and how to 
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accommodate Russia or just let Russia be Russia. Together with the 7th 
Annual Conference on Russia 2021, this publication and its authors off er an 
invaluable contribution to debates on Russia. 
Tartu, 04 March 2021.
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Dr. Sandis Šrāders, Chief Editor and Fellow, Baltic Defence College
COL (Ret.) Dr Zdzisław Śliwa, Dean, Baltic Defence College
Sandis ŠRĀDERS, Zdzisław ŚLIWA
The objective of the Baltic Defence College is to foster a forum for debates 
and knowledge relating to international and regional security perspectives 
for the Baltic Sea Region. Intrinsically, this task includes an appraisal of 
Russian foreign and security policies. As such, these objectives render our 
college important to the civilian and military leadership of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania for one profound reason: the security, economic, and social 
conditions of the Baltic States cannot be viewed separately from but in a 
direct correlation with the Russian Federation  – one of the biggest and 
mightiest countries in the world. 
For the seventh year in a row, our academic mission, teaching, and re -
search activities have been supported by this annual Conference on Russia. 
This event discusses Russian foreign, security and military policies relating 
to the three Baltic States, the Baltic Sea Region, Europe, transatlantic rela-
tions, and Eurasia more widely. In relation to Russia’s foreign and security 
ambitions, the focus is on how the West perceives Russia and how Russia is 
viewing the West.
Our conference and research has summoned the most recognized and 
learned civilian and military pundits from both Russia and the West. This 
pool of knowledge allows an enhanced and nuanced understanding of 
Russia and the way Russia perceives the rest of the world. This conference 
and our publication The Russia Conference Papers 2021 brings together 
experts from both sides of the Atlantic and Russia. Institutionally, this pub-
lication bridges the civilian military cooperation between the Baltic Defence 
College and NATO. 
These papers consist of two distinct parts covering a variety of areas. 
The first part bears the title “From the Heart of Europe.” It consists of 
seven articles. The first paper “The Baltic States at the Berlin Blockade – a 
West Berlin or an East Germany?” by Sandis Šrāders and George Spencer 
Terry reviews the analogy of the past Berlin crisis and the present condi-
tions around the Baltic States. Although separated by seven decades and 
with particular security conditions between then and now, there are signifi-
cant similarities. Transatlantic security depends on the allied solidarity and 
resolve to stand up for even the smallest members of the collective security 
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community. Second, “Changing Course  – From Ostpolitik to Contain -
ment” by Sarah Pagung traces the evolution of the German approach toward 
Russia. Willy Brandt introduced Ostpolitik, which focused on engage-
ment with Moscow. This policy aimed at removing all reasons for conflict 
by giving priority to the cooperation and closer links. Instead, owing to 
more adverse policies from Russia, Berlin has shifted its course to a policy 
of containment. Third, the joint paper “Perceptions of Russia in Poland: 
Reconciling History, Maintaining Dialogue, and Shaping the Future” by 
Eugeniusz Cieślak and Zdzisław Śliwa focuses on the importance of 
Russia in Poland. This paper uncovers the historical and cultural implica-
tions for Polish military, political, and economic arrangements relating to 
Russia. Fourth, Hans Binnendijk offers a logic on NATO in his “NATO 
Adaptation and Baltic Security.” His arguments dwell on the adaptation of 
the transatlantic alliance to external security conditions. Even though the 
Alliance could not engage the Baltic States in collective defence institu-
tionally, the evolution of NATO has been implicitly beneficial for Central 
and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Baltic States should now think about 
their niche power status in front of the emerging challenges more strategi-
cally. Each member of the alliance must contribute to collective security 
instead of just acting as consumers of the collective efforts. Fifth, crucial 
developments in the immediate neighbourhood of the Baltic States allow 
Dovilė Jakniūnaitė to offer the paper, “The Baltic States, Poland, and the 
Protests in Belarus: the Case for the Unconditional Love?” She elaborates on 
the background of current situation in Belarus and the policies and social 
responses from the Baltic States that have supported the democratic transi-
tion over the human rights violations. Finally, an image of the Belarusian 
case is further developed by Sandis ŠRĀDERS and Shota GVINERIA. Their 
article “Belarus: Stuck in a Moment with No Escape” outlines the broader 
growing interest in Belarus by Russia, the hesitant West, and the others. In 
addition, this paper offers several policy recommendations for the Baltic 
States, the European Union, and the West.
“From Russia: Mirror Images” is the second part of the Russia Confe-
rence Papers 2021. This section consists of eight authored articles. The first 
paper is “I Looked Back to See If You Looked Back to See If I Was Looking at 
You: Russian Discourse on Western Critique of Russia’s Actions,” by Dmitry 
Lanko. He provides a detailed overview of Russian narratives toward the 
West from the perspective of the leadership and the population. He argues 
that soft power plays a significant role in how Russians perceive the Western. 
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This assessment of the public view is furthered by Nikita Lomagin in the 
second paper of the section, “Where People Stand: Public Attitudes in 
Russia towards the West”. This paper provides a broader assessment of how 
the Russian population perceives the West, understood by proxy as the 
United States, the European Union, and NATO. His research compares the 
results from three public opinion surveys – those from WCIOM (Russian 
Public Opinion Research Centre), the independent Levada Center, and the 
Pew Research Center. Third, in his paper “Assessing Russian Success and 
Failure,” Keir Giles provides intriguing arguments on the views of the war 
in Ukraine, the intervention in Syria, the covert meddling into the United 
States presidential election, and elimination of opposition at home and 
abroad among other instances as possible successes (or not) for Russia. 
Fourth, Viljar Veebel delivers an assessment on the impact of Western sanc-
tions on the Russian military industrial complex. In his paper “The Future 
of the Russia’s Military Industry: ‘Special Deliveries’, Functional Needs, 
Generous Loan Deals, and ‘Old Love’ from Soviet Times,” he forwards some 
possibilities for the future of Russia’s modern military. Fifth, in his paper 
“Russia and Global Order,” Bobo Lo assesses Russia and international liberal 
order. His arguments outline some of the important areas for the Kremlin in 
the contemporary international disorder where ambiguities and power vacu-
ums might allow Russia to hide its relative weaknesses in key areas. Sixth, in 
his paper “Perceptions of Russia’s Pivot to Asia,” Fraser Cameron describes 
how Russia’s strategic regional approach is perceived in China and by other 
regional players. His conclusions allow for the assessment of Moscow’s stra-
tegic future in Asia. Seventh, Konstantin von Eggert delivers an assess-
ment of the development of Russian ideas in his paper, “How the Empire 
Struck Back: Russia’s Long Quest for a Post-Soviet Soul”. This paper focuses 
on the Russian society. He compares the evolution of ideas in Germany and 
Russia after the Second World War. The Kremlin’s intervention in Georgia 
and Ukraine serve as indicators of Russia’s hard detour from its history when 
Russia was considered a great power. Finally yet importantly, Andrew Wood 
is offering deep insight into the Russian power structure in his paper “Putin’s 
Chains.” He looks into the circumstances behind and the continuing pro-
cesses now of the preservation of power by President Vladimir Putin and 
his inner circle. Wood explains not only the present paradigm, delivering a 
forecast as to what should be expect after 2024 as well. This in-depth refer-
ence to the past allows for an understanding of future Russian politics and 
the role of its national leaders. 
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The Baltic States at the Berlin Blockade – 
a West Berlin or an East Germany? 
Dr. Sandis Šrāders  
George Spencer Terry Sandis ŠRĀDERS, George Spencer TERRY
Abstract 
Civilizational collision between the West and the East is nothing new. 
During the Cold War, this contest between the liberal democratic West and 
communist East reached its apex. From one side, the US policy of contain-
ing communism worldwide tamed the Soviet power and influence. On the 
other, this geopolitical rivalry allowed for some states to choose allies and 
alliance. Nevertheless, these small political entities had to rely on the good-
will of their major power patrons. The Berlin Blockade acted as a crucial 
test of solidarity for the United States and its European allies. By standing 
by West Berlin when it was surrounded by intense Soviet pressure, the West 
proved its commitment to its allies. Multiple decades since, this resolve has 
expanded the Western alliance as far as the Baltic States, but revisionist chal-
lenges have not dissipated in the Kremlin. Considering the above, this paper 
will investigate similarities and differences between the events surrounding 
Berlin Blockade and the situation of the Baltic States. In both cases, only 
solidarity within the Euroatlantic community can ensure prosperity and 
security of all its allies. This paper will investigate the social attitudes, politi-
cal choices, and policies that enhanced the solidarity or divisions in Europe, 
between the Europe’s East and West. 
Key words: Iron Curtain, containment, solidarity, Ostpolitik, Berlin Wall, 
Westpolitik
Introduction
After the Second World War, the relationship between the Soviet Union and 
the West deteriorated incrementally until the adversities were soaring rather 
quickly thereafter. At the United Nations, Winston Churchill’s March 1946 
“Sinews of Peace” speech heralded the erection of Iron Curtain – the begin-
ning of bipolar confrontation between the communist Soviet Union and the 
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liberal democratic West.1 Shortly thereafter, based on the US Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan’s experience and observations until 
1949, the long telegram set the stage for the United States’ emphasis on con-
taining the Soviet Union. 
The containment policy aimed to safeguard Western capitalist or social 
democracies from communism fed the Kremlin’s sense of insecurity. This 
insecurity resulted in the Soviet hostility toward the Marshall Plan. The pos-
sibility of the inclusion of any of Soviet-occupied or subjugated territories 
resulted in political punishment, the defenestration of the Czechoslovak 
Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk from his apartment in 1948 due to his will-
ingness to join the Marshall Plan cooperation. 
This Soviet menace fertilized Western commitment to consolidate 
Western Germany into a single and independent state. The indicators of 
such policies were the introduction of Deutschmark in West Berlin. Due to 
perceptions of such actions in the East, the result was the Soviet blockade of 
all ground transportation to West Berlin, which then lay in East Germany. 
West Berlin then was positioned as a Western outpost, deep within the com-
munist bloc. 
It was a hotbed of intelligence operations by both sides and the best avail-
able escape route for East Germans fleeing communism and Soviet con-
trol to the West. President Truman was convinced that abandoning Berlin 
would jeopardize control of all of Western Germany. Moreover, he believed 
that abandoning even any of the smallest allies would discredit repeated 
American assurances to its allies in Europe or elsewhere.
This overt confrontation over Berlin lasted until 1961, which marked a 
transformative period in the dynamics of the Cold War. The results of the 
Berlin Crisis showed a steel resolve among the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France not to abandon their allies around the world, even 
in the face of naked coercion and overwhelming force. Nonetheless, as the 
Berlin Wall arose and fenced in half of the city, there remained this outpost 
of support, a promise of a future beyond Soviet domination. 
Since 1961 until the end of 1989, the Berlin Wall stabilized the relation-
ship between the Soviet Union and the West. But the promise of the West to 
Berlin, much like the promises entailed in the Welles Declaration to never 
accept neither the de facto nor de jure annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and 
1 James H. Willbanks, “The Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949)” in Jan Gold -
man ed., An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies, (The Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2015), 39–40. 
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Lithuania to the Soviet Union, always allowed for an opening of prospective 
transformations in the statuses of these areas, whether that would be in a 
year, a decade, or in a future still far away.2 
Two years from the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany would reunite and 
the Baltic States would have regained their independence. However, do we 
live in that same world today? Do the Western Allies think that they share 
the same values and the European and transatlantic resolve as their Central 
and Eastern European partners and vice versa? 
This current piece explores these questions by first providing a vignette 
of the domestic German case and its evolution since 1989 and then by alle-
gorically contraposing this state of affairs with the wider topography of out-
looks and developments in Central and Eastern Europe from 1991 onward, 
using the Baltic States as representative of wider changes in the region. 
Left Behind or Left Out?
In many ways, unified Germany can be pragmatically viewed as the heart 
of the European project when the Cold War was over. First, it represented 
the capstone in US objectives to rebuild Europe – whole, free, and Western. 
Reshaping NATO as an organization from military to more political entity 
was a pathway that could soften the geopolitical shock in the Soviet Union 
of Germany’s impending unification and entry into NATO.3 
Second, it was the cornerstone of the European unity as only after the 
Unification Treaty of August 1990 was the Maastricht Treaty considered a 
possibility. Shortly before the German unification, major European leaders 
such as Thatcher and Mitterrand had learned from their counterparts in 
Kremlin about Soviet fears about a possible German unification or posi-
tions on Baltic territorial issues (such as in Lithuania, for example).4 A hasty 
consolidation of European or transatlantic geopolitical interests and insti-
tutional structures might have averted the Soviet/Russian de-militarization 
at the time. 
2 Sumner Welles, “Welles Declaration, Department of State Press Release, ‘Statement by 
the Acting Secretary of State the Honorable Sumner Welles’” (US Department of State, 
April 23, 1940), History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/144967.
3 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed: A German Question (New 
York: Knopf, 1998), 217.
4 Bush and Scowcroft, 277, 557–559.
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Third, this period marked a reunited German resolve at whatever the 
cost – at the expense of Deutschmark, immediate economic gains, or anyone 
who opposed the project, such as the President of the Bundesbank, Karl 
Otto Pöhl, who lost his job.5 The European solidarity and American objec-
tives in Europe depended on German capacity to embrace their unity, 
European and American institutions. 
German adherence to a common European currency and values was 
even a precondition to advancement towards the treaty.6 Even now, as 
a single state, close to a majority of Europeans (48 percent) believe that 
Germany as a single actor has ‘too much influence when it comes to deci-
sion-making in the EU,’ despite 71 percent of Europeans holding a positive 
view of the country.7 Therefore, to understand how Europe has evolved as a 
concept, it is a prerequisite to understand Germany’s own evolution due to 
the perception of its leading role within it. 
A suitable point of departure is to look at the popular attitudes of both 
West and East Germans since 1990, since popular attitudes form a founda-
tional part of the substratum of the systemic environment in which foreign 
policy is formed.8 In 1991, 79 percent of West Germans and 89 percent of 
East Germans viewed reunification as either ‘very positive’ or ‘somewhat 
positive.’9 However, in 2009, West German opinion stayed the same – 77 
percent of the population holding ‘very’ to ‘somewhat positive’ views – yet 
East German outlooks had become increasingly pessimistic, with a drop of 
10 percent in support. While in most other contexts an 80 percent positive 
outlook would be an absolutely victory, this decline in support of predicated 
a growing social dissensus for the future. 
5 David Marsh, Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity (A Mandarin Paperback, 1994), 
72–73.
6 Sven Böll et al., “Euro Struggles Can Be Traced to Origins of Common Currency,” Der 
Spiegel, accessed October 2, 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/euro-
struggles-can-be-traced-to-origins-of-common-currency-a-831842.html.
7 “Post-Brexit, Europeans More Favorable Toward EU” (Pew Research Center, June 15, 
2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/06/15/favorable-views-of-germany-
dont-erase-concerns-about-its-influence-within-eu/.
8 Michael Clarke, “The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis,” in Understanding 
Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach, ed. M. Clarke and B. White, 1989, 
27–59; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1965).
9 “Two Decades After the Wall’s Fall: End of Communism Cheered but Now with More 
Reservations,” The Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center, November 2, 
2009), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2009/11/02/chapter-5-views-of-german-
reunification/.
19Th e Baltic States at the Berlin Blockade – a West Berlin or an East Germany? 
As of 2019, this trend has continued in a stark fashion; 47 percent of 
East Germans are dissatisfied with the current state of German democracy.10 
While some of this unhappiness with the extant situation could be reduced 
to economic complaints and a lower quality of life, such a cleavage of opin-
ion implies a much deeper disagreement on the general guiding liberal nor-
mative values, which can be displayed in the doubled levels of support for 
the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland in the former East as compared 
to the West.11 
From the onset, Germany political reunification was based on the adop-
tion of the West German Grundgesetz, which although supposedly provi-
sional, has continued in place as the law for all German federal subjects. In 
this way, although the reunification of Germany was presented as a natural, 
historically predetermined, and mutually beneficial occurrence by those 
actors involved, it nonetheless was a hegemonically West German-led ven-
ture. This development meant fidelity to West German decisions that had 
already been made, including membership in organizations such as NATO 
and the European Community.
This side-lining of the East to the West, nonetheless in the name of a 
common ‘German’ project, would act as a correlative factor in the disen-
chantment that lead to a situation in which “over half of residents in east-
ern Germany feel like second-class citizens, and that only 38 percent of 
those surveyed said reunification was a success.”12 Some academics, such 
as Dominic Boyer, posit that the related concept of Ostalgie – or nostalgia 
for the East German past – that has arisen in the wake of such dissatisfac-
tion is a specifically East German lens through which to gaze at a markedly 
greyer future rather than to remember any sort of idealized socialist past.13 
Understood this way, Ostalgie and other sorts of political and cultural pro-
tests are a way of asserting actorship in a paradigm wherein such actorship 
10 “How the Attitudes of West and East Germans Compare, 30 Years after Fall of Berlin 
Wall,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 2, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/10/18/how-the-attitudes-of-west-and-east-germans-compare-30-years-
after-fall-of-berlin-wall/.
11 “East Germany Has Narrowed Economic Gap with West Germany since Fall of Com-
munism, but Still Lags,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 2, 2020, https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/06/east-germany-has-narrowed-economic-gap-
with-west-germany-since-fall-of-communism-but-still-lags/.
12 Deutsche Welle, “German Unity Day: Reunification Is ‘ongoing Process’ Says Merkel,” 
DW.COM, October 3, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/german-unity-day-reunification-
is-ongoing-process-says-merkel/a-50687798.
13 Dominic Boyer, “Ostalgie and the Politics of the Future in Eastern Germany,” Public 
Culture 18, no. 2 (2006): 361–81.
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has been either cast aside or made irrelevant. At least on the executive level, 
this division is well understood, as ‘internal reunification’ is assumed as an 
ongoing and markedly current process and not yet a ‘reality.’14
Nevertheless, this ongoing social unification of ideas and German 
interest has undermining Germany’s stronger commitment to European 
and transatlantic solidarity like Berlin experienced from 1948 to 1949. 
The Eastern part of the unified Germany, and the German Länder, such 
as North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Brandenburg were imme-
diately interested in steering Germany toward the East at the onset of the 
unification.15 A secure and institutionally reintegrated Central and Eastern 
Europe was of a profound interest within Ostpolitik not only to forge more 
cooperative relations with the Russia but also to close the so-called grey area 
or the buffer zone between the unified Germany and reborn Russia from 
1991.
From the Gateway to the West to Outpost in 
the East
This ongoing progression of German reunification  – both external and 
domestic – finds a wider analogy in Central and Eastern Europe with the 
expansion of Western institutions past the borders of the Oder and Neisse. 
Like East Germany, post-Soviet and post-communist Europe enthusiasti-
cally oriented toward the West in the 1990s and early 2000s, which would 
soon welcome them into a ‘united’ political community in the form of the 
European Union.
 However, the idealism behind the so-long-awaited homecoming to a 
united country or united continent would soon be dashed, as the end of the 
Cold War did not necessarily mean a world structured by a peaceful, rules-
based order that would bring the material and ideational boons that the 
West had long represented. Russia – although for the 1990s and early 2000s 
relatively benign in its policy toward Europe – remained a perceived exis-
tential threat for many of these member states, and the Western European 
14 Deutsche Welle, “Angela Merkel Hails Germany’s Progress since Fall of Berlin Wall,” 
DW.COM, September 28, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-hails-germanys-
progress-since-fall-of-berlin-wall/a-50620492.
15 Lothar Gutjahr, German Foreign and Defense Policy After Unification (London and New 
York: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 125, 137.
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quality of life would not arrive immediately, and even then, only through the 
most internationalized urban centres.16 
For the Baltic States, this new paradigm signalled an inversion from their 
traditional position within the region, as for their period under the Russian 
Empire and Soviet occupation, they had been viewed more as Western in 
comparison to other subjects of the state. With independence regained and 
the new pivot to Europe and NATO, they now had to operate under the 
assumption that they would be considered Eastern – even if this would not 
be a definition that they would ascribe to themselves. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
based their domestic political renovation on an explicit model that would 
converge upon Western standards, which would guarantee their respective 
places in both the European project and the transatlantic security order. 
From the Baltic perspective, the prospect of joining the European Union 
seen as the democratic precondition for NATO membership.17
In recent years, support for NATO remains high in the Baltic States.18 
Thus, parallels of fatigue akin to those of East Germany could not be as 
easily drawn – but nearly quarter of the population in each of the coun-
tries consistently has harboured Eurosceptic views.19 Nevertheless, only in 
Estonia has an overtly Eurosceptic party been elected to a governing posi-
tion, and even then, this was just in the form of a junior partner of a govern-
ing coalition. 
However, unlike Poland and Hungary, which for the time being remain 
in an aggressive posture against the European Union in arenas from migra-
tion to various interpretations of social issues, the Baltic States have not as of 
yet adopted such confrontational policies that explicitly run counter to the 
normative agenda that emanates from Brussels. Nonetheless, even if their 
transatlantic security interests remain profound – their rhetoric over future 
constitutional referenda or possible elections of more Eurosceptic parties 
16 “Regions and Cities at a Glance 2018 – ESTONIA” (OECD, 2018).; “Regions and Cities 
at a Glance 2018 – LITHUANIA” (OECD, 2018).; “Regions and Cities at a Glance 2018 – 
LATVIA” (OECD, 2018).
17 Sandis Šrāders, Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security Community (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2020), 34.
18 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Christopher Skaluba, “A Report from NATO’s Front 
Lines,” Brookings (blog), June 13, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2019/06/13/a-report-from-natos-front-lines/.
19 Aldis Austers et al., Euroscepticism in the Baltic States: Uncovering Issues, People and 
Stereotypes, 2017, http://liia.lv/en/publications/euroscepticism-in-the-baltic-states-
uncovering-issues-people-and-stereotypes-639.
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could bring any or all of the Baltic States into a future normative conflict 
with the European Union.20 
A Baltic Westpolitik?
Policy cannot be made based on purely hypothetical imageries of the future, 
however. Somewhere between stereotypes between the perceived East and 
the imagined West and rational calculation lies the strategic choice for the 
Baltic States. At the centre of this calculus, conversely, lies an explicit sur-
vival-based discourse, understandably due to historical experiences of the 
Baltic States with their neighbours and especially considering the aggressive 
international posture of Russia in the past decade and a half. By continuing 
the two-way metaphor between the Baltics and Germany further by one 
more linkage, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would fulfil their strategic goals 
best if they were to be seen as a West Berlin rather than an East Germany. 
As Germany as a concept was necessarily constituted by both West and 
East Germany, so too is Europe by the members from Maastricht to the 
members of the enlargements of 2004 and beyond. In addition, like in the 
case of Germany, this unification or enlargement was based almost entirely 
on Western normative standards. Those standards – in both Europe and 
Germany – remain hegemonic today, even if some actors do contend with 
them or strive to redefine them. It is exactly this point of tension where 
contemporary issues arise, both in Germany and in Europe. However, that 
which necessarily keeps Germany together is that which could possibly drive 
the different ‘Europes’ apart. This is none other than the sacrosanct issue of 
sovereignty as the immutability of the state and its territory. Understandings 
of democracy – with the number of definitions matching either number of 
voters or scholars – might lead to a situation where East and West no longer 
even categorically matter. 
As has become apparent in the past years, definitions of democracy have 
come into conflict. There are still adherents to liberal democracy.21 Even if 
the United States as an actor views its liberal world order as crumbling, the 
endowments that such world order has delivered to the United States will 
20 ERR | ERR, “Preparations for Referendum and 2021 Elections Must Begin This Summer,” 
ERR, June 9, 2020, https://news.err.ee/1099907/preparations-for-referendum-and-2021-
elections-must-begin-this-summer.
21 “Liberal Democratic Order Is under Threat – Guy Verhofstadt,” accessed October 6, 2020, 
https://www.euronews.com/2017/02/22/liberal-democratic-order-is-under-threat.
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force the others to compete for the US market and security guarantees.22 
There are those with more illiberal or post-liberal views.23 Such as Russia or 
China, some actors willing to overtly (Moscow) or covertly (Beijing) offer 
an alternative to liberal democracy that leads to a multipolar international 
system wherein regional powers would offer their own values or rules of the 
game.24 This power-based system can abuse all options to divide transatlan-
tic and European partners, by discrediting and weakening democracies to 
undermine their appeal, co-opting possible defectors, and isolating those 
who would resist leaving the United States alone either with a diminished or 
enfeebled coalition.25 Such retreat of a rules-based order, giving way to the 
rule of the jungle is the result of the lack of solidarity where major Western 
partners cannot even agree on a simple binding issue of common cause.26 
Within a country, such as Germany, this discussion does not threaten 
the sovereignty of the state as such, and if a consensus is reached, it could in 
fact strengthen citizen participation and trust toward governmental insti-
tutions. In the EU, however, there is no guarantee that a consensus would 
be reached, and the debate would solely exacerbate already-growing rifts 
among blocs with similar understandings of norms. In a world where the 
United States trends toward unilateralism and has even pulled its troops out 
of allied nations for going against its policy decisions, a weaker EU, that is, a 
Union in name only, would only aggravate threat anxieties and weaken the 
security assurances for the Baltic States. 27
2020 is no analogue to the Berlin Blockade leading to the Berlin Wall in 
1961. The enemies are no longer placed as such by any ideology ipso facto. 
Nevertheless, there is still a communist bastion in Beijing that cannot forgive 
the past communist regime collapse in Moscow and nonetheless sees the 
22 Michael Beckley, “Rogue Superpower: Why This Could Be an Illiberal American 
Century,” (Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2020), 73–74.
23 “Viktor Orban: Era of ‘liberal Democracy’ Is Over,” Deutsche Welle, accessed 
October 6, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/viktor-orban-era-of-liberal-democracy-is-
over/a-43732540.
24 Sergei Karaganov and Dmitry V. Suslov, “A New World Order: A View from Russia,” 
Russia in Global Affairs (November 24, 2020, accessed on March 26, 2020, https://eng.
globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-new-world-order-a-view-from-russia/.
25 Aaron L. Friedberg, “An Answer to Aggression: How to Push Back Against Beijing” 
(Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2020), 151.
26 G. John Ikenberry, “The Next Liberal Order: The Age of Contagion Demands 
More Internationalism, Not Less” (Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2020), 133.
27 “U.S. to Withdraw about 12,000 Troops from Germany but Nearly Half to Stay in 
Europe,” Reuters, accessed October 6, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
trump-germany-military-idUSKCN24U20L.
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United States as a rapidly declining power.28 Furthermore, there is Moscow, 
which aims at rebuilding the lost soviet or imperial glory at least with the 
tacit support from China.29 Moreover, those who seemed to be allies look 
more and more like strangers within the Western alliance. This uncertainty 
toward the international liberal order not only grounds academic debates.30 
It guides popular ones as well.31 
From this paradigm, a strategy based on the construction of a norma-
tive consensus with Brussels and wider Europe, on a nonetheless liberal 
basis, is one of the strongest options for the Baltic States going forward. If 
the United States no longer can be completely considered a reliable security 
guarantee, a plurality of the remaining NATO members with the material 
capacity and will to defend the Baltic States heavily overlaps with Europe. If 
a situation would arise like during the Berlin blockade – and Russia were to 
aggressively pressure Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania like the Soviet Union had 
pressured the West out of West Berlin – the West would first need to view 
the Baltic States as an inviolable part of their collective self rather than just 
burdensome institutional partners. This is primarily possible through an 
active positioning Westward within the Baltic States. Like the solidarity and 
unification of Germany and Europe and transatlantic alliance, the resolve 
to uphold common security interests within Europe and with transatlantic 
partners bolsters the common aim to contain the material and normative 
challenges emanating from a revisionist Russia and communist China.32 
28 Julian Gewirtz, “China Thinks America is Losing” (Foreign Affairs, November/Decem-
ber, 2020), 64.
29 Alexander Dugin, The Rise of the Fourth Political Theory (Arkatos Media, 
2017), 57–83, 114–146; Sandis Šrāders, Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic 
Security Community (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 174.
30 Jef Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier,” 
European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (June 1998): 226–55, https://doi.org/
10.1177/1354066198004002004.
31 “Age of Uncertainties,” Berlin Policy Journal - Blog (blog), January 19, 2017, https://
berlinpolicyjournal.com/age-of-uncertainties/.
32 See Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Containment: Handling Russia, China, 
and Iran,” Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2019).
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Abstract 
Over the last decade, Germany has slowly adjusted its policy towards Russia 
in relation to evolving European and Russian realities. This change was 
driven by the growing alienation of German elites due to the assertive poli-
cies of the Kremlin towards the EU, its partners, and Berlin itself. However, 
Germany still struggles to accept the end of the special German-Russian 
partnership, especially as the debate on Russia is shaped by domestic factors 
rather than foreign policy objectives as the discourse around Nord Stream 
2 illustrates. In this way, differing attitudes toward Russia mirror domestic 
conflicts on values, leadership, and identity. Accordingly, German elites and 
public disagree on how to engage with Russia. This division and the lack of 
a strategic vision for German foreign policy towards Russia have therefore 
caused inconsistencies in Germany’s approach. 
Key words: Russia, German politics, conflict, containment, Ostpolitik 
Introduction
In autumn 2020, Germany once again experienced a heated debate on its 
Russia policy. In early September, a German Bundeswehr laboratory con-
firmed that Alexey Navalny had been poisoned by the nerve agent Novichok, 
making it highly likely that Russian state institutions were involved in an 
attempt to murder a Russian opposition politician. The debate demonstrated 
a change of course in German policy towards Russia. Hence, the poison-
ing should not be understood as a turning point but rather as a visible sign 
of a slow adjustment – a shift that was caused by Russian actions and by 
changing perceptions of Russia within the political elite and its top ranks. 
Despite this change, Germany fails to actively shape its relations with Russia. 
Instead, its gradual adaption to European, Russian, and global realities make 
German Russia policy mostly reactive. This is caused by a German debate 
on Russia that is driven by domestic factors instead of foreign policy strat-
egies. The Navalny case illustrated these conflicting narratives on Russia, 
both within the German public and among political stakeholders. 
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Germany’s Misperception of its Russia Policy
For 50 years, Germany’s Russia policy has been shaped by the idea of 
Ostpolitik. Back in the late 1960s, the creation of the policy was aimed at 
reducing the risk of military escalation in Europe. Its basic assumption was 
that economic interdependence would aggravate military conflict. Despite 
opposition from the US, West Germany’s policy was accepted due to its 
deep entrenchment in NATO. Nevertheless, the Ostpolitik soon evolved 
further and additionally promoted “change through rapprochement.” This 
approach survived the end of the Cold War and stayed the defining prin-
ciple of Germany’s Russia policy. In the 1990s and 2000s, it was developed 
into a modernization partnership based on the hope, that Russia would 
become a liberal democracy. Berlin even adhered to this principle in the 
late 2000s and early 2010s, when growing authoritarianism shaped Russia 
and its political system. This stubbornness had two specific reasons: First, 
Germany’s Ostpolitik was accompanied by a misperception of its power and 
scope. Until today, German politicians as well as the German public tend to 
overestimate the role of this policy approach in ending the Cold War, when 
in fact political change and the final collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states were caused by domestic reasons, with inefficiency and pet-
rification in nearly every sector of political, social and economic life being 
the main drivers. The Ostpolitik only played a supporting role. Secondly, the 
Ostpolitik found strong advocates in German business who sought opportu-
nities in Russia after the collapse of communism. Thus, German Ostpolitik – 
even though still treated like a political strategy – was more and more driven 
by economic considerations. 
Germany’s Failed Ostpolitik in Ukraine
The continuation of German Ostpolitik in the 21st century ignored that 
Russia and the wider strategic environment had changed. The military 
deterrence of ‘the West’, which time functioned as the backbone of German 
Ostpolitik for the longest, lost its credibility for several reasons. The United 
States increasingly focused its attention on the Pacific region, and many 
NATO members – primarily Germany – neglected military investments. At 
the same time, former US President Trump openly questioned NATO and 
its Article 5. Additionally, the Russian elite focused on cementing its grip on 
power and not on change, let alone democratic development. The re-election 
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of Vladimir Putin in 2012 illustrated this development and caused a sense of 
growing alienation in Berlin. However, just like the Georgian-Russian war 
in 2008, this alienation did not lead to a change in policy. Only after Russia’s 
proxy war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, Germany started 
to alter its course by leading the European sanctions consensus. German 
Ostpolitik was slowly supplemented by strategies of containment. In 2016, 
this “dual approach [of] credible deterrence and defence capability as well as 
a willingness to engage in dialogue” was even included in German Federal 
White Paper.1 After all, the Ukraine crisis proved a key assumption of the 
Ostpolitik to be wrong, as economic interdependence did not prevent war – 
but interestingly – it created the conditions for effective sanctions. 
The End of a Special Relationship
The adjustment of Berlin’s policy toward Russia was mainly caused by a 
changing attitude among political leaders concerning Moscow. Chancellor 
Merkel completely lost trust in President Putin after he lied to her about 
Russian intervention in Crimea. Even then, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, one of the strongest advocates of the Ostpolitik, was disil-
lusioned and supported sanctions against Russia. Following these events, 
relations further soured, and this conflict increasingly affected German 
domestic policies. In 2016, Russian media and politicians spread fake 
news of a girl allegedly raped by migrants in Berlin, further fuelling an 
already heated debate on migration in Germany.2 Still, it took Chancellor 
Merkel another four years to finally denounce Russian malign activities in 
Germany openly. In May 2020, she attributed a cyber attack on the German 
Bundestag in 2015 to the Russian military secret service, GRU.3 This clear-
ness was mainly caused by another conflict in German-Russian relations 
that had evolved a year before. In August 2019, a Russia citizen killed the 
former Chechen commander Zelimkhan Changoshvili in a public park 
in Berlin. Germany’s General Attorney linked the perpetrator to Russian 
1 “The White Paper 2016 on German Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” The German 
Federal Government, 2016, 66, https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20
White%20Paper.pdf. 
2 Andreas Rinke and Paul Carrel, “German-Russian ties feel Cold War-style chill over rape 
case,” Reuters, 1 February 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-russia-
idUSKCN0VA31O.
3 “Angela Merkel droht mit Konsequenzen,” ZEIT ONLINE, 2020, https://www.zeit.de/
politik/deutschland/2020-05/hackerangriff-bundestag-2015-russland-angela-merkel. 
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security services, making it a case of state terrorism.4 Berlin reached out to 
Russian officials for support in their investigations, relying on its close ties 
to Russia. Nonetheless, Moscow reacted with denial, delaying tactics, and 
fake news, calling it a “hackneyed story.”5 This disappointment explains the 
much harsher reaction of Chancellor Merkel and other officials both in the 
Navalny case and in the attribution of the hacking attack. Berlin had come 
to realize that its special relationship with Russia was useless. Therefore, 
Germany adopted a tougher approach, including the public shaming of 
Moscow. Berlin was turning the wheel in the direction of containment.
Germany Lacks a Strategic Vision
As this chain of events shows, change was slow. It was characterized by con-
tradictions along the road. The most striking example is Nord Stream II 
that was agreed upon just a year after Russia’s proxy war in Ukraine had 
started. The pipeline project is the result of economic interests, interests of 
German federal states, and the overall Ostpolitik idea. It illustrates a lack of 
strategic vision for relations with Russia after Ostpolitik has proven to be 
outdated. Attempts to frame the pipeline as a way of implementing the so-
called Mogherini principle of selective engagement were half-hearted. The 
massive underestimation of resistance from European partners as well as 
the United States is one of the gravest foreign policy mistakes of the German 
government in the last decade. Nonetheless, Nord Stream II illustrates two 
lessons for Germany’s Russia policy. First, it demonstrated, that the dual 
approach of rapprochement and selective engagement was failing in reality, 
despite the hopes that Germany put into it. Possible cases for cooperation 
were sparse. Germany and the EU on one hand and Russian on the other 
share interests mostly in areas where both do not have leverage or power 
like the Iranian nuclear deal. Where both sides possess power and influence, 
such as the Common Neighbourhood or potentially in conflicts in Syria 
and Libya, interests do not overlap or are even contradictory. Second, Nord 
Stream II illustrates the changing reference points in Berlin’s policy towards 
4 “Georgian’s Death in Berlin was Russian-ordered assassination, prosecutor believes,” 
DW, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/georgians-death-in-berlin-was-a-russian-ordered-
assassination-prosecutors-believe/a-53860911. 
5 Florian Flade and Georg Mascolo, “Verdacht auf Staatsterrorismus,” Tagesschau, 24 
May 2020, https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/tiergartenmmogherord-
verdaechtiger-anklage-101.html. 
29Changing Course – From Ostpolitik to Containment
Russia. While relations with Russia have always been politicized, the context 
has been changing. In the beginning, interdependence was instrumentalized 
to achieve peaceful coexistence and subsequently to bring about change in 
Russia. Now, interdependence is also assessed as a possible risk further fuel-
ling the debate on the fate of German Ostpolitik. 
Russia Presents a Projection Screen for German Domestic 
Conflicts
Berlin’s adjustment to the reality of relations with the Kremlin is caused by 
conflicting narratives and a polarized debate on Russia within the country. 
A poll conducted in 2019 shows that 30% of Germans believe that relations 
with Russia should be closer, 23% assess relations as just right, 9% think they 
are too close and as much as 38% do not know or refused to answer.6 Living 
or having been born in the former GDR as well as being older increases the 
likeliness of wanting better relations. The logic behind this answer is similar 
among varying social groups. Respondents connected opinions on Russia 
to German domestic policies, making the country a projection area for wor-
ries and wishes for Germany itself. Russia or Putin himself are associated 
with strength and order or traditional values and national pride, things that 
respondents say are missing in Germany.7 Moreover, latent Anti-American 
attitudes lead to positive attitudes towards Russia, painting the country as 
the ideological opposite to the USA – even 30 years after the end of the Cold 
War. This is also reflected in a 2019 poll; 29% see value in having relations 
with the US, 25% with Russia and 30% with both.8 This equidistance to West 
and East is a continuity in German thinking since the 19th century. 
6 Gwendolyn Sasse, “Russland: Russlandbilder in Ost- und Westdeutschland,”ZOiS Report 
5/2020, May 2020, 14f, https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/zois-
report-52020/. 
7 Ibid.
8 Jacob Pushter and Christina Huang, “Despite some improvements, Americans and 




German Parties are Divided over Russia
The fact that Russia serves as a projection of the German domestic political 
situation is also reflected within the German party system. The parties that 
demand the closest relations with Russia are to be found on the far right and 
far left, drawing contradictory narratives from Russia. The left party Die 
LINKE sees Russia as a bulwark against US imperialism, capitalism, and 
globalization, even though Russia does not present the antipode to either of 
these. By contrast, the far right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) admires 
Russia’s and Putin’s assertive strongmen-policies defending so-called tradi-
tional values, ignoring that Russia as a multi-ethnic state is the antithesis to 
the party’s idea of homogenous ethno pluralism. Both parties want to lift 
sanctions and build a collective security structure in Europe without the 
United States while including Russia.9 Die LINKE even adopts a Russian 
narrative by stating that NATO and EU expansion caused the ongoing con-
flict with Russia.10 
The three governing parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social 
Democrats (SPD) have had to manage a delicate balance since 2014. 
Chancellor Merkel’s CDU, a deeply transatlantic party, has been critical 
towards Russia and its foreign and domestic policies. The party has been 
the driving force behind the policy adjustment including sanctions and 
thereby rejecting the idea of Ostpolitik.11 Still, the CDU defends Nord 
Stream II, causing an inconsistency in policy towards Russia. Its coalition 
partner, the SPD, faces even bigger challenges in its Russia policy. The party 
of Willy Brandt, the founder of the Ostpolitik, has been promoting the idea 
of Ostpolitik for decades. Today, however, the party is torn between conflict-
ing groups. Mostly, but not only, younger members like Foreign Minister 
Heiko Maas demand a containment policy towards Russia while there are 
those who believe in the idea of Ostpolitik like the former prime minister of 
the federal state Brandenburg Matthias Platzeck and those who have been 
9 “Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundes-
tag,” AfD, 2017, 19, https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017- 
06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf. 
10 “Langfassung des Wahlprogramms zur Bundestagswahl 2017,” Die Linke, 2017, 100, 
https://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/wahlen2017/wahlprogramm2017/die_
linke_wahlprogramm_2017.pdf. 
11 Roderich Kiesewetter (2020): A balance of values and interests: Germany, realpolitik, 
and Russia policy, see: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_balance_of_values_and_
interests_germany_realpolitik_and_russia/.
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corrupted or co-opted by Russian interests like former Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder. Additionally, regional heads of governments like Manuela 
Schwesig, prime minister of Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania, the state 
where Nord Stream 1 and 2 land, support cooperation in order to attract 
voters and to secure economic benefits. The latter groups have prevented 
any serious change in policy within the SPD, even though Foreign Minister 
Maas has promoted a New European Ostpolitik. As a publication of the 
SPD fraction within the German Bundestag in 2018 shows, the SPD de 
facto equates security interests and the needs of its European partners and 
Russia.12 Additionally, some SPD politicians, such as the head of the SPD 
fraction in the German Bundestag, Rolf Mützenich, are questioning nuclear 
sharing with the United States.13 Both effectively undermine the EU and the 
NATO. Still, the position of the SPD has changed since 2014 as its support 
for sanctions illustrates. This change is mainly caused by personal disap-
pointment among senior party officials. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, president 
and former foreign minister, as well as former Coordinator for relations with 
Russia, Central Asia, and the Eastern Partnership countries of the German 
Government Gernot Erler have been strong advocates of the Ostpolitik. Like 
many others, both were deeply frustrated with their relations with Russian 
officials following the war in Ukraine. Ultimately, they helped build a sanc-
tion consensus within the party. 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats (FDP) are also torn apart between 
classic liberal values in foreign policy and an electorate that emphasizes free 
trade and conservative values while opposing sanctions. Next to Die LINKE 
and AfD, the Greens are the only party that have a clear policy strategy 
towards Russia. The party pursues a foreign policy based on values with a 
critical attitude towards Russia. Members of the Greens regularly demand 
additional sanctions and also focus on Russian domestic issues, human 
rights, and democratization.
12 “Dialog  – Vertrauen  – Sicherheit,” SPD Fraktion in the German Bundestag, 2018, 2, 
https://www.spdfraktion.de/system/files/documents/positionspapier-spdfraktion-
dialog-vertrauen-sicherheit-20181009.pdf. 
13 Pia Furhop, Ulrich Kühn, and Oliver Meier, “Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons from Europe,” 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-10/
features/creating-opportunity-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-europe. 
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German Business Cautiously Supports Sanctions
The view from German economy also presents a mixed picture. While com-
panies had criticized sanctions in the spring of 2014, many business enti-
ties supported sanctions against Russia following the downing of MH17 in 
July 2014. The German Eastern Business Association, the main lobbying 
body of German companies for business in Eastern Europe, has upheld its 
support until today despite warnings of additional economic sanctions. 
While Joe Kaeser, CEO of SIEMENS, and other leading German business 
figures met with Putin in 2014 publically, German business officials now 
keep a public distance from Russian state officials. A similarly mixed pic-
ture can be observed among civil society institutions. Many German NGOs 
and foundations finance or support Russian civil society structures in their 
fight for democracy or rule of law. Organizations like the Petersburger 
Dialog or the German Russian Forum want to provide room for exchange 
between German and Russian civil society. Hence, both structures have been 
politically commandeered, preventing an open exchange with Russian civil 
society organizations. Russia pursued its domestic strategy of duplicating 
functioning civil society institution to deprive them of attention and instru-
mentalize their proxies – and Berlin did not oppose this.
Conclusion
The recent events in German-Russian relations have illustrated a policy 
adjustment that has been evolving since 2012. This change in course is 
caused not only by Russian actions but by a shift in attitudes among senior 
political leaders as well. Still, many politicians as well as the German public 
are divided in regards to the question on how to engage with Russia. This 
split also reflects other divisions in domestic politics such as ‘traditional 
values’ or in foreign policy questions like NATO burden sharing. Therefore, 
Berlin’s Russia policy is not only determined by foreign policy needs but also 
has become dependent on an increasingly populistic debate on domestic 
issues. This is reflected by strategic inconsistencies within Germany policy 
toward Russia policy that cause a policy of disorder and irregularity rather 
than a policy driven by strategic vision. Still, Germany’s Russia policy has 
evolved from an approach dominated by the paradigm of Ostpolitik to a 
dual approach of engagement and containment, eventually emphasizing the 
latter. The upcoming parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2021 will 
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likely be decisive for the future of Germany’s Russia policy. As none of the 
governing parties wants to continue the present coalition and the Green 
party is increasingly gaining support among Germans, a new collation con-
sisting of the CDU/CSU and the Greens becomes probable. This would turn 
the wheel even more in the direction of containment, as such a coalition 
would increasingly focus on Russian domestic issues like political repression 
and be more willing to impose additional sanctions as well as strengthen 
transatlantic defence cooperation. 
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Abstract 
The long shadow of the past complicates current Polish-Russian relations. 
Despite a genuine interest from Warsaw and Moscow to rebuild mutual rela-
tions based on cooperation, this renewed relationship cannot immediately 
discount painful historical memories in the popular conscience. The longer 
such dissensus drags on into the future, it becomes more difficult find a 
common language for cooperation. Moreover, any past common under-
standing from Warsaw Pact cooperation based on the knowledge of Russian 
language is fading. Conversely, the Russian people and the Russian state 
are not viewed as a unitary actor in Poland, instead seen as a dyad between 
society and government. As such, the Polish elites and wider population per-
ceive the possibilities of cooperation with Russia differently. Nevertheless, 
there is a strong reciprocity between the popular thought and the policies 
of the Polish elites. This paper will explain the important aspects of history 
in Poland, elite and popular attitudes toward dialogue, and prospects for 
reconciliation in order to shape future relations between Poland and Russia. 
Key words: Poland, Russia, historical memory, cultural politics, dialogue
Introduction
Polish-Russian relations have traditionally been perceived as difficult. Due 
to shared geopolitical and historical conditions, it has been difficult to over-
come Polish-Russian hostility, which has resulted in problems in achieving 
mutual understanding and reconciliation. Prejudices and stereotypes rooted 
in history and cultural conditions have put a visible mark on the percep-
tion of Russia and Russians inside Poland as well as Poland and Poles inside 
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Russia.1 Compounded with the past, these present political and economic 
disputes have rendered any hopes for quick improvements in bilateral rela-
tions between Poland and Russia difficult. However, there is a noticeable 
potential for improving the situation in the long term. This improvement 
may be the result of cultural similarities, social interactions and shared eco-
nomic interests.
To address these instances, the current chapter outlines a brief over-
view of the historical and cultural determinants of Polish-Russian rela-
tions. Against this historical background and these cultural perceptions, 
transformations in the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of the Polish political 
elite towards Russia will be analysed. In turn, these ideas affect immedi-
ate military, political, and economic policy approaches. This thinking and 
implementation of Polish foreign policy eventually is reflected within Polish 
society, which is the subject of the second part of this paper. Resulting from 
these elite political perceptions, these past and present ideas in turn shape 
public opinion. In the end, the public perception of Russia affects any future 
policy prospects. The final part of this paper focuses this discussion on the 
possible ways to improve Polish-Russian relations.
The chapter discusses the perception of Russia and Russians by the 
Polish political elite and the public opinion after 1989 when Poland regained 
its state sovereignty. Due to the limited volume of the chapter, the authors 
focused on the analysis and assessment of key historical and cultural factors 
as well as current events that shaped the perception of Russia and Russians 
by the Polish political elite and society. The scope of the work will be limited 
to the views, assessments, and beliefs formulated by the Polish political elite, 
scientists and specialists, and society more broadly. 
Historical and Cultural Factors
Poland and Russia have been neighbours for more than a thousand years. 
However, the most important historical determinants of relationship 
between Poland and Russia took place in the 16th and 17th centuries. At 
that time, both countries competed for primacy in the Eastern and Central 
European space and Poland almost mortally lost in this competition. 
1 Czynnik historyczny w stosunkach Polski z Rosją: wymiar społeczny i kulturalno-naukowy, 
(Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Studiów Międzynarodowych, 2017): 2–3, accessed No-
vember 10, 2020, https://ptsm.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/czynnik-historyczny-
w-stosunkach-polski-z-rosja-wymiar-spoleczny-i-kulturalno-naukowy.-raport.pdf 
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Further historical events related to the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, 
and 1795 and to the fact that a large part of ethnic Poles remained under the 
territory of the Russian partition until 1918 increased the problems leading 
to mutual hostility. The compulsory Russification of Polish lands and the 
violent suppression of subsequent national uprisings have become a per-
manent part of the historical consciousness of Poles. The aggression of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic from 1919–1920 and the par-
ticipation of the Soviet Union in the occupation Poland in September 1939 
strengthened this perception of Polish political elite and society that Russia 
is intrinsically hostile to the nation2. Mass repressions and deportations of 
Poles deep into the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the 
mass execution of Polish officers in the Katyń forest provided further evi-
dence of the inhumane methods of the Soviet Empire. 
After World War II, many people in Polish society had been displaced 
from their homes in the pre-war Polish eastern borderlands and suffered 
personal harm from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union actions during the 
final period of World War II and immediately after its end contributed to 
the negative perception of the Soviet Union in Poland. Many Poles blame 
the Soviet Union for the lack of assistance to the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, 
repressions against Polish independence underground movement, and vio-
lence against the Polish civilian population in the areas that became part of 
Poland after World War II. The imposition of a communist regime on Polish 
society and the consequent domination of the Soviet Union over formally 
independent Poland exposed Poles to the consequences of the lack of full 
political and economic sovereignty. The dependence of the Polish ruling 
elite on the Soviet Union and its interference in Poland’s internal affairs 
did not contribute to the development of friendly relations between both 
societies.
This sequence of events in the common history of Poland and Russia 
highlights many negative experiences and phenomena that make building 
mutual trust and achieving reconciliation beyond historical divisions a chal-
lenge. Understanding the differing interpretations of these is essential for 
conceptualizing the impact of these historical factors on the perception of 
Russia in Poland. This applies primarily to the official historiographies of 
both Russia and Poland. Poles are concerned with the Russian interpreta-
tions of history that deny responsibility for any aggression against Poland 
2 Józef Tymanowski, “Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie i perspektywy ich zmiany,” Studia 
Wschodnioeuropejskie, No 11 (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, May 2020): 5.
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in 1939, avoid the issue of responsibility for harm inflicted on Poles by 
the Soviet Union, or glorify the role of Stalin in creating the Yalta order. 
This negative perception of Russian historical policy finds fertile ground in 
Poland, especially in comparison with Polish-German historical dialogue 
and reconciliation based on the acceptance of historical facts and taking 
responsibility for them.
The historical connotations of the negative perception of Russia in 
Poland are also the result of the instrumental use of history in current 
politics by both sides. Polish Professor of international relations Ryszard 
Zięba argues that the Polish perception of Russia is particularly sensitive to 
symbolic issues and their excessive interpretations. Polish politicians, espe-
cially those of the right-wing, operationalize tragic episodes and historical 
processes to place Russia under the pillory of international opinion. Zięba 
observes that the period between 2005 and 2007 and since autumn 2015 has 
been a time when the ruling elites in Poland found it convenient to scare 
their society with Russia to facilitate the conduct of authoritarian and popu-
list internal politics.3
Cultural factors influence Polish-Russian relations as much as histori-
cal factors. To be fully understood, mutual prejudices between Poles and 
Russians need to be understood through a reference to a different “cultural 
programming” in both nations. In 1916, Nikolai Berdyaev wrote, “The quar-
rel between Russians and Poles cannot be explained only by external forces 
of history and purely political reasons (...). It is primarily a feud between 
two Slavic souls, linguistically and anthropologically related, and at the 
same time so different, almost contradictory, incompatible, and unable to 
communicate.”4
Similarly, the Polish Nobel Prize winner Czesław Miłosz wrote, “Poles 
and Russians do not like each other, or, more precisely, do not have any 
unfavourable feelings towards each other, ranging from contempt to hatred, 
which does not exclude a vague mutual attraction, but always marked by 
distrust.” Different sources and traditions of political cultures in both coun-
tries and societies also influence the perception of Russia in Poland. Polish 
political culture, based on the noble liberties of the Rzeczpospolita, is alien 
to the monopolisation of power. Poles do not understand the Russians’ 
3 Ryszard Zięba, “Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich / Main Problems in 
Polish-Russian Relations”, Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations nr 3 (t. 
54) 2018, 15–18
4 Olga Nadskakuła, “W matni uprzedzeń i stereotypów”. Znak. Kwiecień 2007, https://www.
miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/6232007olga-nadskakulaw-matni-uprzedzen-i-stereotypow/
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deference towards authorities, their orientation towards collectivism, and 
their acceptance of autocracy.5
Among the cultural factors influencing the perception of Russia in 
Poland, one can mention the Polish concept of Prometheanism that was 
expressed in the missionary nature of eastern Polish policy. The Polish 
political elite has held a historical conviction that Poland should and has 
the right, as the largest state in Central and Eastern Europe, to engage in 
shaping the political scene in the post-Soviet areas by promoting democratic 
standards and Western models of political culture there. The idea of helping 
countries in the post-Soviet area to develop and reinforce their political ties 
and economic integration with the West is visible in Poland’s foreign policy 
since 1989. Such an approach is inherently set on a collision course with 
Russia’s desire to maintain its security zone within the post-Soviet space.
For many years, developments in national culture have contributed to 
mutual understanding in relations between Poland and Russia.6 Over the 
centuries, both national cultures have inspired each other and influenced 
their mutual development. It was evident in the nineteenth century, when 
the majority of Poland was a part of the Russian Empire, but also in the 
second half of the twentieth century when Polish culture acted as an inter-
mediary between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. This influence is 
evident among the older and better-educated part of Polish society, who are 
familiar with Russian literature, theatre, cinematography, classical music, 
and ballet. Poles are also aware of the similar fate of both societies and 
the efforts for human rights and democracy undertaken in both countries 
during the communist period. As professor de Lazari observed, Poles could 
love Russians if they had only their culture. However, Russians also have a 
state that is possessive and expansive, which has been historically prone to 
turn into an empire with autocratic rulers. Furthermore, this is what Poles 
fear and cannot accept.7
The declining knowledge of the Russian language in Polish society has 
a negative impact on the understanding of Russia in Poland. Until 1989, 
teaching the Russian language in Poland was obligatory and ideologically 
5 Ibid
6 Miron Lakomy, “Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko – rosyjskich na początku XXI 
wieku,” in Stosunki Polski z sąsiadami w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku, ed, Mieczysław 
Stolarczyk, (Katowice: Silesia University Publishing, 2011): 69. 
7 Romuald Karyś, “Między nami, Słowianami”. Sprawy Nauki. 09-11-2006, http://www.
sprawynauki.edu.pl/archiwum/dzialy-wyd-papierowe/16-politologia/73-58
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motivated. Nevertheless, during that period, many Poles learnt not only the 
Russian language but also Russian culture as well. Although the older gen-
eration of Poles is able to communicate in Russian at a basic level, 51 percent 
of the society no longer knows this language, as the international language 
of the young generation speaks English. Therefore, fewer and fewer Poles 
can immerse into Russian culture or follow political, economic and social 
events in Russia using Russian-language sources. This will most likely limit 
future close contact between societies and understanding of the “Russian 
soul” by young generations of Poles.
Polish Political Elite Perceptions of Russia 
The political elite perceives Russia through the prism of disputes over the 
history of mutual relations, different concepts of European security, and 
Polish concerns about energy security.8 Demands that Russia acknowl-
edges its role in Poland’s tragic history was a constant element of the Polish-
Russian dialogue and polemics of the political elites. In the nineties of the 
last century, a differentiation in the approach of the Polish political elite to 
Russia was noticeable. Right-wing circles have tried to eliminate the ideo-
logical factor from relations with Russia and pursue a dual-track policy with 
a focus on economic relations.
At the same time, the Polish government opposed Russia’s attempts to 
maintain its sphere of influence in Central Europe. As personalities matter 
in politics, there were also regular tensions between the President of Poland, 
Lech Wałęsa, and the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. The 
assumption of the presidency by the left-wing post-communist Aleksander 
Kwasniewski led to a sanitation of bilateral relations in the second half of 
the nineties to some extent. At that time, the easing of the position of the 
Russian side was also noticeable. Between 2001 and 2005, two successive 
centre-left governments in Poland led by Leszek Miller and then Marek 
Belka tried to implement pragmatic cooperation with Russia. Such coopera-
tion was criticized by the opposition Law and Justice and the Civic Platform 
parties, as well as by the anti-Russian Polish media.
8 Political elite is understood as a group of people high in a hierarchy of political life in 
Poland, including top governmental officials both active and retired, and leaders of major 
political parties. Mariusz Janicki, “Kto w Polsce należy do elity”, Polityka, 4 lipca 2017, 
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1710972,1,kto-w-polsce-nalezy-do-elity.
read
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The rule of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party between 
the autumn of 2005 and 2007 was a period of sharp polemics and decla-
rations of a tough policy towards Russia. In 2007, the Polish government 
postulated the will to continue dialogue on historical matters, condition-
ing it by a need to change “the awareness of the Russian political elite.” The 
government also declared that it would oppose “unjustified attempts to dis-
criminate against Poland” by Russia.
A temporary softening of the polemics over the common history took 
place in 2007–2010 during the mandate of Civic Platform. Since 2009, the 
Polish Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church have joined in 
building dialogue and reconciliation between Poles and Russians. When the 
Law and Justice Party’s government came to power in 2015, its policy toward 
Russia became passive, isolationist, and compounded with aggressive anti-
Russian rhetoric aimed at attracting right-wing voters and internal politi-
cal market. After 2015, relations with Russia supported short-term goals 
in domestic politics, in terms of public relations rather than real politics. 
According to Professor Zięba, the historical policy imposed by the govern-
ment after 2015 strengthened Poland’s inclination toward an instrumental 
use of history for current politics, which only served to achieve the goals of 
one political option.
The events at hand have reinforced the pre-existing historical and cul-
tural fixations held by Polish political elites throughout the period after 
1989. The most notable events were Russian aggression against Georgia in 
2008, the presidential plane crash in Smolensk in 2010, and Russian aggres-
sion against Ukraine in 2014. The use of military power by Russia in the 
post-Soviet area has traditionally sparked a harsh response from Polish 
political elites. In 2008, right-wing President Lech Kaczyński condemned 
the Russian aggression against Georgia in a harsh way. Kaczyński warned 
against further aggressive steps by Russia towards its neighbours, saying 
“Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic 
states, and then, perhaps, the time will come for my country, Poland.”9
However, there was no unity inside the Polish government about the 
condemnation of Russia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was more reluctant 
in voicing criticism against Russia and declared that Poland would remain 
9 “Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine appeal to Russia over Georgia,” The Baltic Times, 
August 8, 2008, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.baltictimes.com/poland__
lithuania__latvia__ukraine_appeal_to_russia_over_georgia/.
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in the mainstream of European activities in connection with the Russian-
Georgian conflict. With anti-Russian rhetoric developing in Poland, there 
were numerous occasions to expose this mutual lack of trust. Press alle-
gations about a simulated nuclear attack on Poland by the Russian armed 
forces during the Zapad 2009 military exercises reasoned well with anti-
Russian sentiments. Further information on the Russian plans to deploy 
Iskander missile systems in the Kaliningrad region also disappointed the 
Polish political elite.
After 2010, bilateral relations became a hostage of the Smolensk air crash 
and the issue of recovering the wreckage of the presidential plane. Although 
the 2010 Smolensk air crash could have acted as a chance for Polish-Russian 
reconciliation, politicians from the then opposition Law and Justice Party 
used it quickly to accuse Russia and the Polish government of a conspirato-
rial attack on the Polish delegation. The Russophobe campaign launched 
by Law and Justice in 2010 ruled out any possibility of Polish-Russian dia-
logue.10 Politicians from Law and Justice accused the Polish government of 
failing to recognize the threats to independence posed by Russia, accusing 
it of betraying national interests and serving the country. These conspir-
acy theories served the purposes of purely internal political struggle but 
nonetheless damaged Polish-Russian relations beyond repair. With a harsh 
response from Russian authorities, a spiral of mutual accusations acceler-
ated, ruling out any chance of dialogue. After the Smolensk air crash, right-
wing politicians used attitude to Russia as a litmus test in internal political 
debate in Poland. Those more moderate and open to possible dialogue were 
labelled as traitors.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine from2013 on became a trigger for 
anti-Russian sentiments in Poland.11 The speed of this aggression and 
Russia’s lack of respect for international law deeply shook the Polish politi-
cal elites. In 2014, Russia was included as a threat in the strategy of Poland’s 
national security for the first time after 1989. Russia’s strong political, mili-
tary, and economic pressure in the post-Soviet area was described as the 
reason for the persistence of instability in this region. Nevertheless, the 2014 
strategy emphasized the importance of Russia’s relations with the West as an 
10 Monika Sus, “Poland: Leading Critic or Marginalised Hawk?” in EU Member States and 
Russia. National and European Debates in an Evolving International Environment, ed. 
Marco Siddi (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Report No 53/2018): 82.
11 Katarzyna Pełczyńska – Nałęcz, “How Far do the Borders of the West Extend? Russian/
Polish Strategic Conflicts in the Period 1990–2010,” (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 
2010): 21–23.
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important factor that affects the security of Poland, the region, and Europe. 
At the same time, the value of the Euroatlantic solidarity was reemphasized 
and the United States’ military power started to be sought as a bulwark 
against any future aggression by Russia. 
Russian aggression against Ukraine has shaped the perception of Russia 
as an existential threat ever since. The “Defence Concept of the Republic of 
Poland” of 2017 listed the aggressive policies of the Russian Federation as 
a direct threat to the security of Poland and the other countries of NATO’s 
Eastern Flank.12 It warned of Russian way to pursue its political goals, the 
situation in neighbouring countries, of undermining their territorial integ-
rity, and of hybrid activities. The expansion of the military potential of the 
Russian armed forces in the Western Military District and the aggressive 
scenarios of the Russian military exercises after 2014, which envisaged the 
use of nuclear weapons against Poland, was estimated in Poland as a confir-
mation threat assessment of the Russian Federation.
The recent National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland rein-
forced the political elite’s preoccupation with Russian aggression.13 The 
strategy placed the neo-imperial policy of the Russian Federation, along 
with its willingness to use military force, as the most serious threat to 
Poland’s security. The Polish political elite sees the threat from the Russian 
Federation through the prism of its offensive military potential and activi-
ties below the threshold of a hybrid war. The perception of the actions of 
the Russian Federation as a real military threat to Poland’s security contrib-
uted to the consensus of the Polish political elite on the need to strengthen 
Poland’s defence potential in the national dimension, within NATO and in 
bilateral cooperation with the United States.
Poland is organizing territorial defence troops and acquiring anti-access 
aerial denial operational capabilities to increase the possibilities of inde-
pendent defence with these facts in mind. At the same time, it is involved in 
shaping the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance and activities aimed at 
strengthening the security of NATO’s Eastern Flank. At the same time, the 
Polish political elite considers the presence of the US military in Poland and 
in the Central and Eastern Europe as a safeguard against Russian aggression.
12 Poland’s Ministry of National Defence, The Concept of Defence of the Republic of Poland, 
(Warsaw: Ministry of Defence, 2017): 8, 21–24. 
13 President of Poland, The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, (Warsaw: 
The President of Poland, 2020): 6.
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Polish public opinion about Russia and Russians
Public opinion polls on Russia and Russians are part of regularly held polls 
on the issues of international relations, Poland’s neighbours, and current 
political events. Polls directly concerning Polish-Russian relations and Poles’ 
assessments of Russia and Russians have been conducted in Poland for the 
governmental Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, 
which was established in 2012. The issue of the perception of Russia and 
Russians also appears in surveys conducted by other social research centres 
commissioned by the media, such as television, Internet portals, and the 
press.
The Centre has published three reports on public opinion under the 
title “Poland-Russia. Social Diagnosis” in the years 2012, 2014, and 2020. 
Those reports included the results of research on the opinions of Poles 
about Russia and Russians as well as about Polish-Russian relations. The 
vast majority of Poles assess Russia’s attitude towards Poland as definitely or 
somewhat unfriendly (80 percent in 2012, 82 percent in 2014 and 79 percent 
in 2020)14.
At the same time, in 2020, 64 percent of Poles believed that Russian atti-
tudes towards Poland and Poles were friendly, after a drop in such ratings in 
2014 to 46 percent. Such a differentiation of the state and nation’s attitude 
towards Poland and Poles is observed only concerning Russia and Russians. 
Although Poles see Russians as the most distant to them in terms of cul-
ture and customs from among the seven neighbouring nations, spontane-
ous associations with the word Russian are generally positive or neutral. 
Positive associations focus on Russian Slavic identity, hospitality, and other 
similarities and cultural closeness. The first negative association is Russian 
alcohol abuse, followed immediately by political threads linking the “poor” 
Russian nation in opposition to the “bad” government. In 2020, 74 percent 
of respondents perceived Russia as an authoritarian country and only 11 
percent as a democratic one while 45 percent of respondents considered it 
an unfriendly country compared to 20 percent as a friendly one.15
Public opinion polls in Poland show a very critical assessment of Russian 
authorities and policies. Around 60 percent of respondents in 2020 were 
critical of President Putin’s activities. The term Russian foreign policy 
14 Polska–Rosja diagnoza społeczna 2020, (Warsaw: Polish – Russian Centre for Dialogue 
and Understanding, 2020): 9.
15 Ibid, 12, 16. 
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evoked negative associations with imperialism, expansion, and aggres-
sion by most respondents. Most respondents of the 2020 surveys associ-
ated Russian foreign policy with propaganda, lies, and manipulation by the 
state’s authorities. Few respondents held a positive or neutral opinion about 
Russian foreign policy, based on efforts and care of the Russian authorities 
to promote interests of their own country.
The 2020 research confirmed the inconsistencies observed in 2012 
between the will and actions of the Russian authorities and the will of “ordi-
nary Russians.” Most of the respondents to the research conducted for the 
Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding in 2020 (76 per-
cent) believed that ordinary Russians did not influence the Kremlin’s opera-
tion, and therefore cannot be blamed for the government’s foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, 39 percent of respondents felt that the majority of ordinary 
Russians who support it are also to blame for Russia’s aggressive foreign 
policy.
Public opinion in Poland is critical of individual political events related 
to Russia’s foreign policy. Most Poles consider Russia a threat to national 
security. In the Centre’s 2020 research, the sense of threat from Russia 
was the highest in the group of respondents aged 55–64 (69 percent of 
respondents), which is explained by the experience and individual histori-
cal memory of this generation of Poles. The respondents aged 18–24 were 
the smallest group of people who were afraid of being threatened by Russia 
(35 percent of respondents).16
The Centre’s research on the use of cultural and social cooperation as a 
platform for Polish-Russian understanding looks promising. As many as 85 
percent of Poles surveyed believed that such cooperation was beneficial for 
explaining to Russians their arguments and getting to know the neighbour’s 
perspective, as well as mitigating conflicts. Only 33 percent of respondents 
believed that such cooperation is possible without restrictions while 52 per-
cent of respondents indicated the need for a limited degree of cooperation 
as they feared that Russian authorities might use it to spread manipulation 
or disinformation. Only 9 percent of respondents rejected any cultural and 
social cooperation, believing that the best way to ensure Poland’s security is 
to minimise any contacts with Russia.
The results of public opinion polls for the Centre for Polish-Russian 
Dialogue and Understanding on information warfare and historical propa-
ganda carried out in April 2020 also provide good insights into Polish public 
16 Ibid, 24. 
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opinion about Russia.17 74 percent of respondents considered historical 
issues as the main reasons for the disagreements between nations. 30 per-
cent of respondents considered current matters relating to economic matters 
to be the cause of disputes, and 26 percent of respondents pointed to cur-
rent political matters. Among the political issues, 44 percent of respondents 
viewed Smolensk air crash as the most predominant political issue while 
only 8 percent pointed to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and 7 percent to 
the war in Donbas, the dispute over Crimea, foreign policy issues, and Katyń 
massacre. 
Polish public opinion is critical of Russian historical revisionism. Poles 
spontaneously indicate Russian motives as a desire to create a negative 
image of Poland and improve their image (14 percent of respondents), as 
well as to falsify history (11 percent of respondents) and to provoke ten-
sions and conflicts between nations (10 percent of respondents). Poles react 
emotionally to Russian propaganda activities, which both manipulate and 
deny historical facts. Such actions inspire the outrage of 42 percent, irrita-
tion of 35 percent, and the embarrassment of 20 percent of respondents. 
According to 43 percent of respondents, the most desirable course of action 
to respond to Russian information warfare and historical propaganda is by 
presenting the Polish point of view and by protesting and publicising the 
Kremlin’s manipulation on the international arena. Poles consider it desir-
able to coordinate such actions with other countries that fell victim to Soviet 
totalitarianism.
When assessing the perception of Russia by Polish society, one must 
notice the positive influence of Russia’s and Russians reactions or behav-
iours that are consider by Poles to be morally right and fair. The Public 
Opinion Research Centre polls conducted in March and May 2010 exam-
ined the opinions of Poles about the crime in Katyń and its importance for 
Polish-Russian relations. Poles perceived the initial actions and gestures of 
the Russian Federation authorities after the presidential plane crash near 
Smolensk as honest and reconciling18. Poles saw this as an opportunity for 
improvement in mutual relations, the possibility of explaining the Katyń 
massacre and closing the inflammatory chapter in history.
17 Wojna informacyjna i propaganda historyczna, (Warsaw: Polish  – Russian Centre for 
Dialogue and Understanding, April 2020): 9, 11, 14–15, 16.
18 Public Opinion Research Centre, “Opinia publiczna o zbrodni katyńskiej i jej znaczeniu 
dla stosunków polsko-rosyjskich, BS/67/2010”, accessed 3 November 2020. https://www.
cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_067_10.PDF
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Perspectives
The assessment of Polish-Russian relations as being in the worst state 
since the end of World War II presented by the ambassador of the Russian 
Federation to Poland in February 2020, although exaggerated, points to the 
problem of a serious deterioration of the situation in recent years. While the 
ruling circles blame this state of affairs exclusively on the Russian side and 
do not show any will to engage in dialogue with Russia, the Polish political 
elite perceives this problem in a more nuanced way.
In November 2016, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, former Polish ambas-
sador to the Russian Federation, pointed to the need to demythologise rela-
tions between Poland and Russia. She criticised simplified black-and-white 
perceptions of relations with the Russian authorities by the government 
circles, which resulted in an almost complete blockade of developing these 
relations. She called for a deliberate and balanced approach to recreating 
communication channels at the ministerial level, officials, opinion lead-
ers, society and cultural environments. She also warned against spectacular 
quarrels with Russia and pointed to the potential danger of Russia using 
bilateral relations to weaken the European Union.
Later, in 2018, Pełczyńska-Nałęcz critically assessed the Polish govern-
ment’s approach towards Russia, calling it radicalism without a policy. The 
ambassador criticised the political elite and experts for their habitual way 
of thinking about bilateral relations and blaming Russia for the situation. 
She noticed “such superiority, and at the same time, defensive perception 
of reality is very comfortable for the elites. This is because it frees you from 
the need to ask questions about the effectiveness of the actions taken, and 
thus to accept helplessness, ineptitude, and irresponsibility in relations 
with Moscow.”19 According to the ambassador “Russophobe Poland in con-
flict with Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and Ukraine is completely satisfying for 
Moscow.”20
Cooperation with Russia does not have to be equated with a cynically 
pragmatic cooperation with Putin, Pełczyńska-Nałęcz observes. Poles should 
look at the size and geographic proximity of the Russian market, which may 
be a source of beneficial cooperation. At the same time, she emphasises the 
need counter Russian interference in Poland’s internal affairs seriously. In 
19 Pełczyńska – Nałęcz Katarzyna, Polska wobec Rosji. Radykalizm bez polityki, (Warsaw: 
Fundacja Batorego, 2010): 8.
20 Ibid, 11.
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particular, Poland should counteract information aggression, protecting 
electoral processes and building credibility in international cooperation in 
the process.
According to the ambassador, Poland should start to treat its biggest 
neighbour and primary opponent seriously. A real policy is needed that 
would protect the interests of Poland and would act as an adequate answer 
to the threats in line with the strategies of the European Union and NATO 
towards Russia. As Pełczyńska-Nałęcz concludes, “Our hostility harms 
Russia very little; on the contrary, it is often convenient in its present form. 
Moscow does not need a pro-Russian turn of Warsaw at all. Poland, with 
hostile slogans on its lips, fulfils almost all the wishes of the Kremlin.”21
The Conference of Polish Ambassadors has recognised the need for 
changing Poland’s approach to Russia. In September 2019, they published a 
report on Poland’s Eastern policy. The ambassadors criticised the anti-Rus-
sian rhetoric of the authorities and opposition groups, which did not trans-
late into real political and economic activities. The current policy towards 
Russia is perceived as “dreamed up by Kremlin strategists,” and the harsh 
rhetoric of a significant part of the Polish political elite becomes a justifica-
tion for real retaliation from Russia.
Russia can build an image of Poland as a genetically Russophobe country 
in the international arena, and the lack of real contacts between societies 
effectively protects Russia from being infected with freedom and democratic 
ideas flowing from Poland. The ambassadors argued, “Polish-Russian rela-
tions do not exist, and the tools for rebuilding them have been largely dam-
aged, destroyed or taken over by other political players. What is more, it was 
possible to build an atmosphere in Poland in which dialogue with Russia 
will be complicated.”22 They recommended a clear message from the Polish 
government that the policy disputes are aimed at the Russian government 
and not at Russian society.
Former Polish ambassadors advocated a rebuilding of contacts with the 
Russian elites of the older generation and dialogue with the rulers, the mod-
erate opposition intelligentsia, and the young generation of Russian elites 
in addition to an intensification of relations with the Russian democratic 
21 Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, “Stosunki Polska-Rosja: obalamy 7 mitów,” Polityka, 
November 1, 2016, accessed October 31, 2020, https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/
swiat/1681052,1,stosunki-polska-rosja-obalamy-7-mitow.read.
22 Marek Jerzy Nowakowski, Jacek Kluczkowski, Bogumił Luft, Agnieszka Madziak-
Miszewska. Polityka Wschodnia Polski. Raport, (Warszawa: Konferencja Ambasadorów 
RP, 2019): 8.
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emigration in Europe. They called for the creation of a long-term program 
of contacts with the younger generation of Russians to build trust and sup-
port mutual cultural exchange.
Numerous Polish scientists and specialists dealing with Polish-Russian 
relations voice their concerns about the status quo and call for a change in 
the attitude toward Russia. In his book “Poland’s Sickness – Russia,” pub-
lished in 2016, the Polish philosopher and historian of ideas, Bronisław 
Łagowski argues for accounting for realities in relations with Russia and not 
relying on myths about Russia and its importance in contemporary Europe. 
He warns against Russophobia, which he sees as an irrational prejudice, full 
of fear and blind hostility, which makes it difficult to adapt politics to chang-
ing external and internal conditions.23 At the same time, Łagowski accepts 
an anti-Russian policy, which should include an element of rational calcula-
tion, correct or incorrect, depending on the intellectual calculations of the 
rulers.
In the 2019 monograph “On Russia differently,” recognised Polish histo-
rian of ideas and philosopher Andrzej Walicki argues that Poland’s relations 
with Russia can be good. In his opinion, this is possible due to the lack of 
border disputes, problems with national minorities, and favourable condi-
tions for the development of beneficial economic and even political coop-
eration. Walicki notes, however, that for this to happen, Poles should stop 
seeing Russia as an unchanging historical enemy and themselves as defend-
ers of Europe against this Russian threat. He encourages the possibility of 
treating Russia as a reserve power of Europe and Poland’s role in the process 
of building relations between the European Union and Russia.24 Although it 
is difficult to imagine this in the present situation, it is difficult to deny the 
rationality of such a view in the long-term.
In regards to the future of Polish-Russian relations, it is good to recall the 
views of the late Professor Michał Dobroczyński. He argued that there exists 
a genuine desire in the younger generations in both countries to engage in 
various kinds of constructive contacts with as many representatives as pos-
sible. This development would be of fundamental importance for the future 
of Polish-Russian relations. Although it will be a long process, it will allow 
for a broad understanding and deepening of rapprochement between the 
two nations. Professor Tymanowski observed in 2020 that the process of 
23 Bronisław Łagowski, Polska chora na Rosję, (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Fundacja Oratio 
Recta, 2016), 75.
24 Andrzej Walicki, “O Rosji inaczej”, (Warszawa: Fundacja Oratio Recta, 2019): 109.
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reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations requires systematic dialogue, which 
should reduce the distances between both groups, create friendly attitudes, 
set directions for the future, and agree on principles. Tymanowski hopes that 
“sooner or later (it would be better, of course, sooner), a dialogue will take 
place, which is in the interest of both countries. Because both Russia and 
Poland want to have stable and predictable neighbours at their borders.”25
Conclusions
The perception of Russia and Russians in Poland relies on deeply histori-
cal and cultural preconceptions, reinforced by current political, military, 
economic and social events. The historical policy of both countries, used 
instrumentally in current politics, has a serious impact on mutual rela-
tions. Polish political elites and society are critical of Russian historical revi-
sionism. Poles are concerned about the aggressive actions of the Russian 
Federation towards its neighbours, especially the threats or use of military 
force. Currently, the political elite considers Russia the most serious threat 
to Poland’s security, and this perception shapes national strategies and 
actions taken in the sphere of security and defence as well as public opin-
ion in Poland. In recent years, limiting contacts and freezing relations have 
become a substitute for a rational policy towards the Russian Federation. 
Public opinion shares most of the elite fears and assessments in relation to 
the authorities and the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.
However, Poles see Russia as a country and Russians as a people in sepa-
rate ways. The criticism toward Russian authorities’ actions does not trans-
late into hostility towards Russian society. Poles do not blame “ordinary” 
Russians for the aggressive policy of their government. They understand 
the “Russian soul,” value Russian hospitality, and appreciate other similari-
ties and cultural closeness. A noticeable part of the Polish political elite see 
the need to move away from irrational hostility and frozen relations with 
Russia. Postulates of realistic, rational calculations in mutual relations are 
voiced more and more frequently in the public debate. Former diplomats 
advocate dialogue with the Russian elites, actions within the framework of 
public diplomacy, and continuation of economic contacts. Therefore, a more 
balanced and nuanced policy toward Russia may be of pragmatic benefit 
not only to Poland, but also to entire Central and Eastern European region.
25 Józef Tymanowski, “Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie i perspektywy ich zmiany,” 23.
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However; the lack of contacts with Russian society in recent years and 
Poland’s integration with the West will reduce the interest of the younger 
generations of Poles in Russia. Such a state of affairs is unlikely to improve 
the perception of Russia and Russians in Poland in the short term. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Poles are aware of the cultural and economic 
potential for the development of cooperation, dialogue, and reconciliation 
between societies and states. Despite the poor status of relations now, there 
is a conviction among the Polish political elite and Polish society that there 
is both the need and the opportunity of improving Polish-Russian relations 
in the future.
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NATO Adaptation and Baltic Security
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Abstract 
This article explores the emergence of transatlantic security cooperation 
from a historical perspective. Even though it was not possible to address the 
Baltic security challenges during the Cold War due to the Soviet occupation 
and presence of the Warsaw Pact, adjustments to the transatlantic structures 
have always delivered their necessary future benefits. This article explores 
the four stages of NATO transformation by explaining how the alliance has 
adapted to emerging and already existing security challenges. Since the 2004 
enlargement, the Baltic States now can actively contribute to addressing the 
emerging geopolitical and technological challenges all allies face to remain 
the “strategic anchor in uncertain times.” In conclusion of the article, the 
author provides seven recommendations for enhancements, cooperation, 
and adaptation to new tasks for NATO.
Key words: Adaptation, cohesion, dual track, Russia, emerging challenges
As NATO nears its 72nd anniversary, it remains history’s most successful 
alliance because it has consistently adapted to the changing security envi-
ronment. In general, those historical adaptations have benefited the security 
of the Baltic States. NATO is now in the midst of another adaptation. Several 
steps have already been taken since 2014 to strengthen NATO’s military 
capabilities, and the recent NATO Reflection Group’s report offers several 
important recommendations for strengthening NATO’s political cohesion.
The new Biden Administration will seek to reassure its transatlantic allies 
that the United States remains a strong ally that is willing to lead. These 
positive trends will come together during the coming year in the form of a 
renewed NATO strategic concept. If carried out properly, this process can 
make NATO more coherent politically, more capable militarily, more resil-
ient as a society, more comprehensive in scope, more global politically, and 
more equitable in sharing the burden. An adapted NATO should provide 
even greater security for the Baltic States.
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Four Phases of the NATO Alliance
To understand NATO’s future, one must first understand NATO’s past. 
One can think of the Alliance as having transitioned through four different 
phases in the past seven decades, each of which took place in a different 
international system. Each of those international systems presented differ-
ent challenges, threats, and opportunities. The Alliance used varying strate-
gic concepts to adjust both militarily and politically so that it could remain 
relevant to the changing strategic environment. NATO summits generally 
served as pivot points for the adaptation process.
The first phase of NATO, call it NATO 1.0, was the Cold War (1949 to 
1989). NATO during its early years had to adjust to several events such as 
German membership and the Suez Crisis. The 1956 “Three Wise Men” 
report suggested ways to strengthen Alliance political consultation and to 
extend that consultation into non-military fields. But major military and 
political adjustments during this phase came in 1967 with the Harmel 
Report. The United States under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 
sought to shift NATO’s nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to the more 
credible flexible response. 
Some in Europe interpreted that as a willingness to fighting nuclear war 
on their soil. In 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s military command 
structure. The Harmel Report struck a balance by connecting deterrence 
and defence with detente and arms control. That balance was tested a decade 
later by the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, and the test was met in December 
1979 with the NATO dual track decision: to deploy INF range missiles in 
Europe while negotiating for their subsequent removal. Despite large pro-
tests in Europe,1 cruise and Pershing missiles were deployed, resulting in 
the 1987 INF treaty and global removal of an entire class of delivery sys-
tems. That led to greater Western detente with the Soviet Union. This com-
bination, alongside a collapsing Soviet economy, both forced and enabled 
Gorbachev to proceed with his reforms. The Baltic States were safer and 
about to get their freedom.
NATO 2.0 spanned the decade from 1989 to 2001, sometimes called the 
post-Cold War period. This was the unipolar moment in which democracy 
seemed destined to prevail across the globe. Some asked if NATO was still 
needed. NATO summits in London and Rome answered “yes” and began to 
1 Two reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: NATO Today: The Alliance in 
Evolution, April 1982; Post-Deployment Nuclear Arms Control in Europe, February 1984. 
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transform the alliance with a renewed focus on Central and Eastern Europe. 
Two issues of adaptation dominated this period, both in this geographical 
area. One was primarily political, the other military. 
First, political discussions on the prospect of NATO enlargement began 
as early as 1991.2 Objections were raised by those who feared that this 
move would alienate Russia, and it took most of the decade – until the 1999 
Washington summit – to welcome Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
in the first stage of enlargement. To deal with Russia, the Alliance had cre-
ated the NATO-Russia Council at the Paris summit in 1997. 
Second, NATO’s delayed reaction in dealing militarily with the breakup 
of Yugoslavia caused Senator Richard Lugar to tell NATO that it would have 
to operate out of area or go out of business. By the end of the decade, NATO 
had fought two wars in the Balkans and deployed stabilization operations 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. A Baltic Battalion was created that participated in 
Balkan peacekeeping operations. Baltic State security was again better off 
as a result since peace had been enforced by NATO, the Baltic States dem-
onstrated their ability to be a producer of security, and the door had been 
opened to further enlargement. 
NATO 3.0 (2001 to 2014) began on September 11, 2001 when the twin 
towers and the Pentagon were attacked. The Global War on Terror was the 
dominant theme of this international system. NATO began to speak in 
terms of “360 degrees” of defence effort. Again, the adaptation had political 
and military elements. NATO for the first time declared that the common 
defence clause (Article 5) had been triggered. NATO allies volunteered 
to support US efforts to drive Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. They are still 
deployed there. But George W. Bush’s unwise decision to invade Iraq caused 
deep transatlantic divisions. This focus on the Middle East distracted NATO 
efforts to strengthen deterrence in Europe. 
Militarily, America had transformed the way the US fights using pre-
cise battlefield intelligence, stealth aircraft, rapid command and control, 
and precision strike. Early European participation in Afghanistan high-
lighted the fact that European militaries had not transformed in a similar 
way and were thus unable to fight alongside the United States. The focus 
turned to transforming European militaries. The 2002 Prague summit both 
spurred military transformation with the creation of the NATO Response 
2 “NATO Can’t Be Vague About Commitment to Eastern Europe,” International Herald 
Tribune (IHT), 8 November 1991.
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Force3 and invited seven additional countries to join the alliance, including 
the three Baltic States. Those nations formally joined NATO at the 2004 
Istanbul summit. During this period, NATO militaries concentrated on 
counter-insurgency operations and civil-military cooperation (called the 
comprehensive approach)4 rather than preparing to deter high intensity 
conflict with a peer adversary. The 2006 Riga summit continued the mili-
tary transformation and political enlargement process. The latter hit a speed 
bump when membership for Ukraine and Georgia was discussed at the 2008 
Bucharest summit. 
Politically, the 2010 Lisbon summit featured a new strategic concept 
based on the recommendations made by a Group of Experts headed by 
Madeleine Albright.5 That concept predated the subsequent Russian inva-
sion of Ukraine, but it did anticipate a more complex strategic environment. 
The 2010 strategic concept defined three core tasks for the alliance: col-
lective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Those tasks 
expanded NATO’s traditional concentration on collective defence and 
provided adequate flexibility for NATO to operate in that more complex 
environment.
NATO 4.0, the current phase of the Alliance, began as Russian President 
Vladimir Putin took more assertive military action against Georgia and 
Ukraine in part in response to the Bucharest summit. The precise start of 
this phase might be dated to the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The 2014 
Wales summit again pivoted the alliance in a new direction. Politically, it 
clarified NATO’s views on Russia’s aggressive policies and set in motion a 
series of subsequent military steps designed to enhance NATO’s deterrent 
posture, with a focus on the Baltic States.6 
That new deterrent posture took shape over the next five years and 
was based on modest forward deployed forces, a robust civil-military total 
defence, and the ability to forward deploy reserve forces rapidly. NATO for-
ward deployed a battle group into each of the three Baltic States and Poland, 
created a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, upgraded the NATO 
3 “A European Spearhead Force Would Bridge the Gap,” IHT, 16 February 2002.
4 “From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability,” NATO Review Online, 
18 April 2008.
5 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of 
the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, NATO Public Diplomacy 
Division, 17 May 2010.
6 “Deterring Putin’s Russia”, in Transatlantic Relations in a Changing European Security 
Environment, edited by Robert Kupiecki and Andrew Michta, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2015, 21–29.
55NATO Adaptation and Baltic Security
Response Force, created a new set of mobility commands, and agreed to 
robust Readiness7 and Mobility Initiatives. The United States further funded 
a European Deterrence Initiative and forward deployed rotational brigade 
combat teams into Poland. But as military adaptation succeeded, NATO’s 
political fabric was badly frayed by President Trump’s erratic and undiplo-
matic policies toward his transatlantic partners.
NATO Adaptation and the New Strategic Concept 
The November 2020 NATO Reflection Group report calls the alliance a 
“strategic anchor in uncertain times” and includes 14 main findings. The 
focus is on strengthening the damaged political side of the Alliance. Some 
of the more prominent findings are: 8
• First, maintaining political cohesion and unity must be an unambiguous 
priority for all Allies. 
• Second, NATO should continue the dual-track approach of deter-
rence and dialogue with Russia while revitalizing its nuclear-sharing 
arrangements.
• Third, NATO must devote much more time, political resources, and 
action to the security challenges posed by China. 
• Fourth, terrorism poses one of the immediate, asymmetric threats to 
Allied nations and citizens. 
• Fifth, climate change will continue to shape NATO’s security environ -
ment. 
• Sixth, NATO should better utilizing its relationship with the EU and 
other partners. 
• Seventh, NATO must be diligent in ensuring that it remains capable of 
reaching and implementing decisions in a timely fashion. 
In order to deal with these and other findings, the Alliance will need to use 
the renewed strategic concept to be more effective in several areas9 that will 
have positive consequences for Baltic security. As in the past, this will again 
require both political and military adaptation. To meet these challenges, the 
Alliance needs to: 
(a) Be more coherent politically. Deep divides have emerged among 
7 “NATO Must Adopt Readiness Initiative to Deter Russia,” Atlantic Council, 2 July 2018.
8 “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” NATO Secretary General, 25 November 2020, 12–
15.
9 “Four factors to consider in keeping NATO relevant,” Defense News, November 24, 2020.
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NATO members during the past decade. Transatlantic confidence was 
shaken by the Trump Administration.10 Perspectives on the Russian threat 
differ markedly in the East and South of Europe. China is seen as a partner 
by some and an adversary by others. Terrorism has hit some countries much 
harder than others. Several NATO nations have become more autocratic and 
less free. Economic differences in Europe divide the North and South. Brexit 
has weakened the EU. This has created a lack of political cohesion that was 
the focus of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s Reflection Group 
initiative. A new American President will help regain some of this cohesion 
but the varying fissures run deep. The place to start in the new Strategic 
Concept will be to articulate a common statement of Alliance values, a 
common threat assessment, and a code of conduct focusing on democratic 
principles.
(b) Be more effective at conventional deterrence. The steps taken during 
the past five years to assure the security of the Baltic States have been 
positive. Russia would be taking a massive security risk should it decide 
to pursue any kind of military adventure in Eastern Europe. But NATO 
Readiness and Mobility Initiatives are key to sustaining conventional deter-
rence and budgets supporting them may suffer as post-COVID defence 
resources are reduced. Those two initiatives need to be given high priority. 
In addition, United States force posture is also key to deterring Russia. The 
US now periodically rotates a brigade though the Baltic States, but a more 
persistent presence there would be much more effective. A US brigade is 
now deployed on a full time heel-to-toe rotational basis in Poland.11 The 
same should be done for the Baltic States with deployments spread among 
the three countries. 
(c) Be more precise at nuclear deterrence. The demise of the INF treaty 
has created a potential imbalance in non-nuclear deployments that could 
tempt Moscow to engage in riskier behaviour.12 Russia is now in a position 
to deploy intermediate range missiles targeted at Europe while European 
Allies are unlikely to agree to any additional ground based nuclear mis-
siles on the continent. Worse, Russia has articulated a nuclear doctrine that 
amounts to first use, while NATO has no public nuclear use doctrine at 
all. Unlike the 1980s, new US ground-based nuclear deployments are not 
10 “The folly of a NATO troop withdrawal decision,” Defense News, June 9, 2020.
11 “Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the US Military Presence in North Central 
Europe,” Atlantic Council Task Force Report, 13 December 2018.
12 “Trump’s decision to end nuclear treaty will strengthen Putin,” San Francisco Chronicle, 
22 October 2018.
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necessary, but NATO does need to strengthen its nuclear posture. The dual 
capable aircraft owned by various European nations need to remain modern 
and NATO needs to design a nuclear doctrine which will clarify for Moscow 
that any first use of a nuclear weapon against NATO will result is a sym-
metrical response.13
(d) Be a more resilient society in fighting hybrid war. Russia engages in 
ongoing hybrid war against much of NATO. It seeks divisions in societies 
and then uses social media and other techniques to amplify those schisms. 
The Baltic States and NATO units deployed there are often targeted. NATO 
and the Baltic States have taken several steps to counter Moscow’s efforts 
at malign influence and coercion. These include total defence concepts, a 
heightened sense of the need for reliance, NATO Centres of Excellence in 
each Baltic State that focus on elements of hybrid war, and NATO counter-
hybrid assistance teams. NATO might next consider ways to deter these 
ongoing hybrid attacks by making clear to Moscow that NATO will retaliate 
if they continue. 
(e) Be more comprehensive in scope. To remain relevant to all generations 
in the transatlantic space, NATO will need to broaden its scope to include 
issues like managing pandemics, global warming, and uncontrolled immi-
gration. NATO has already played a visible role in the COVID crisis but 
needs to think forward to see how its’ technical, organizational, and logis-
tic skills can help alleviate future pandemics. Similarly, NATO navies have 
played key roles in dealing with cross-Mediterranean immigration, but as 
this crisis will likely continue, NATO’s “rules of engagement” for handling 
refugees will need to be refined. Global warming too may have a profound 
impact on broader security interests if ice melts impact crowded coastlines. 
NATO should develop contingency plans defining its role in each of these 
three areas.
(f) Be more global in outlook.14 NATO has already begun to consider its 
global role. It is increasingly hard to distinguish global issues from issues 
that have a direct impact on European security. For example, NATO has 
noted that China is “coming to Europe.” China is challenging NATO inter-
ests and values in many areas, including abuse of human rights, challenges 
to democratic governance, ownership of critical infrastructure, control of 
technology and technology standards, predatory economic practices, use of 
13 “Decisive Response: A New Nuclear Strategy for NATO,” Survival, Volume 61, Number 
5, October-November 2019, 113–128.
14 “NATO needs a new core task,” Defense News, 22 July 2020. 
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coercive diplomacy, defence cooperation with Russia, and use of the global 
commons. Europe has this past year awoken to the realities of a Chinese 
challenge. A new and more cooperative transatlantic approach to China is 
likely to be developed by the Biden administration. While Chinese challenges 
extend well beyond NATO’s remit, NATO will nonetheless need to define the 
critical role it can play in meeting these global challenges. In doing so, NATO 
will need to reach out much more effectively to Asian partners.15 
(g) Be more assured in decision making. NATO’s lack of cohesion, dis-
cussed above, has given rise to the concern that in time of crisis, NATO 
might be deadlocked and unable to act in a concerted fashion. Consensus 
decision making is hard wired into the alliance and probably cannot be 
changed for most issues. But single country vetoes have frustrated NATO poli-
cies. If such a political deadlock occurred in time of military crisis, such as an 
attack on the Baltic States, then a coalition of willing partners would prob-
ably respond quickly under Article 5 while NATO decides what to do. But the 
response would not benefit from all of NATO’s assets. So, the United States 
has sought to build in time limits for decisions that would escalate them to 
the ministerial level quickly. This process might be assisted with the latest on 
line meeting technology.16 Some combination of constraints on single country 
vetoes and time limits on decisions in crisis would strengthen the Alliance.
(h) Be more equitable in sharing the burden. Burden sharing has been a 
perennial issue in the Alliance.17 The 2 percent of GDP defence spending 
goal was agreed to by all during the Obama Administration. Progress has 
been made toward that goal, though not enough. Now, a new reality needs 
to be considered by the Alliance. As China’s military power grows to rival 
that of the United States in Asia, NATO must contend with the fact that a 
major power conflict in Asia involving the United States would have a pro-
found impact on Europe, much more than is generally perceived. US troops 
would be shifted to the Asian theatre, making Europe much more vulnerable 
to Russian aggression. In addition, a US war with China would inevitably 
draw European nations into the conflict economically and politically, if not 
militarily. So, Europe has a greater than ever interest in being able to defend 
itself should there be less than expected American support. It needs to plan 
for that eventuality.18
15 “Capitalizing on transatlantic concerns about China,” Atlantic Council, 24 August 2020.
16 “NATO should always work from home,” Defense One, 10 April 2020.
17 “What NATO’s burden-sharing history teaches us,” Defense News, 9 July 2018. 
18 “NATO needs a European level of ambition,” Defense News, 7 December 2018.
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(i) Be more creative in using the NATO-Russia Council. During the past 
half-decade, “business as usual” with Russia has broken down. Each month 
seems to bring another Russian action that makes any degree of coopera-
tion more difficult. The latest have been the poisoning of Alexei Navalny 
and massive Russian cyber-attacks on various US government and business 
computer systems. Another “reset” by the Biden Administration is unlikely 
unless Russia changes its practices. Any yet there remain areas of potential 
cooperation in the security field where common interests exist. They would 
include some arms control measures, agreement on rules of the road for 
military exercises, and incident management procedures. The NATO-Russia 
Council might be used to explore more effective ways to manage military 
incidents and avoid unwanted escalation with Russia.
Conclusion
The Baltic States have a high stake in the success of NATO’s adaptation pro-
cess. Adaptation has served them well historically during four phases of the 
Alliance’s history. Current adaptation must be comprehensive because the 
global strategic environment is increasingly complex and dangerous. But 
history also indicates that the Alliance is up to the task. New leadership in 
the United States will bring positive change. Europe too will need to share 
a more co-equal burden in all elements of the Alliance. This new burden-
sharing requirement should include enhancing Europe’s traditional military 
capabilities, but it should also extend to the new tasks of countering hybrid 
or grey area attacks. The Baltic States are well situated to contribute signifi-
cantly to this latter mission.
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The Baltic States, Poland, and the Protests in Belarus: 
the Case for the Unconditional Love?
Dr. Dovilė Jakniūnaitė  Dovilė JAKNIŪNAITĖ
Abstract 
The dubious August 2020 election results in Belarus have caused interna-
tional condemnation and domestic unrest in Minsk. The anti-Lukashenko 
protests in the capital of Belarus were met with militarized repression, incar-
ceration of the opposition leaders, and exile for opposition leaders such as 
Sviatlana Tsihanouskaya. In this shifting paradigm, the Baltic States and 
Poland have played a crucial role. First, they have reinforced the democratic 
opposition by hosting and accepting them in their countries in order to alle-
viate the humanitarian impact of the government suppression of protests. 
Second, the Baltic States and Poland have assisted by leading debates about 
the necessary steps to stop violence and promote democratic transition in 
the neighbouring Belarus. This paper explains the reasons for the Baltic 
States and Poland to support the democratic transition in Belarus by leading 
debates on sanctions and policies in Europe and the region, concluding that 
this advocacy has been critical for the opposition, prefiguring any concrete 
policy from the EU. 
Key words: Belarus, anti-government protests, Lukashenko, Tsihanouskaya, 
democratic transition
Introduction
The scale and the duration of the Belarusian anti-government that began 
on 10 August after dubious election results surprised many observers – and 
likely most Belarusian people themselves. In this unexpected situation, 
what was not surprising was the quick support and admiration that pro-
testers received from the three Baltic States and Poland, both from their 
populations at large and at the official level. For years, they had declared 
the democratization process in Eastern neighbourhood of the EU as a for-
eign policy priority, and they had stayed consistent despite making some 
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concessions towards Belarusian regime from time to time over the years. 
This process involved activities such as engaging with the Belarusian author-
ities, suspending sanctions despite information about human rights viola-
tions and suppression of the political opposition, or believing Lukashenko’s 
criticism towards Russia. 
Support of these protests was the continuation of long-term rhetorical 
backing for the democratic opposition in Belarus. However, such rhetoric 
has become problematic by gradually gaining inertia through the ritualistic 
expression of criticism against the Belarusian authorities on various human 
rights violations towards its political opponents. It seemed that that the 
presidential elections in the summer of 2020 would result in a predictable 
outcome, Lukashenko’s victory, which again would be followed by criticism 
from outside observers and Western governments. 
However, the unexpected happened. By allowing Sviatlana Tsihanous-
kaya to run in the presidential elections, Alexander Lukashenko unwillingly 
allowed part of Belarusian society to see an alternative view of the future. 
Then, many vote-counting irregularities were revealed, and this gave the 
people a reason to go to the streets. Moreover, by authorising the usage of 
force against his citizens, Belarus authorities provided for those protests 
to persist. All of this allowed the countries in Belarus neighbourhood – 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland – to reaffirm their interest in the 
country and sparked hopes about the regime change in Belarus. 
Even though at the beginning of 2021 the protests have waned, political 
instability is still lasting. It is already feasible to reflect upon and review the 
efforts and justifications by these four countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland – in supporting the 2020 Belarusian protest movement. First, 
I will review the reactions and support Belarus received from these states, 
and then, I examine the reasons and rationale for such policies, concluding 
with discussion on major findings and the remaining policy challenges and 
perspectives for Belarus.
Support for the Democratic Protests in Belarus
Almost immediately after the first protests on the duplicity of the official 
election results, all four states expressed their shared concerns over the 
transparency of the August elections and condemned violence against 
peaceful protesters. For example, on 13 August, the prime ministers of 
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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania made a joint statement calling Belarus to con-
duct new, “free and fair” elections in front of international observers, which 
would be more transparent. The statement also urged the EU to consider 
sanctions on those responsible for the violence and rigging of the elections.1 
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki expressed adamant support and 
called for the EU to take further action by hosting a special Belarus summit, 
although without ever clarifying its potential content.2 The leaders of these 
countries continued to use a similar lexicon of support and criticism for the 
Belarusian authorities many times in a variety of formats in the subsequent 
months. 
In their backing of a coordinated EU sanction policy, these states also 
stayed consistent in their demands, and the Baltic States were quick to adopt 
their own policy in the form of independent sanctions regime. They dem-
onstrated impatience with the EU’s indecisively slow approach to respond 
to the gruesome events in Minsk. On 31 August, they imposed travel bans 
on Lukashenko and 29 other regime officials who are suspected to have con-
tributed to the dubious election results and to the orchestration of violence 
against protesters.3 The inclusion of Lukashenko was symbolic, as other EU 
states were particularly reluctant even to consider sanctions against him 
personally. Poland said it considered unilateral sanctions, but in the end, it 
waited for formulation of a common EU stance. 
A variety of other symbolic support activities were organised as well. 
One of the prominent early events was organised on 23 August in Lithuania 
called the Freedom Way. On that day, a human chain stretching more than 
30 kilometres from the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius, to the border with 
Belarus was formed.4 The chosen date was not accidental; on 23 August 
1989, two million people in the three Baltic States formed the Baltic Way to 
peacefully protest the communist rule that had lasted since the signing of 
1 RFE/RL, ‘Baltic States Urge New Election In Belarus, Call For EU Sanctions’, 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 15 August 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/baltic-states-
urge-new-election-in-belarus-call-for-eu-sanctions/30785103.html.
2 Joanna Plucinska and Kacper Pempel, ‘Poland Offers New Support for Belarus Civil 
Society, Media’, Reuters, 14 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-
election-poland-idUSKCN25A0X3.
3 Andrius Sytas, ‘Baltic States Impose Sanctions on Lukashenko and Other Belarus 
Officials’, Reuters, 31 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-
sanctions-idUSKBN25R0Z7.
4 RFE/RL, ‘Lithuanians Form “Freedom Way” Human Chain In Solidarity With Belarus 
Opposition’, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 23 August 2020, https://www.rferl.org/ 
a/30798715.html.
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the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This event affirmed the symbolic connection 
between the past fight for the independence in the Baltic States then and the 
present struggle of the Belarus people. Various rallies of support were organ-
ized in Latvia and Estonia as well.
A series of public events entitled “Solidarity with Belarus” were organised 
by the Polish government as well. One landmark event was a huge concert 
in the national football stadium.5 At the end of the year, the annual Freedom 
Prize by the Parliament of Lithuania was dedicated to Belarusian opposi-
tion. Overall, it is possible to firmly state that the majority of the population 
agreed with their government’s decision to stand on the side of the protest-
ers. In general, public support in all four countries relied often on the his-
torical analogy between their struggles and projected their understanding 
about the importance of freedom.
Lithuania and Poland also became host countries for many Belarusians 
who had left their home country. Among them were prominent opposition 
and business figures. In Vilnius, Lithuania hosts the Belarusian opposition 
leader and the presidential candidate Tsihanouskaya, who was forces to flee 
Belarus alongside her team. Veronika Tsepkalo, another opposition figure, 
found her new home in Poland, with several others as well. Polish govern-
ment also provided a villa in one of the districts of Warsaw for the use of 
the Belarusian opposition.6 With more than 1.5 million subscribers as of 
end of 2020, one of the most popular information sources in early months 
of the protest, the Nexta Live Telegram channel, has been broadcasting from 
Warsaw. The location in Warsaw was coincidental, without any official 
Polish assistance; nevertheless, it also has contributed to the growing idea 
of full Polish support (and another reason for Lukashenko to believe in an 
external conspiracy against him).
The support that the Baltic States and Poland have provided was not 
only symbolic. The countries initiated the variety of projects to assist the 
people who suffered violence and were willing or forced to leave Belarus. 
Polish hospitals began to treat Belarusian activists who have been injured 
or tortured by the authorities in Minsk. In addition, to alleviate restric-
tions on movement, these countries loosened their visa requirements and 
fast-tracked immigration procedures. They also promised tax breaks for 
5 Christian Davies, ‘Poland Takes a Back-Seat Role in Belarus Standoff ’, Financial Times, 18 
September 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/e851f4b2-819a-46ca-a443-e5078dbb66c0.
6 Adam Easton, ‘Belarus Protests: Why Poland Is Backing the Opposition’, BBC News, 9 
September 2020, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54090389.
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companies that moved from Belarus to the Baltic States or Poland. Poland 
ensured a 24-hour hotline and Polish language classes for children. Poland 
also provided funding for the start-ups.7 Furthermore, it promised to allo-
cate around 50 million zloty (11 million euros) as a part of the new support 
programme for repressed academics in Belarus.8 In August, Latvia allocated 
€150,000 EUR for legal and medical counselling and other practical assis-
tance to detained protesters who suffered from the physical abuse. Lithuania 
launched a web page for IT specialists seeking employment, and is help-
ing Belarusian companies to open bank accounts, obtain visas, and find 
office space. Belarusian IT sector seemed especially desirable, as in 2019, it 
accounted for 5 percent of the Belarus exports. The neighbouring countries 
(including Ukraine) saw the opportunity to recruit talent, and, one can say, 
to exploit the unfortunate Belarusian situation for their own advantage. For 
example, as of October, Latvia said that 12 Belarus companies had decided 
to move there, but Lithuania’s investment agency informed it has been har-
boured over 85 companies.9 
These activities did not go unnoticed in Minsk. Lukashenko accused 
Poland and Lithuania (and Ukraine, and the Czech Republic) of meddling 
in Belarus’s domestic affairs, organising protests, and wanting to overthrow 
his government.10 He threatened Lithuania with sanctions but did not make 
good on his promise. Nevertheless, Belarus demanded the reduction of dip-
lomatic staff residing in Belarus from Lithuania and Poland and charac-
terized the Lithuanian and Polish diplomatic activities as “unambiguously 
destructive.” Moreover, he recalled its own ambassadors from Riga, Vilnius, 
and Warsaw.11 
Reacting to this pressure, Lithuania and Poland also recalled their 
ambassadors from Belarus. A couple of days later, Estonia, Latvia and sev-
eral other countries followed the same path in solidarity. Finally, at the end 
7 Andrius Sytas, Ilya Zhegulev, and Margaryta Chornokondratenko, ‘With Warm Words 
and Fast Visas, Neighbours Woo IT Workers Fleeing Belarus’, Reuters, 1 October 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-election-tech-idUSKBN26M5FJ.
8 Reuters Staff, ‘Poland Says It Will Support Belarus Civil Society, Media’, Reuters, 
14 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-election-poland-society-
idUSW8N2CW01L.
9 Sytas, Zhegulev, and Chornokondratenko, ‘With Warm Words and Fast Visas, Neighbours 
Woo IT Workers Fleeing Belarus’.
10 Tut.by, ‘Лукашенко рассказал, что у Беларуси «хотят отсечь Гродненскую область»‘, 
TUT.BY, 21 August 2020, https://news.tut.by/economics/697579.html.
11 TASS, ‘Belarusian Foreign Ministry Says Lithuania, Poland Have Reduce Diplomatic 
Staff in Minsk’, TASS, 3 October 2020, https://tass.com/world/1208203.
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of December 2020, Belarus closed all of its state borders for its citizens 
except the one that it shares with Russia citing the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In any case, most of the measures taken by the Belarusian authorities dem-
onstrated a show of strength and to find and external scapegoat for unrest 
at home. These measures also have displayed the possibility of a complete 
break of all diplomatic and political relations with Belarus and the Baltic 
States and Poland. 
Reasons for Supporting Protests and Backing the Opposition
There is a variety of explanations for the approach that the three Baltic States 
and Poland have taken towards the post-election events in Belarus. One of 
the most obvious answers regarding the huge interest into the processes in 
Belarus – all countries other than Estonia share a border with Belarus, and 
Estonia is still in proximity and holds a similar foreign policy towards the 
region as Lithuania and Latvia do. Another general explanation, at least for 
Poland and Lithuania, is historical. Their territories once belonged to the 
same state – either Grand Duchy of Lithuania, or later Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Therefore, there are several historical events and figures 
that are shared among Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Poles. For some in each 
country, this historical context creates some sense of togetherness and a jus-
tification for helping their historic relatives. Crucial in this paradigm is that 
Lithuania and its policies act as an essential ligature that ties Estonia and 
Latvia to Poland in a common approach toward Belarus. 
However, these ideas and broader historical analogies provide only gen-
eral, abstract reasons for this attention but do not necessarily explain the 
political choices and actions made by the Baltic States and Poland. One 
major reason can be used when explaining this common position – Russia 
and its role in Belarus. Many studies have been written about Belarus’s mul-
tifaceted dependence on Russia.12 It includes the existence of Union State 
of Russia and Belarus with the constant possibility of deeper integration 
and less sovereignty for Belarus, and energy and economic dependence as 
a political advantage over Minsk – with political and even military-security 
repercussions if Belarus were to diverge from its planned course. 
12 For example, Anaïs Marin, ‘Under Pressure: Can Belarus Resist Russian Coercion?,’ 
Brief (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 7 July 2020), https://www.iss.
europa.eu/content/under-pressure-can-belarus-resist-russian-coercion.
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Keeping in mind the constant fear and mistrust of Russia by the Baltic 
States and Poland, the hypothetical situation of Belarus just another Russian 
Oblast’ does not provide any sense of security in the Baltic Sea Region.13 
During his long political presidential career, Lukashenko has made a variety 
of intelligent moves in trying to balance Russia’s influence, sometimes dis-
tancing more from Russia and coming closer to the EU, hinting at a more a 
pro-European orientation (and implicitly, a more democratic and anti-Rus-
sian). These hopes, as it transpired later, were false. Moreover, the events of 
August 2020 and the following months demonstrated that the only constant 
ally that Lukashenko’s regime can rely on is Russia. Therefore, for the Baltic 
States and Poland, this geopolitical fact is a sufficient reason to justify their 
opposition to Lukashenko in his quest to stay in power. 
Despite these commonalities – proximity, history, and the fear of geopo-
litically revisionist Russia – there has been some differences among the four 
states on how they have approached Belarus. Besides, these four states have 
not always implemented idealistic, value-based foreign policies toward the 
current Belarusian regime. Therefore, it is useful to quickly review and com-
pare the Belarus policies of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in order 
to better acknowledge their differences, current position, and outcomes. 
Latvia has economic initiatives to cooperate with Belarus, as it has 
well developed port infrastructure and is closest and cheapest pathway 
to the international trade (together with Lithuania14). Over the years, the 
Belarusian authorities have been trying to play a strategic game by creat-
ing competition between Lithuania and Latvia over transit, especially after 
its relations with Lithuania became strained over the newly built Astravets 
nuclear power plant near Lithuania’s border. 
For example, Belarusian products currently account for around 30 per-
cent of the cargo transit through Latvia.15 In contrast to Lithuania, Latvia 
has not focused much on the issues that Belarus authorities would consider 
sensitive (as the Lithuanians did with Astravets nuclear power plant or 
openly hosting opposition groups in their country), taking a more pragmatic 
13 For the review of the Baltic States relations to Russia in early 2000s, see Eiki Berg and 
Piret Ehin, eds., Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European 
Integration (Ashgate, 2009).
14 Lithuania is even easer to cooperate with if one seeks to diversify the economic activities 
as it has less Russian business interests to deal with in its trasport and transit sector. 
15 Dzianis Melyantsou, ‘Belarus’s Relations With the Baltic States: Strategic Economic Links 
and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Calculations’ (Jamestown Foundation, 29 May 2020), 
https://jamestown.org/program/belaruss-relations-with-the-baltic-states-strategic-
economic-links-and-pragmatic-foreign-policy-calculations/.
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stance. Therefore, Latvia was much eager supporter of EU-Belarus rap-
prochement. There were even plans at the beginning of 2020 regarding 
Lukashenko’s visit to Riga.16 Despite this pragmatic strategy, Latvia never 
doubted the EU strategy towards Belarus and has always emphasised human 
rights violations and lack of democracy within Belarus.17 Therefore, despite 
clear economic interests, Latvia did not have difficulty formulating its politi-
cal position after the protests in Belarus, joining Lithuania and Poland in the 
common approach. 
Estonia is the only country in this overview that does not border Belarus. 
Being farther to the north, it serve mores as an entrance to Northern 
European market that is of lesser interest to Belarus.18 Because of these 
factors, Belarus has not been a foreign policy priority in Tallinn as com-
pared to the other neighbouring countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. 
Nevertheless, Estonia’s case is somewhat similar to that of Latvia. Support 
for the democratic Belarus opposition and criticism of various violations of 
law and human rights have always been on its agenda. Therefore, for Tallinn, 
it was easy to follow the same path with the others as it had even less eco-
nomic costs to keep in mind. 
Poland has stood by Lithuania as the main supporter of the democratic 
Belarus cause, but during the last five years, it has been taking a more prag-
matic approach in economic cooperation with Belarus (similar to Latvia). At 
the end of 2016, Polish Senate Marshal Stanislaw Karchevsky visited Belarus 
and met with Lukashenko and other high level officials, signalling some 
renewal of political contacts that have been absent since the 2011 EU sanc-
tions (after another contested election). 
This renewed dialogue was connected with economic interests and 
partly with changed Belarusian rhetoric after the events in Ukraine and 
the annexation of Crimea, making the assumption that more a sovereign 
Belarus can counterbalance Russian ambitions for larger military presence 
near Polish borders.19 According to some Polish experts, these moves might 
have been influenced by certain reservations by some Belarus opposition 
figures towards Poland. Therefore, it allowed Lithuania to lead the regional 
16 Melyantsou.
17 Kamil Kłysiński, ‘No Other Choice but Co-Operation. The Background of Lithuania’s 
and Latvia’s Relations with Belarus’, OSW Commentary (Centre for Eastern Studies, 7 
January 2013), https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-01-07/
no-other-choice-co-operation-background-lithuanias-and-latvias.
18 Melyantsou, ‘Belarus’s Relations With the Baltic States’.
19 Davies, ‘Poland Takes a Back-Seat Role in Belarus Standoff ’.
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effort with Belarus.20 However, as mentioned in the beginning of the 
article, Poland did not hesitate to vocally express its backing for the Bela-
rusian opposition, mobilizing international support. 
Nevertheless, Lithuania has been the most vocal public supporter of 
Belarus protesters. It was of Lukashenko’s primary critic, pushing the EU 
to adopt sanctions as soon as possible, even against the initial search for a 
consensus policy and a slow EU approach. All of the EU countries in the 
Belarusian neighbourhood have declared their hopes for more democratic 
Belarus at least for the last decade. However, looking back at the last couple 
of decades, one can see that Lithuania’s foreign policy towards Belarus has 
also been ambiguous. Lithuania has also implemented the double-track 
policy towards Belarus.21
The political relations between two states have been cold since the 2010 
election  – it demonstrated that efforts to engage with Belarus blatantly 
failed. Criticism towards Lukashenko was frequent and harsh, and many 
opposition activists easily found their new homes and offices in Vilnius. 
However, under these politically almost non-existent relations, intensive 
and fruitful economic cooperation had been developing. It was popular to 
emphasise that Lithuania’s border with Belarus is its longest state border, 
thus, economic cooperation is inevitable and logical. Lithuanian businesses 
invested in Belarus, the Lithuanian transport sector profited from the transit 
form Belarus, and economic and cultural tourism from Belarus contributed 
to the Lithuanian economy. As a result, Lithuanian foreign policy oscil-
lated between these two opposing poles. At one end of this continuum were 
ideas about the democratization of Belarus, using economic isolation and 
EU Eastern Partnership as tools for such a goal. At the opposing end was 
a non-interference, commercial pragmatism, and acceptance of Belarusian 
dependence on Russia.22
There were several reasons for such fluctuation between idealistic and 
pragmatic Belarus policy, apart from clear economic calculations and pres-
sure and impact of business interest groups. These reasons explain the 
policy ambiguity by Latvia and Poland as well. First, there is the clever 
manoeuvring by Lukashenko who exploited the hopes of the EU and the 
20 Easton, ‘Belarus Protests’.
21 Kłysiński, ‘No Other Choice but Co-Operation. The Background of Lithuania’s and 
Latvia’s Relations with Belarus’.
22 Tomas Janeliūnas, ‘Lietuva ir Baltarusija: pusiausvyros paieškos’, in Ambicingas 
dešimtemtis: Lietuvos užsienio politika 2004–2014, ed. Dovilė Jakniūnaitė (Vilnius: 
Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2015), 174.
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other Western countries by promising reforms and distance from Russia. 
These signals misled policymakers and societies into thinking that Belarus 
can change peacefully from the top-down and did not allow a closure of 
cooperation and communication. Second, it was believed that the Belarusian 
authorities are rational actors despite their domestic policies and, when a 
problem arises, it would be solved if the communication channels were left 
open at some level. Third, gradual disappointment in the chances and pos-
sibilities of Belarusian opposition to topple Lukashenko regime contributed 
to this. The Belarusian authorities have closed all domestic channels of 
influence for political opposition, making it impotent and inefficient, and 
besides, internal quarrels and competition among the opposition weakened 
them as well. Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland took the pragmatic “wait and 
see” position toward Belarus expecting either forceful changes from Russia 
or public grass-roots protests and civil society activity. 
During the last year or two, these reasons have provided less and less of 
a justification. First, Lukashenko lost all the credibility that he ever had, and 
even though during his last presidential campaign he tried to distance from 
Russia, few, at least in the EU countries, believed him. There is little possibil-
ity for any new reset of EU-Belarus relations. Pressure from Russia against 
Belarus has also increased, leaving less space for manoeuvring between 
the West and Russia.23 Second, the rationality of Belarus government also 
appeared to be unwarranted as an argument. After a long planning process, 
Belarus began to build a nuclear power plant in Astravets in 2012, which is 
just several kilometres from the Lithuanian border and 45 kilometres from 
Vilnius. Lithuania considers this power plant to be challenge to it security. 
There have been several serious incidents already during the construction 
phase.24 These incidents and Vilnius policies have not prevented the con-
struction. The only option now remains to boycott electricity imports, and 
Latvia has also promised to ban electricity imports from Belarus.25 The idea 
of rational discussion with Belarus proved to be unsubstantiated.
23 Artyom Shraibman, ‘Embattled Lukashenko Loses Friends in East and West’, Carnegie 
Moscow Center (blog), accessed 11 January 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82245.
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, ‘Fundamental Problems of 
the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant under Construction in Belarus | News’, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 29 March 2018, https://www.urm.lt/
default/en/news/fundamental-problems-of-the-astravets-nuclear-power-plant-under-
construction-in-belarus-.
25 Andrius Sytas, ‘Lithuania Stops Baltics Power Trade with Belarus, Russia over Nuclear 
Plant’, Reuters, 3 November 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/litgrid-belarus-
idUSKBN27J2CA.
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Finally, the unexpected happened in August 2020, and a substantial part 
of Belarusian society decided to show its discontent after the unfair elec-
tions by participating in mass demonstrations. This was unexpected turn 
of events that few had foreseen, though some had been long hoping for. 
Yet, this possibility has always existed, and the protests did not need any 
special interpretation – they were anti-government, demanding democratic 
elections – therefore, it was what that Belarus’s European neighbours had 
wanted to see. There were new people, new forms of mobilization and com-
munication, and new faces of opposition, and thus old discontent could be 
forgotten and new hopes could be raised. 
What is Next?
Unequivocally supporting the opposition protests in Belarus, the Baltic 
States and Poland have put all their foreign policy efforts into one basket, 
having clearly committed themselves to waiting for regime change in 
Belarus. Of course, the question is how long should such policies last. The 
biggest questions are about the future of the political processes in Belarus. 
What will 2021 bring? How or whether political stabilisation would take 
place? Would Lukashenko prevail? If not, what kind of a political regime 
would emerge? Would Belarus experience stronger ties with Russia or would 
Belarus inch closer to democratic standards? Now, there are still many 
unknowns. 
The Baltic States and Poland have stayed the most vocal supporters of 
the still ongoing Belarusian democratic protest movement, championing 
continued pressure on Lukashenko by the EU. In the context of uncertainty 
in Belarus, there is nonetheless some certainty that the Estonian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, and Polish positions towards Belarus remains and should 
remain the same. There is little doubt that this on-going support would 
continue, even if a pessimistic scenario about Lukashenko staying in power 
would be realised. Even if Lukashenko promises some democratic reforms – 
the mistrust is reciprocal and hardly recoverable. There is also a huge prob-
ability that none of these four would return to their sometimes more, some-
times less pragmatic policy positions towards Belarus in the economic and 
commercial policies – many rhetorical moves of criticism have been levied 
and many promises have been made to Belarusian people and its activists 
in exile. 
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After its usual coordination, deliberation, and certain trade-offs, the EU 
managed to formulate a supportive and strict policy and adopt a mostly 
symbolic schedule of three rounds of sanctions, although there is a constant 
risk that some other internal or external more urgent events will shift focus. 
Therefore, the largest external threat is waning attention toward the situa-
tion Belarus, which could be caused by diminishing interest in waiting for 
regime change from more powerful international actors. Then, the alertness 
and will of the most ardent supporters of Belarus in the EU would become 
of the utmost importance. What remains to be seen is if they themselves 
would not be overtaken by more urgent and demanding concerns. 
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Abstract 
Belarusian President and strongman Alexander Lukashenko has long bal-
anced the domestic and foreign and security policies of Belarus to main-
tain the benefits from its strategic partnership with Russia and a pragmatic 
cooperation with the West. However, the troubled presidential elections of 
August 2020 resulted in an eruption public resentment and protests against 
the government. These events disturbed the domestic political stability 
and balance – the only ostensible benefit of Lukashenko’s regime until this 
contested election. Now, Lukashenko has been widely condemned due to 
his response to the protests, and it is too late for the West to establish an 
actionable and substantial policy towards Belarus. Nevertheless, some states 
can implement or offer a policy for Europe and the West vis-à-vis the rela-
tions Belarus still has with Russia. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyse 
what are the key components of Kremlin’s actual strategy and what are the 
Western interests regarding Belarus. Most importantly, the paper will con-
sider what the three Baltic States as close neighbours of Belarus could do to 
facilitate the emergence of a coherent and unified strategy towards Belarus. 
Key words: Belarus, Russia, United States, European Union, policy recom -
men dations 
Introduction
Relative silence had rung out from Belarus for protracted periods. Despite 
his soft authoritarianism, Alexander Lukashenko’s social contract with 
the Belarussian people had been functioning until the 2020 presidential 
election. Before these elections, even if many in Belarus did not approve 
Lukashenko’s policies, the majority still covertly agreed to give away fun-
damental democratic freedoms in return for continued stability and jobs. 
Popular opinion had passively approved close contacts with Russia, but soci-
ety was not actively engaged in autocratic policy designs or implementation. 
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A few positive steps were evident in Belarus. First, informal reports from 
Belarusian siloviki claim success in fighting against crime, having impris-
oned more than 41,000 criminals over the last two decades – mostly for 
tax evasion. Officially, incumbent Sergei Roumas reported the elimination 
of corruption in the areas of health and regional reform. Second, in stark 
contrast with the past traditions of inefficient state ownership, private busi-
ness now provides for more than a half of Belarus gross domestic product 
(60 percent) – a striking shift away from the socialist economic traditions. 
Substantial political support had been invested in small and medium enter-
prises in concert with a simultaneous reform of the public sector. Third, 
attempts to diversify sources of energy resulted in the construction of the 
Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant. Built by Russia’s Rosatom, the plant hardly 
helped in reducing fossil energy dependence on Russia. It also did not diver-
sify from reliance of Russian technology, but Belarus could not afford the 
first offers to build such plant from Japan or France. As a result, the govern-
ment enjoyed both public trust and that of Lukashenko. 
 Nevertheless, authorities, academia, and society openly were invested 
in some kind of a social contract. The fragile stability and incremental 
improvement had their limits, which arose during the 2020 presidential 
elections, growing even starker in its aftermath. There are a few specific 
reasons why Belarusian society decided to terminate its social contract with 
Lukashenko. In this context, many commentators wrongly compare protests 
against massive election fraud and ruthless oppression against demonstra-
tors to the ‘colour revolutions’. 
The leaders of the demonstrations have repeatedly stated that – in con-
trast to the Colour Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine – the demonstra-
tions do not demand any geopolitical shift or influence over the foreign 
policy choices of the government.1 The elimination of political opposition 
raised doubts – as Lukashenko is the only feasible candidate received major-
ity support – but the over-falsification of election results created substan-
tial discontent in Belarus. In addition to this, the appalling handling of the 
COVID-19 challenges also contributed to this growing wave of popular 
resentment. Finally, the combination of negligence, injustice, and ruthless-
ness by the authorities brought the public in Belarus on streets to protest. 
1 Sviatlana Tsihanouskaya, “I repeated many times: our revolution is not about geopolitics, 
this is not a decision between East and West, it is not pro-European or pro-Russian. 
It is pro-Belarusian.”, Twitter, 28 November 2020, https://twitter.com/WarsawForum/
status/1329082650418507783/photo/1. 
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The 2020 presidential elections clearly demonstrated that Lukashenko’s 
management regime must change and is not indispensable to the populace 
at large.
On the foreign relations front, decades of balancing between the West 
and Russia further rattled Lukashenko’s domestic political stability and 
influence. Fighting against crime, the modernization of economy, and diver-
sification of energy sources were the lodestars of the EU’s Eastern partner-
ship initiative, which Belarus had passively pursued without pressure from 
Brussels.2 Before the election, there was even some hope in Brussels for a 
slowly, but incrementally improving record on human rights. There is no 
ideology behind Lukashenka authoritarian regime and therefore it was not 
perceived as a security threat in any of the Belarus’s western neighbours. 
On the top of the absence of closer and deeper cooperation especially in 
the realms of security and economic, the greatest challenge in this regard is 
Lukashenko’s growing dependence on Russia, which is a tool for Moscow to 
further tighten its grip over Belarus.
Through irresponsible and reckless behaviour, Russia has consistently 
increased its influence in its self-declared ‘sphere of exclusive influence 
and interests,’ stretching across the former subjugated Soviet territories. 
Following longstanding occupation of Moldovan, Georgian, and Ukrainian 
regions, Russia now enjoys military presence in five (out of the six) Eastern 
Partnership countries after stationing the so-called peacekeeping forces in 
Nagorno Karabakh earlier this year. 
Russia’s poorly tamed assertiveness to broaden its geopolitical foothold 
in Eastern Europe has become a rather antagonistic trend in a long-term 
perspective for the security, economic, or social interests of the Baltic States, 
NATO more broadly, and the EU. China – among other major powers – 
is no longer feigning to bide time for its moment but instead can offset 
Russia’s influence through direct financial-economic assistance to Minsk. 
In response, only now has the United States started to be more visible with 
the nomination of an Ambassador to Belarus and State Secretary’s Pompeo 
visit in 2020. During this visit, as it was reported, the United States and 
Belarus aimed to strengthening cooperation, including in the field of energy 
cooperation, which is one of the most profound advantages that Russia has 
over Belarus. On the European side, an exception to such circumscribed 
2 For more information on Eastern Partnership initiative please see “Eastern Partnership,” 
EEAS, 19 October 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-
partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en. 
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cooperation was the involvement of British troops in training of the Bela-
russian armed forces.3 
Politics after the presidential election in Belarus suggests that elevated 
interest towards Belarus by both the West and Russia may indicate some 
geopolitical shifts. This paper will analyse the trajectory of those possible 
shifts and answer some outstanding questions such as: What is Russia trying 
to achieve in Belarus? What policy can and should the Euro-Atlantic com-
munity plan and implement? The aim of the article is not to describe domes-
tic political dynamics of Belarus but rather to focus on what neighbours 
such as the Baltic states could do to improve conditions with and in Belarus. 
Business as Usual: Russia Acts, the West Reacts
The results of the 2020 elections presented possibilities to push Russia’s own 
interests in Belarus forward. It is important to note that one of the key objec-
tives for Kremlin was and still is to extend its influence in Belarus either 
through weakening Lukashenko’s position or through replacing him with 
leader more loyal to Moscow. Therefore, the Kremlin’s reaction and engage-
ment in the aftermath of the elections was based on the understanding that 
Lukashenko, punished and isolated by the West, is either forced out from the 
power or compelled to fully comply with Russia’s command at the expense 
of Belarus’s sovereignty and national interests. 
One of the most important geopolitical conditions around Belarus is 
the perceived friendship and strategic partnership with Russia. However, 
Lukashenko has long been a headache for Moscow. On the top of personal 
animosity between the two authoritarian leaders – Putin and Lukashenko – 
Minsk’s tough negotiation tactics have prevented the Kremlin from achiev-
ing its three major strategic objectives with Belarus. First, Lukashenko has 
hampered the possibility of fully implementing the 1999 Union Treaty 
Agreement with Russia, which would further merge Belarus into Russia 
even more. Second, rights for increased military presence and open mil-
itary bases in Belarus for the Russian forces have not been granted as of 
yet. Third, Belarus has not recognized the statuses of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia – but most importantly Crimea – that would uphold the legitimacy 
of Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions in the former Soviet territories. 
3 See “Belarusian, British military to share experience of tactical, engineering training,” 
BELTA, 24 March 2020, https://eng.belta.by/society/view/belarusian-british-military-to-
share-experience-of-tactical-engineering-training-128775-2020/. 
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If in the first post-Cold War moments Belarus emphasized the impor-
tance for the United States to avoid overstepping Cold War geopolitical bor-
ders by aligning with Russia instead of going West (like the Baltic States), 
then situation today is dramatically different.4 At the beginning of 1990s 
because of the geographic and historical proximity as well as economic and 
security dependence, a separate or neutral alliance with Russia was seen 
possible and necessary in Minsk. Conversely, the Baltic States chose NATO 
and closer cooperation with the United States and EU integration to avoid 
dependence on Russia and possible challenges to their sovereignty. The 
Baltic States turned out to be have made the correct decision. Russia is inch-
ing closer to the Baltic States, the EU, and NATO. The most recent actions 
in this way were in Georgia in 2008 (against NATO enlargement) and in 
Ukraine in 2014 (against EU integration). Belarus is a rare exception as it 
is the only country in the whole of the EU Eastern Partnership region that 
does not have a conflict or breakaway region within its territory. Such a situ-
ation makes it easier to justify Lukashenko’s domestic and foreign policies. 
In Minsk, as in Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius, there has been and even now 
is a growing concern with the Kremlin’s activities. Even though as a Union 
State Agreement signatory Belarus legally gains territories lost by Ukraine 
to Russia, Lukashenko early and from the outset opposed and called the 
annexation of Crimea illegal – a bad precedent per his own words.5 While 
Lukashenko condemned annexation right away, it took the EU over a year of 
conflict, as it could not identify the Russian troops in Ukraine,6 and Brussels 
was much better equipped with substantial tools to tame Kremlin’s aggres-
sion early on. 
Furthermore, Minsk has been hesitant to recognize Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as so-called independent states. On the contrary, Lukashenko has 
asked Putin to rethink relations with neighbours, noting, “Belarusians and 
Russians live in their own countries,” hinting that shared borders should 
be respected.7 The concern for Lukashenko might be that the Union 
4 Anatol Maisenia, “A View from Belarus,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement: Opinion 
and Options (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995), 155–165.
5 See RFE-RL 23.03.2014 report “Belarusian President Says Crimean Annexation ‘Bad 
Precedent”, accessed on 11.03.2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-lukashenka-crimea-
precedent/25306914.html 
6 Keir Giles, Russia’s “New” Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in 
Moscow’s Exercise of Power (Chatham House: March 2016), 31.
7 See “Lukashenko: Russia needs time to re-think relations with neighbors,” Gomel Region 
News Portal, Oktiabrskiy Regional Executive Committee, 21 October 2010, http://www.
oktiabrskiy.gomel-region.by/special/en/republic-en/view/lukashenko-russia-needs-
time-to-re-think-relations-with-neighbors-8045/, accessed 23 March 2020. 
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Agreement is not an endpoint as it is seen by Minsk, but rather halfway to 
annexation as seen in Kremlin in order to completely quash the sovereignty 
of Belarus. The Belarusian leader has reported that the Russian strongman – 
Vladimir Putin – has been pushing for a complete merger with Russia. To 
be more particular, the Russian leadership has hinted “at the incorporation 
of Belarus in return for unified energy prices.” The Kremlin’s policies have 
strong grounds in the past. 
Strategic partnerships between Belarus and Russia were forged in 1999 
at the behest of Lukashenko. Such agreements were naturally justified on 
geographic location, close historic and cultural links between both coun-
tries and peoples, and economic ties and cooperation between Belarusian 
and Russian businesses.8 Conversely, Lukashenko has been convinced that 
neither Russians nor Belarusians would ever want to merge Belarus and 
Russia into one state.9 Of course, transit and gas agreements as a model for 
economic integration and an eternal source for income raise questions about 
alternatives for Belarus. The only feasible option otherwise is to construct 
ties with the West. 
Despite its geopolitical situation having unfolded on the borders of the 
West, consisting of the United States-led NATO and the EU, this commu-
nity has been rather hesitant to craft any substantial and consistent position 
toward Belarus for years, notwithstanding the aftermath of the 2020 elec-
tion. Before the 2020 election riots, there was a demand from the Belarusian 
public for more cooperation with the West. However, during and after the 
August 2020 unrest, Western institutions failed to elaborate a consistent 
strategy or even a common vision towards Belarus. 
In response to disproportionate violence deployed by Belarussian author-
ities against peaceful protesters in August 2020 – causing deaths, injuries, 
and incarcerations – it took days for the EU to even forge an initial reac-
tion. Only five days after the announcement of the election results and con-
stant protesting was the EU able to muster a response of a video conference 
of the foreign ministers agreeing on the need to sanction those responsi-
ble for violence and violation of the rule of law. The EU shortly thereafter 
decided not to recognize the election results and therefore sided with the 
fleeing Belarusian opposition leaders, abandoning democratic protesters in 
Belarus. Furthermore, a couple of dozen of persons and companies have 
8 See “Russia and Union State,” Belarussian Diplomatic Service, 11 March 2020, http://
mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/.
9 See “The Kremlin is pushing Belarus to merge with Russia: Lukashenko,” EURACTIV.com 
with AFP, 14 February 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/the-
kremlin-is-pushing-belarus-to-merge-with-russia-lukashenko/, accessed 11 March 2020.
78 SANDIS ŠRĀDERS, SHOTA GVINERIA, VILJAR VEEBEL
been sanctioned. Moreover, the EU has agreed on the economic coopera-
tion with Belarus when it becomes a democracy – the European Council 
also encouraged the European Commission to prepare a plan of economic 
support for a democratic Belarus.10 In the case that Belarussian authorities 
indeed decide to rapidly democratize, there might be a hope for an eco-
nomic assistance plan to Belarus from the EU. 
From the outset, the West has demanded the same from Belarus as it did 
from the every partner or aspirant nation, including the Baltics. First, democ-
ratize – whatever the cost. Then, as democracy, you can receive access to the 
EU market and probably US security guarantees. Only such an adjustment 
to EU wishes would allow for the development of relations with the EU, even 
with the possibility of allowing financial support. Consequently, EU’s closer 
engagement with Belarus is inherently linked with the regime change and 
Lukashenko’s legitimation in Brussels seems no longer an option. 
Nevertheless, not all states hold the same security interests as the Baltic 
States – being ready to give all to escape Russian domination. Minor and less 
related to substantial cooperation, dialogue with Belarus has been limited to 
technical talks on specific issues, such as support to civil society and victims of 
repression and a visa facilitation agreement from July 2020.11 Hypothetically 
speaking, the alternative to this policy could be to first engage with Minsk on 
the basis of conditionality and then to await the results. However, at this point 
when the EU does not recognize the legitimacy of Lukashenko’s regime, it is 
even more difficult to define what would it mean to engage with Minsk and 
who would be the right counterpart for Brussels. 
Briefly, a common EU foreign policy toward Belarus can be described as 
fractured and divided amongst EU member states. Some member states and 
their leaders are even seen as supportive of Russia’s interests as they perceive 
Belarus as a part of Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence or simply want to 
please Russia in return for various cooperation initiatives. Prime Minister 
Orban’s choice for EU enlargement and relations, Mr. Olivér Várhelyi, called 
for lifting all sanctions on Russia.12 
10 Ibid.
11 See “EU relations with Belarus” and “Sanctions following the August 2020 presidential 
elections,” European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-
partnership/belarus/#,” accessed on 5 January 2021. 
12 Lili Bayer, “Hungary’s ‘incredibly rude’ Commission pick” Politico, 3 October 2019, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-orban-european-commission-oliver-varhelyi-
criticism-management-style-verbal-abuse/, accessed on 5 January 2021.
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Orban also supported one of the most Russia-friendly voices in the EU, 
Cyprus, in blocking sanctions on Minsk over election fraud and human 
rights abuses.13 As part of an anti-Western agenda, Hungary also called on 
the EU to push for the European army as an important part of EU’s strategic 
autonomy from the United States. In this light, several EU member states 
individually have condemned the activities of Belarus and sanctioned few 
officials as symbolic penalty for the regime activities after the August 2020 
election. 
Relations with the United States have been uneasy and similarly lim-
ited. After recognizing the independence, the United States appointed the 
first Ambassador to Minsk in 1992, but in 2008, the Belarusian Government 
unilaterally forced the US Embassy to withdraw its Ambassador and reduce 
its staff from 35 to five diplomats (to agree on the normalization of rela-
tions only in 2019). Besides the recent high-level visit by Secretary of State 
Pompeo, there have been only members of the Bush administration in 
Minsk during March 2001.14 US foreign policy toward Belarus has been 
limited to expanding democratic rights and fundamental freedoms and pro-
moting a market economy by strengthening the private sector and stimulat-
ing entrepreneurship.15 
In stark contrast, the real power Moscow wields over Minsk stems 
from economic cooperation. Conversely for the Kremlin, the successful 
re-incorporation of Belarus as the geopolitical goal is profoundly tied to 
Putin’s domestic political interests.16 Moscow’s policies toward Minsk can 
affect the political stability around Kremlin and the central regions of the 
Russian Federation. If Belarus steps closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures, 
13 See Gabriela Baczynska and John Chalmers, “Hungary’s Orban says EU should reverse 
Russia sanctions, not push Cyprus on Belarus” Reuters, 25 September 2020, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-russia-belarus-idUSKCN26G2IU, accessed on 5 
January 2021; Eli Moskowitz, “Cyprus Blocks Sanctions Against Belarus as Some Question 
its Motives” OCCRP, 23 September 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/13163-cyprus-
blocks-sanctions-against-belarus-but-some-question-its-motives, accessed on 5 January 
2021.
14 See “U.S.-Belarus Relations,” U.S. Embassy in Belarus, https://by.usembassy.gov/our-
relationship/policy-history/us-country-relations/, accessed on 5 January 2021. 
15 See “U.S. Relations with Belarus,” State Department, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-
with-belarus/, accessed on 5 January 2021.
16 Iulia Sluckaja, “Kremlin’s Belarussian Strategy: Destabilization, Regime Change, In -
corpo ration? (Белорусская стратегия Кремля: дестабилизация, смена режима, инкор-
порация?),” Наше Мнение, 14 February 2020, https://nmnby.eu/news/analytics/7044. 
html?fbclid=IwAR1TYuwvMItJQfzC8cuwuIFSZINPqznQFlvvQApnKHoTzctX4C 
EpIvVVmyE, accessed on 11 March 2020. 
80 SANDIS ŠRĀDERS, SHOTA GVINERIA, VILJAR VEEBEL
conditions for Putin’s political survival would be rather dim. On the other 
hand, Moscow learned an important lesson through losing popular support 
in Ukraine and Georgia due to its aggressive polices. By invading and occu-
pying parts of both countries, Russia has irreversibly pushed the Ukrainian 
and Georgian peoples, once friendly to Russia, towards the West. It is clear 
for Russia that it cannot afford to use the same coercive tools with Belarus – 
the last remnants of Moscow’s geopolitical ambition of a pan-Slavic union.
The Way Forward 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that Russia is the only power 
with not only a very clear, coherent, and proactive policy towards its neigh-
bourhood but also with a strategy how to enhance its influence from the 
Baltic to Black Sea regions.17 It is also obvious that Western policies and 
strategies in Eastern frontline are indistinct, divisive, and ill equipped to 
deter Russia’s growing aggression in its neighbourhood. 
The on-going situation in Belarus is an unfortunate demonstration of 
this pattern. The Baltic States have long been squeezed between internal 
divisions during the EU and NATO discussions on the possible approaches 
to the Eastern front. At this point, there is little the neighbouring states can 
do bilaterally to change the domestic political situation in Belarus, especially 
after the 2020 election. However, perhaps, now is the right moment for the 
three Baltic States to propose and lead a coherent Western policy towards 
Belarus.
The first step for the Baltic States would be to engage multilateral struc-
tures while keeping their eyes open (Belarus is a member of Moscow’s led 
CSTO and it depends on Kremlin’s subsidies that restrain Minsk’s foreign 
and security policy decisions). Nevertheless, the large Euro-Atlantic com-
munity has been wrong on two accounts. Engagement with Russia by the 
West was based on a delusional prediction – that Russia would be a democ-
racy one day. Respect afforded for this regional power and efforts to avoid its 
alienation and engagement in security cooperation have brought the Euro-
Atlantic community and Russia to a dead end. Neither the US-Reset, (false) 
STARTs, nor special relations with leaders in Europe have delivered any 
results. The Russian regime continues to export instability and neo-imperial 
17 Shota Gvineria, “The New Iron Curtain,” CEPA, August 26 2019, https://cepa.org/the-
new-iron-curtain/. 
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ambitions in the near abroad and beyond. An active phase of similar revi-
sionist strategies is unfolding in Belarus at this point. 
Second is that the basis for a new Eastern policy of the West should be 
shared security, economic, and social interests – especially regards to the 
nearest neighbourhood country of Belarus. If before the August 2020 elec-
tion, the Baltic States and Poland could have pragmatically remedied the 
democratic deficits in Belarus through the economic cooperation, then the 
deterioration of these relations for the West and for the neighbourhood has 
made any positive political outcomes even less likely. The United States lacks 
any institutional advantage to cope with the challenges in Belarus against 
Moscow’s foothold in Minsk. Moreover, the EU lacks the internal unity and 
resolve to construct a rational and lasting schedule of either long- or short-
term policies. 
The Baltic States share significant interests with Belarus. As members 
of NATO and the EU, the Baltic States could propose a platform of security 
consultations with Minsk, however, with the full participation of Belarus’s 
democratic civil society. First, this would be done to ensure confidence and 
trust building between Belarus and parts of the West. Second, it would be 
undertaken to expand cooperation where possible or necessary. Such poli-
cies would be desirable to ensure better conditions for democratic transition 
in Belarus in a long-term. Since the UK military has been on the ground in 
Belarus for military exercises, such a policy would not be a step too far for 
Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius especially in the framework of broader partnerships 
with allies. 
Third, cooperation between the Baltic States and Belarus is not limited 
only to security and geo-economic areas. Closer diplomatic ties and cultural 
initiatives (such as sports and educational exchanges for youth as well as 
environmental cooperation) are all important. Now during this period of 
instability, the Baltic States could propose a more constructive, more guided, 
and more comprehensive offer to Minsk, again with the condition of the full 
participation of the representatives of the civil society. Such an approach 
would on one hand support and strengthen democratic civil society and 
would force dialogue between the regime and the people on the other. 
The hardest step would be to overcome obstacles for the Baltic coopera-
tion within already-existing multilateral structures. Here, the objective is 
to resolve the divergence between Lithuanian and Polish interests. Rooted 
in historical ambitions and bifurcating further due to contemporary condi-
tions, both countries approach Belarus differently on a bilateral basis. With 
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patience (if possible), the Baltic States and Poland should outline a common 
approach toward Belarus in order to eventually propose it as an EU-wide 
policy. This approach would advocate for incremental cooperation improve-
ments that would be reciprocally echoed in Brussels, Belarus, and the Baltic 
region. The pre-2020 election stability inside Belarus is much cherished. 
Thus, emphasis should be placed on the absence of instant and dramatic 
demands. Lukashenko is still forced to perform a neat balancing act between 
the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia. The coming or present leadership 
in Belarus and their partners would benefit from positive, non-confronta-
tional agenda with both Kremlin and Brussels.
The fourth task is to decrease energy dependence on Russia as the 
main source of vulnerability for Belarus. The question here is if the Baltic 
States could open their energy markets in order to buy surplus energy from 
Belarus. It is difficult to provide an answer, but there are the few reasons 
why this might not be possible. For example, Lithuania is the most ada-
mant opponent of opening the EU energy market to Belarusian electricity 
for environmental (security) concerns. Nonetheless, there could be at least 
two critical counterarguments to such an approach. 
Rosatom has already built one nuclear power plant in Finland and the 
second is under construction, and Hungary is following the Helsinki’s 
model. Thus, Rosatom technology in principle is legitimized for use on the 
EU energy market. We must ask why the same source-technology electricity 
should be banned from Belarus. Second, the Ignalina nuclear power plant 
was built as near to Latvia’s border as the Ostrovets plant is to Lithuania’s 
border. If compliance with the European Atomic Energy Community stand-
ards were assured for Ostrovets, there would be no difference between two 
projects when it comes to the geographic proximity to foreign borders, 
either Ostrovets to Lithuania or Ignalina to Latvia. 
Moreover, former experts from the Ignalina plant could become employ-
ees at Ostrovets to ensure high standards. A benefit from such improved 
cooperation could be translated into increased transits from Belarus to 
Lithuanian and from Lithuania to Belarus. Furthermore, the Ostrovets 
plant would bring the competition into the Nord Pool electricity stock 
exchange so as to compete with nuclear energy suppliers, such as Finland, 
in the common Baltic-Nordic energy market. Such steps suggest not only 
the direct and broader economic benefits but also closer cooperation with 
Belarus in general. 
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In order to decrease Belarus’ dependence on Russia’s oil, the Baltic ports, 
including the restoration of Polotsk 1 pipeline from Ventspils in Latvia 
(approximately 500km) to Belarus and the construction of Polotsk 2 from 
Mazeikiai in Lithuania to Belarus (approximately 450km), could ensure 
two-way transit. The obstacle for such cooperation is the Russian owner-
ship of transit routes in Latvia and – to more limed extent – in Lithuania. 
Minsk’s calls in Latvia met deaf ears due to Russia’s substantial control over 
transportation assets in Latvia. LatRosTrans is controlled by Russia, as the 
company is owned by the Russian Transneft and the Dutch-Swiss Vitol. Vitol 
most likely will not be willing to spoil relations with one of the largest net 
exporter of oil over Baltic-Belarus cooperation. 
Conversely, Lithuania is free from such restrains to transit and is already 
experiencing profound volumes of transit business with Belarus, not-
withstanding harsh opposition against the Ostrovets project. To decrease 
Belarus’s energy dependency on gas and oil, especially LNG, terminals in 
Lithuania and ports in the Baltic States could become an economic benefit 
for all. Then, future investments in the infrastructure must be considered. 
The United States’ Three Seas Initiative and energy exports to Belarus could 
fit well in these new infrastructural projects. This would be done not only 
with economic gains in mind but also to enhance cooperation around the 
Baltic Sea Region. 
The fifth task is to find the right position in major power battles over 
Belarus. China has chosen Belarus as one of its key outposts for trade and 
investment in the Baltic region; it sees Belarus as a hub for trade with the 
West and a window to the Europe. This influence is underwritten by invest-
ments and loans that are pushing Minsk closer to the EU. On the other hand, 
with the Three Seas Initiative, the United States is becoming a bolder player 
in the region in relations to security, investments in infrastructure, and the 
economy. On the top of this, there is a challenge to consider – a warning 
from the most informed pundits about the coming economic downturn of 
Russia.18 As a result, early cooperation with Belarus could pre-empt some of 
the most adverse consequences for security first and for economy fallouts, 
regional stability, and social welfare second. The Russian economy is in an 
appalling state. With oil prices falling, the Kremlin faces severe economic 
constraints –dangerous for all its neighbours.
The sixth is the exchange of information. There is more that we can do 
to promote business opportunities and social contacts between the Baltic 
18 Dmitri Trenin, Should We Fear Russia? (Global Futures: December, 2016), 56–76.
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States and Belarus. To offset this lack of awareness and information, civil 
society should organize exchanges of journalists to and from Belarus. As 
a result, this would give all necessary information for small and medium 
enterprises to launch new and extend existing cooperation. Furthermore, 
it would intensify cooperation and personal contacts such as the exchange 
programs for students, regional cooperation platforms like start-ups com-
munities, enhanced contacts between local municipalities, and an overall 
surge of social contacts. Such trends would create better understanding and 
trust, new incentives, and eventually jobs. 
The Baltic States are small enough to be non-provocative. They know 
enough to share their expertise with the others to the West. For the most 
part, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius understand each other well, as they too were 
incorporated in the Soviet Union – the entity that Moscow wants to restore 
in all but name. A robust Baltic-Belarusian cooperation could be one of the 
most challenging impediments of Kremlin’s plans.
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“I Looked Back to See If You Looked Back to See If I Was 
Looking at You”: Russian Discourse on Western Critique 
of Russia’s Actions
Dr. Dmitry Lanko  Dmitry LANKO
Abstract 
Most Russians are interested in finding out how their country’s particu-
lar actions are perceived in the West. To satisfy this interest, the website 
Inosmi.Ru was established almost twenty years ago, and since then, this 
website has selected, translated, and published foreign – mostly Western – 
media reports on Russia. This paper analyses the publications on the web-
site, including translated articles and editorial comments, with the aim of 
understanding Russian discourse on the Western critique of Russia’s actions. 
The paper applies the theoretical lens of Orientalism as an analytical tool 
as an important characteristic of the Russian discourse on Western cri-
tique of Russia’s actions; in this paradigm, it is the assumption that the West 
treats any Russia’s action with an attitude of hubristic superiority. In con-
clusion, this paper illustrates the two major strategies that Russian agents 
apply in order to cope with this assumed Western conceit: mimicry and 
self-Orientalisation.
Key words: Russia, Orientalism, perception, discourse, West 
Putin: I Watch Western Media, but I do not Believe It
The song “I looked back,” a line from which provided the first half of the 
title of this paper, appeared on the B-side of the single “Master Jack” by 
the South African rock ensemble Four Jacks and a Jill released in 1967. In 
1996, Russian pop singer Maksim Leonidov released his probably most 
popular song of his entire career, Devochka-videnye (Phantasm Girl), the 
refrain of which repeated those same words. The words “I looked back to 
see if you looked back to see if I was looking at you” perfectly convey the 
impression that Russia’s reaction to Western reaction to its actions creates. 
When Western reactions to Russia’s actions are positive, Russian discourse 
appreciates it. In most cases, however, it is negative. In such cases, different 
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Russian agents apply different strategies of coping with Western critiques, 
from admitting its correctness to devaluing it or hyperbolizing it. Below, 
the following work will demonstrate that what makes all those interlocutors 
similar is that all of them would rather hear Western criticism than not get 
any Western reaction to Russian actions at all.
Western academia opened the debate on Russian disinformation cam-
paigns in Western media, including social media, after the announcement 
of the results of the 2016 United States presidential election, in which Russia 
allegedly interfered. There were few publications earlier than 2016 on 
the matter of Russian disinformation campaigns in countries neighbour-
ing Russia. For example, Ciziunas names propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns among the tools that Russia applies with the aim to influence 
domestic politics in the Baltic States; other tools being diplomatic pressure, 
military threats and peacekeeping deployments, economic leverage and 
energy controls, exploiting ethnic and social discontent, discrediting gov-
ernments through political influence, and penetrating intelligence servic-
es.1 Although several influential US Democrats, including former President 
Jimmy Carter,2 have declared that Russian interference played the decisive 
role in determining the outcomes of 2016 presidential elections, Western 
academia failed to reach consensus on the impact that Russian interference 
actually had on the election results.
The role that any (dis)information campaigns, including a foreign one, 
had on the outcomes of particular elections is difficult to measure, if not 
impossible. It is possible, however, to measure the influence of such cam-
paigns on public and elite perceptions of particular events. In Germany, for 
example, “Russian disinformation exploiting historical memory, discontent 
with policies, and skepticism towards the U.S.” has not produced approval 
of Putin’s Russia and its actions, both domestic and international, but it has 
resulted in ‘understanding’ of it.3 Most scholars agree that despite some of 
the information perceived to be part of Russian disinformation campaigns in 
Western media, including social media, is either false or true but misleading, 
1 Pranas Ciziunas, “Russia and the Baltic States: Is Russian Imperialism Dead?,” 
Comparative Strategy 27, no. 3 (2008): 287–307.
2 John Wagner, “Jimmy Carter Says Trump Wouldn’t Be President without Help from 
Russia,” Washington Post, June 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
jimmy-carter-says-trump-wouldnt-be-president-without-help-from-russia/2019/06/28/
deef1ef0-99b6-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html.
3 Steve Wood, “Understanding’ for Russia in Germany: International Triangle Meets 
Domestic Politics,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs forthcoming (2020).
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most of it is nonetheless true. Richey explains the potency of Russian disin-
formation campaigns not with its establishing “falsehoods as true,” but with 
its ability to pollute “political discourse such that news information consum-
ers are led to doubt the very concepts of truth and objective political facts.”4 
Remarkably, it was in 2016 that the Oxford Dictionary named post-truth as 
its Word of the Year.
While being the alleged source of multiple disinformation campaigns 
that influenced international politics in the latter half of 2010s, Russia simul-
taneously suffered being the target of multiple disinformation campaigns 
allegedly orchestrated from other countries. The alleged potency of Russian 
disinformation campaigns itself became a propaganda tool targeting Russia. 
In particular, Carden named the publications in Western media accusing 
Russian government of hacking the US Democratic National Committee, of 
orchestrating the Brexit, and of tacitly supporting Trump as “evidence-free.”5 
A reaction to these and other accusations of Russia in the country itself was 
the growing concern among the elite and the public in Russia of what they 
believed to be Western disinformation campaigns against Russia. Debates 
on disinformation campaigns, propaganda and information warfare gained 
prevalence not only in the West, but also in Russia as well.6 Russian debate 
on Western anti-Russian propaganda started at least a decade earlier than 
similar Western debate on Russian anti-Western propaganda began in the 
West.
The war in Chechnya became the first subject that Putin’s adminis-
tration declared a propaganda tool of Western anti-Russian media cam-
paign. Despite in the early years of the 21st century, Russia was an ally in 
the United States-led global war on terror; Western media in those years 
criticized what the administration called a “counter-terrorist operation” 
in Chechnya. According to the administration, part of the information 
on which the critique was founded was false. Russian President Vladimir 
Putin himself expressed his “concern… for coverage of the events that take 
4 Mason Richey, “Contemporary Russian Revisionism: Understanding the Kremlin’s 
Hybrid Warfare and the Strategic and Tactical Deployment of Disinformation,” Asia 
Europe Journal 16, no. 1 (2018): 101–13.
5 James Carden, “The Media’s Incessant Barrage of Evidence-Free Accusations against 
Russia,” The Nation, July 6, 2016, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-
medias-incessant-barrage-of-evidence-free-accusations-against-russia/.
6 Mario Baumann, “‘Propaganda Fights’ and ‘Disinformation Campaigns’: The Discourse 
on Information Warfare in Russia-West Relations,” Contemporary Politics 26, no. 3 
(2020): 288–307.
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place [in Chechnya] to be objective.”7 Foreign media coverage of Russian-
Georgian War of 2008 became another occasion for Putin to start casting 
doubt on the objectivity of Western media. In particular, in his interview to 
the CNN, Putin criticized an interview with an American of South Ossetian 
origin aired by CNN’s rival broadcaster Fox News. “Is that an honest and 
objective way to give information? Is that the way to inform the people of 
your own country?” Putin asked, referring to the Fox interview. “No, he 
answered to self that is disinformation.”8
Russian authorities actively criticized the way in which Western media 
covered Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Even before the beginning of the vio-
lent phase of the conflict, Putin criticized the way in which Western media 
covered the Russian-Ukrainian so-called gas wars during the latter half of 
2000s. During his news conference specially organized for foreign report-
ers on the occasion of termination of supplies of natural gas from Russia to 
Ukraine in January 2009, Putin claimed that he “watch[ed] both Western 
European and North American media,” and that he could not “see objective 
assessment of the events.”9 Recently, Putin criticized Western media cov-
erage of the Russian role in the civil war in Libya, which has been going 
on since Gaddafi was removed from power in 2011. Some Western media 
reported that Russia supported the Libyan National Army and that Russian 
mercenaries fought on its side. When a journalist from Turkey asked Putin 
if such reports were true, Putin responded, “Do you believe what is written 
in the Western media? Read what they write about Turkey, and you will 
change your mind.”10
The above-quoted statement by Putin concerning Western media cov-
erage of the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian conflict over natural gas supplies is 
indicative of the internal controversy that is characteristic of a vast part 
of Russian elite. They, like Putin, watch Western media. Inversely, they do 
not believe what they see. This paper seeks to understand this controversy 
by applying the concept of Orientalism, which has been developed in the 
literature on the relations between the West and the non-West since Said 
7 Vladimir Putin, Interview with German television channels ARD and ZDF, May 5, 2005, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22948.
8 Vladimir Putin, Transcript: CNN interview with Vladimir Putin, August 29, 2008, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/29/putin.transcript/.
9 Vladimir Putin, Zapadnye SMI ne dayut ob’yektivnoy otsenki gazovogo konflikta 
[Western media do not provide with objective assessment of the gas conflict;  – in 
Russian], January 8, 2009, https://www.vesti.ru/article/2177190.
10 Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference,” Kremlin.Ru , December 19, 
2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366.
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introduced the term in late 1970s.11 The paper will discuss the ambiguity 
of the Russian self-perception between the East and the West, between that 
of the Orientalist and the Oriental. The paper analyses the abstracts that 
Russian online media Inosmi.Ru, which specializes in re-publishing trans-
lated articles concerning Russia from foreign media, attaches to texts of 
translated articles that cover Russian foreign policy action. It will demon-
strate that the ambiguity mentioned above forces vast part of Russian elite to 
look for Western assessment of Russia while simultaneously being prepared 
to find that it is grounded in stereotypes.
Russian Orientalism and Self-Orientalism: 
We, the people of Mordor
The double-headed eagle on the Russian coat of arms is intended to sym-
bolize the position of the country between the West and East. With that, 
Russian discourse on neighbouring countries is ambiguous. This Russian 
discourse includes elements that can be qualified as Orientalist in Said’s 
terms. Scholarly studies of the peoples of the Orient as well as artistic pres-
entations of Russians meeting those people have contributed to the forma-
tion of the Russian discourse on the Orient. Evidence of the continuity of 
the Oriental Studies from the Russian Empire, to the Soviet Union, and to 
the Russian Federation can be found in Kemper and Conermann’s edited 
volume.12 Russian literature from Lermontov13 until present provides mul-
tiple examples of tales about Russians meeting people of the Orient told 
solely from the Russian perspective. Jersild concludes that the Orientalist 
discourse, which at the dawn of the 20th century justified Western impe-
rialism as a “white man’s burden” in the West itself,14 was simultaneously 
characteristic to the elite of the Russian Empire, though Schimmelpenninck 
van der Oye rejects this conclusion.15
11 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
12 Michael Kemper and Stephen Conermann, eds., The Heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2011).
13 Peter Scotto, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Ideologies of Imperialism in Lermontov’s 
‘Bela,’” Publications of the Modern Language Association 107, no. 2 (1992): 246–60.
14 Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the 
Georgian Frontier, 1845–1917 (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2002).
15 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind 
from Peter the Great to the Emigration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
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Conversely, the assumption that Western discourse on Russia can be 
qualified as Orientalist is also an element of the Russian discourse. Many 
Western scholars also note an Orientalist Western discourse on Russia. 
When Russia is considered a part of Europe, thanks to its geography, it is 
considered a part of Eastern Europe. In this case, Western discourse on 
Russia bears similar characteristics with Western discourse on Eastern 
Europe in general, the characteristics that Larry Wolff16 identified as being 
essentially Orientalist. When, however, Russia is considered a place outside 
of Europe, there is no major change in this presentation. Brown found char-
acteristic elements of Orientalism in Western discourse on Russia, namely 
“exaggeration of difference, assumption of Western superiority, and resort to 
clichéd analytical models.”17 In turn, an element of Russian discourse on the 
West is the assumption that representatives of the West in general and Western 
media in particular intentionally seek only for such information from and 
about Russia, which affirms the difference, superiority, and the clichés. 
Khudoley and Lanko18 discuss the influence of the ambiguity of Russian 
discourse that justifies condescending approaches to people of the Orient 
living in Russia and abroad while simultaneously failing to justify a similar 
condescension of some people of the West to Russia itself on Russian foreign 
policy. They discuss Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya as an oriental Russian 
leader influencing the country’s foreign policymaking despite the fact that 
they, too, fail to answer Varisco’s question “at what point does European-
looking Russia fade into the Eastern steppe.”19 Russian poet Alexander 
Pushkin delimited the border between the European and the Oriental parts 
of Russia in the most radical way by declaring the Russian government to 
be “the only European” aspect of Russia in a letter to his former school-
mate Pyotr Chaadayev. The latter was a prominent thinker participating 
in Russia’s most important philosophical debate that of the Westerners vs. 
Slavophiles, with which Hahn associates the emergence of Orientalist ele-
ments in Russian discourse.20
16 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the 
Enlightenment (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994).
17 James D.J. Brown, “A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, inside a Caricature: Russian 
Foreign Policy and Orientalism,” Politics 30, no. 3 (October 2010): 149–59, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01378.x.
18 Konstantin K. Khudoley and Dmitry A. Lanko, “Russia’s Turn to the East: A Postcolonial 
Perspective,” Stosunki Miedzynarodowe – International Relations 54, no. 2 (2018): 31–50.
19 Daniel Martin Varisco, Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid (Publications on the 
Near East) (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2007).
20 Gordon H. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 232.
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Morozov approaches Russia as a “subaltern empire” where the govern-
ment is the “only European” that never listens to its own people thus jus-
tifying the qualification of the people as a “subaltern,” a term applied by 
postcolonial scholars to identify the people (most often of the Orient) 
excluded from the hierarchies of power in (most often Western) empires.21 
Many people in Russia perceive their government as a part of the West, 
which never listens to them; thus, they perceive critical reviews of Russia’s 
actions in Western media as deceitful as rave reviews of those same actions 
in Russian pro-government media. Koplatadze perceives such an approach 
as an attempt to exonerate Russian people, if not the Russian state, of the 
wrongdoings of the Russian Empire, of the Soviet Union, and of the recent 
wrongdoings of the Russian Federation.22 Thus, unconscious recourse to 
practices described by postcolonial scholars, such as mimicry and self-ori-
entalism, has found a place among defensive strategies adopted by many 
Russians facing the necessity to cope with Western critique of the actions of 
Russian government.
Exaggeration of the difference between the West and the rest helps jus-
tifying Western superiority in Western discourse on the rest. For repre-
sentatives of the rest, it becomes a source of insecurity, material losses, and 
psychological discomfort. Facing these challenges, representatives of the 
rest adopt either of the two strategies. Sometimes they attempt to bridge 
the difference by means of adopting Western practices, from clothing to 
political institutions. However, adoption of Western practices by a group 
rarely results in elimination of the elements of Western discourse on that 
group, which in turn justify claims of Western superiority. Bhabha noted 
that Western Orientalist discourse justifies treatment of such attempts as 
mimicry; participants of the Western Orientalist discourse thus approach 
the attempts of non-Western groups to adopt Western practices as result-
ing in practices, which are “like Western, but not quite.”23 Thus, some other 
non-Western groups adopt the opposite to mimic the strategy of self-Orien-
talism, the term first introduced by Iwabuchi.24
21 Vyatcheslav Morozov, Russian Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric 
World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
22 Tamar Koplatadze, “Theorizing Russian Postcolonial Studies,” Postcolonial Studies 22, 
no. 4 (2019): 469–89.
23 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 1994), 122.
24 Koichi Iwabuchi, “Complicit Exotism: Japan and Its Other,” Continuum 8, no. 2 (1994): 
49–82.
94 DMITRY LANKO
Self-Orientalism is the strategy of exaggerating the differences between 
non-Western group and the West. Self-Orientalism is widely spread in tour-
ist industry outside of the West;25 rendering it profitable, workers of the 
tourist industry wear traditional clothes when dealing with Western tourists 
seeking ‘indigenous’ experiences, though they change for jeans after hours. 
Self-Orientalism does not aim for greater profit only but also for security 
and psychological comfort. It is search for psychological comfort that pushes 
some Russians to adopt self-Orientalizing practices in response to Western 
critique of Russia. An example of such practices is the Russian-language 
Twitter account under the name of “The Voice of the Mordor,”26 which pre-
sents negative reports on Russian actions in Western media as dictated by 
the desire of the Western media to present contemporary Russia as a kind 
of Mordor, the fictional evil kingdom from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings in a 
sarcastic manner. The current article will demonstrate that Russian online 
media Inosmi.Ru also adopts self-Orientalizing practices when comment-
ing on the texts of translated articles covering Russian foreign policy action 
from Western media that it publishes.
Inosmi.Ru: A Russian Soft Power Tool
Many Russians treat the West and Europe as a point of reference. For some, 
the West and Europe are positive examples. Despite some authors having 
claimed that Russia as a whole “has moved from the role of the recipient 
of the EU’s normative power to the demands to be accepted as an agent of 
normative power,”27 the words “like in Europe” have positive connotation for 
many Russians. Many others, however, “following early Slavophiles and also 
Dostoyevsky, argue[d] that the Russians [were] morally superior to people 
of the West, because they [had] grown spiritually as they [had] been faced 
with hardships, such as communism, which [had] not been present in the 
25 Grace C. Yan and Carla A. Santos, “China, Forever’. Tourism Discourse and Self-
Orientalism,” Annals of Tourism Research 36, no. 2 (2009): 295–315; Lei Wei, Junxi Qian, 
and Jiuxia Sun, “Self-Orientalism, Joke-Work, and Host-Tourist Relations,” Annals of 
Tourism Research 68, no. 1 (2019): 89–99.
26 @spacelordrock, “Golos Mordora,” 2014, https://twitter.com/spacelordrock.
27 Elena B. Pavlova and Tatiana A. Romanova, “Normative Power: Some Theory Aspects 
and Contemporary Practice of Russia and the EU,” Polis (Russian Federation) 1 (2017): 
162–76.
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West.”28 They believe that the West and Europe, which had made significant 
achievements in terms of political, social, and economic development in 
the past, are degrading today. In their view, this degradation is a result of 
refocusing of attention from the interests of individuals, attention to which 
made Europe exemplary in the past, to the interests of groups, specifically 
those of minority groups.
Representatives of these two groups of Russians have polar opinions 
in most cases, but what makes them similar is their thirst for opinions on 
Russia’s actions published in European and Western media. Representatives 
of the former group look for those opinions as for something that reaf-
firms their own beliefs about what is good and what is bad in contempo-
rary Russia. Representatives of the latter groups look for those opinions for 
a different reason; the phrase attributed to Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, 
whose popularity has recently significantly risen in Russia, and who alleg-
edly said, “If our enemies scold us, then we are doing everything right,” helps 
understanding that reason. At the same time, representatives of both groups 
demand those opinions. To satisfy that demand, Russian journalist Yaroslav 
Ognev in 2001 launched the website Inosmi.Ru, “inosmi” being Russian 
abbreviation meaning foreign mass media. Initially, the website enjoyed sup-
port of the Effective Policy Foundation, a non-profit founded and headed 
by Russian journalist and former Soviet dissident Gleb Pavlovsky, but in 
2002, it came to belong to the VGTRK, a state-owned Russian broadcasting 
company.29
In 2004, VGTRK gave the website over to RIA Novosti, the state-owned 
Russian news agency. In 2013, Russia adopted its new Foreign Policy 
Concept,30 which became the first Russian Foreign Policy Concept (previ-
ous versions of the documents were adopted in 1993, 2000 and 2008 respec-
tively) that mentions soft power. In line with the desire to make soft power a 
tool of growing Russian ambitions on the international arena, Russia started 
heavily investing in state-owned broadcasting companies targeting for-
eign audiences. RIA Novosti was transformed into the state-owned media 
28 Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation, vol. 9 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 180.
29 Alexander Skudin, “InoSMI Otdali v RIA ‘Novosti’ [RIA Novosti Aquired InoSMI],” 
Webplaneta, February 24, 2004, http://www.webplanet.ru/news/internet/2004/2/24/
inosmi_inovesti.html.
30 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, February 18, 2013), https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/
official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186.
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holding Rossiya Segodnya, which currently owns such Russian media as RT 
and Sputnik. Inosmi.Ru also became a part of the holding despite the fact 
that over half of its audience comes from Russia as of October 2020.31 At 
the same time, the official declaration of the website as a tool of Russian soft 
power attracted attention of Western scholars to it. Multiple studies made 
use of the website’s selection of articles originally published in foreign media 
to be translated into Russian and posted on the website in order to under-
stand Russian soft power strategy.
For example, Spiessens and van Poucke found that “through selective 
appropriation, shifts in translations and visual strategies,” the website “pro-
duces a discourse that is more in line with the Kremlin’s official viewpoints 
than the original data set.”32 In a separate article, however, van Poucke 
discusses the particular strategies that translators working for the website 
adopt in order to make “the Western discourse on Russian subjects more 
visible to the reader, especially in these cases where the source text contains 
metaphors that suggest a critical interpretation of the Russian state, society 
or the leaders of the country.”33 In turn, Spiessens found that the website 
“re-interprets Western reports on the Crimean crisis by triggering ‘deep 
memory’ of the Great Patriotic War,” the term that Russians use to identify 
the part of WWII in 1941–1945 when the Soviet Union was at war with Nazi 
Germany.34 After the financial crisis of 2008, which heavily hurt the Russian 
media market, multiple changes took place in its leadership and structure 
even before the website was officially declared a Russian soft power tool.
In 2009, Yaroslav Ognev stepped down as the editor-in-chief of the web-
site, and Marina Pustilnik, who had previously headed the user support 
group of the Russian branch of LiveJournal, became the editor-in-chief.35 
In 2012, Alexey Kovalev came to replace Pustilnik as editor-in-chief of 
31 “Alexa, An Amazon.Com Company,” Inosmi.Ru: Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix 
and Traffic , accessed October 29, 2020, https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/inosmi.ru.
32 Anneleen Spiessens and Piet van Poucke, “Translating News Discourse on the Crimean 
Crisis: Patterns of Reframing on the Russian Website InoSMI,” Translator 22, no. 3 
(2016): 319–39.
33 Piet van Poucke, “Foreignization in News Translation: Metaphors in Russian Translation 
on the News Translation Website InoSMI,” Meta 61, no. 2 (2016): 346–68.
34 Anneleen Spiessens and Piet van Poucke, “Deep Memory during the Crimean Crisis: 
References to the Great Patriotic War in Russian News Translations,” Target 31, no. 3 
(2019): 398–419.
35 “Glavnym Redaktorom Sayta Inosmi.Ru Naznachena Marina Pustilnik [Marina Pustilnik 
Appointed Editor-in-Chief of the Inosmi.Ru Website; – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, March 9, 
2009, https://inosmi.ru/online/20090311/247854.html.
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the website,36 though he kept a vast share of her legacy in place. Among 
Pustilnik’s initiatives, the most important was a reform of the website’s 
forum, where visitors of the website had the opportunity to discuss posted 
translations of articles originally published in foreign media. Initially, she 
planned to switch from the forum mode to comments under each article, 
but the plan faced mass online protests from frequent visitors of the website. 
As a result, the forum remained in place, though its interface changed signif-
icantly, and the possibility to make comments under each article appeared in 
addition to the forum but not as a replacement of the forum. Multiple stud-
ies aiming to understand Russian public opinion on others and of Russian 
discourse on them have made use of those comments since then.
An example is the study by Radina, to whom the comments are evidence 
of digital political mobilization of the commenters.37 Another example is 
the study by Gazda, who “examined the expressions of intolerance toward 
the opinions of others and linguistic aggression on the part of the Russian-
speaking commenters toward the authors of critical Czech journalism as 
natural and instinctive dismissive reactions to “different” or hostile language 
and cultural and ideological expressions.”38 Studies that made use of the 
comments posted by visitors of the website have played an important role in 
understanding of Russian public opinion in the 2010s. This paper, however, 
aims at understanding elite opinions; thus, it will not make use of visitors’ 
comments posted on the website, but of editors’ notes to each article. The 
paper will make use of the 153 editor’s comments to translations of the arti-
cles mentioning NATO and NATO member states posted on the website 
in 2019 and in January through October 2020. Results of qualitative con-
tent analysis of those editorial notes do not represent the entire plurality of 
Russian elite opinions, but they contribute to understanding of the Russian 
discourse on the West and Europe.
36 “InoSMI Nashel Novogo Glavreda v Londone [Inosmi.Ru Found Its New Editor-
in-Chief in London;  – in Russian]”.,” Lenta.Ru , February 9, 2012, https://lenta.ru/
news/2012/02/09/inosmi/.
37 Nadezhda K. Radina, “Digital Political Mobilization of Online Commenters on 
Publications about Politics and International Relations,” Polis (Russian Federation) 2 
(2018): 115–29.
38 Jiri Gazda, “Online Comments as a Tool of Inter-Cultural (Russian-Czech) ‘Anti-
Dialogue,’” Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics 12, no. 1 (2018): 100–
120.
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Editors of Inosmi.Ru: If You Cannot Devalue Western Critique, 
Hyperbolize It
The results of content analysis of the articles mentioning NATO translated 
from foreign media and posted on the website Inosmi.Ru and of the edito-
rial notes that precede each article demonstrates that the website published 
articles that can be classified as pro-Russian, neutral, and anti-Russian. To 
increase the number of pro-Russian articles, editors of the website post and 
translate articles from non-Western and non-European media. On multi-
ple occasions, the website posted translated articles originally published 
by Akharin Khabar39 and from Ifeng.Com,40 media from Iran and China 
respectively, of which is neither Western nor European. On other occa-
sions, the website posts translated articles from the website of the Stratejik 
Düşünce Estitüsü, the Institute of Strategic Thinking, a think tank from 
Turkey,41 whose geographic location vis-à-vis regions of the world is a sub-
ject of discussion in the Russian discourse on the country. There are percep-
tions of Turkey as located between East and West, like Russia itself, as a part 
of the Middle East, as a part of Europe but not of the West, as a part of the 
West but not of Europe, and as a part of both the West and Europe.
On some occasions, however, the website posts translated pro-Russian 
or neutral articles originally published in mass media from NATO member 
states and not only from Turkey. On those occasions, the editors of the web-
site attach neutral notes to the translated articles, which summarize their 
contents or simply repeat part of their introductory or concluding parts 
without evaluating the quality of analysis presented in them. For example, 
to the report originally published in French Le Figaro on Russian military 
exercises “Centre-2019,” which took place in September 2019, editors of the 
website attached the following note: “‘Pathfinder-85 to the group command-
ers, you can start moving. Kavkaz-16, you first’. Such commands endlessly 
sound from a loudspeaker in the command centre on the banks of the Tom’. 
39 “Akharin Khabar: Rossiyskie Razrabotki Neytralizuyut Ugrozy NATO [Akharin Khabar: 
Russian Developments Neutralize NATO Threats; – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, December 
9, 2019, https://inosmi.ru/military/20191209/246393382.html.
40 “Feniks: Rossiya Gotova Otvetit’ Na Razmeshchenie Voysk NATO Vblizi Svoikh 
Granits [Phoenix: Russia Is Ready to Respond to the Deployment of NATO Troops 
Near Its Borders;  – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, October 23, 2019, https://inosmi.ru/
politic/20191023/246080887.html.
41 “SDE: Po-Zivantiyski Khitrye SShA Nachali Igru a Gruzii [Byzantine Cunning USA 
Started the Game in Georgia; – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, July 31, 2019, https://inosmi.ru/
politic/20190731/245551711.html.
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A dozen heavy T-72V3 tanks lined up on the bank pull away towards the 
river that represents the Russian border. This is how the correspondent of 
the French newspaper begins his report.”42 The article is considered posi-
tive, because it underlines Russian strength and Russian openness: Russia 
allowed French journalists to observe military exercises.
At the same time, translated articles posted on the website that approach 
Russian actions negatively outnumbers pro-Russian and neutral articles. In 
such cases, editorial notes to the translated articles attempt to devalue the 
critique presented either in them or, to the contrary, to hyperbolize that cri-
tique. Multiple tactics help those editorial notes to devalue Western critique 
of Russia’s actions presented in the translated articles. An editorial note can 
point at the fact that the translated article it is presenting reports only part 
of the truth, while silencing other relevant information. For example, when 
commenting on the British Telegraph’s report on Russian military exer-
cises held in times when NATO had to cancel the Defender-2020 exercises 
due to COVID-19, editors of the website wrote, “Russia flexes its muscles 
near NATO borders – it conducted exercises with the participation of 82,000 
troops, the newspaper frightens the public. But he is silent that these exer-
cises to localize emergency situations associated with the threat of viral infec-
tions were held at seven training grounds in the Western and Central Military 
Districts – far from the borders” [with any NATO member country].43
An editorial note can simply claim that the translated article it presents 
does not provide enough evidence to support the author’s claim. For exam-
ple, when commenting on a CNN report that a Russian fighter jet violated 
the airspace of one of NATO’s member countries when intercepting a US 
bomber, editors of the website wrote, “The US military continues to panic 
over allegedly unsafe interceptions by Russian fighters. Another reason for 
the accusations was an incident during which, according to the NATO Air 
Force, a Russian Su-27 violated Danish airspace. Evidence, as usual, is not 
presented.”44 An editorial note can claim that the translated article that is 
42 “Le Figaro (Frantsiya): Na Sibirskikh Ucheniyakh Rossiyskoy Armii [Le Figaro (France): 
At the Siberian Exercises of the Russian Army; – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, September 24, 
2019, https://inosmi.ru/politic/20190924/245877334.html.
43 “The Telegraph (Velikobritaniya): NATO Preduprezhdaet Rossiyu, Chto Koronavirus Ee 
Ne Slomil [NATO Warns Russia That COVID-19 Has Not Broken It;  – in Russian],” 
Inosmi.Ru, April 2, 2020, https://inosmi.ru/politic/20200402/247186363.html.
44 “CNN (SShA): Rossiyskiy Samolet Narushil Vozdushnoe Prostranstvo NATO Pri Popytke 
Perekhvata Amerikanskogo Bombardirovshchika B-52 [CNN (USA): Russian Aircraft 
Violated NATO Airspace While Attempting to Intercept American B-52 Bomber; – in 
Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, September 2, 2019.
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presented repeats the argument that Western journalists have used multiple 
times in the past thus devaluing the content of the articles by means that 
there is nothing new in it. For example, when commenting on the report on 
NATO Exercise Eager Leopard that took place in Lithuania in September 
2020 originally published in Le Figaro, editors of the website wrote, “The 
Baltic States once again see Russia as a threat, and they turned to NATO 
for help. Stating this, the correspondent of the French newspaper does not 
bother to comprehend the real state of affairs and, as a result, does not notice 
how contradictory the evidence of this ‘threat’ is.”45
Sometimes, editors of the Inosmi.Ru target the authors of the translated 
articles or the newsmakers whose opinions the article presents. Sometimes 
they point at the fact that the author of the translated article has already 
published several articles that were critical of particular Russian actions 
but did not present sufficient evidence to support the critique in order to 
devalue the article in question. For example, when commenting on the arti-
cle by Jouko Juonala, originally published in the Finnish Ilta-Sanomat, edi-
tors of Inosmi.Ru wrote the following: “If Finland becomes the target of an 
attack, it will not automatically receive military aid from the West, according 
to a Finnish journalist known for his ‘objective’ attitude towards Russia. It 
is from Russia that the attack is supposed to be, and the only insurance can, 
of course, be Finland’s entry into NATO.”46 In general, editors of Inosmi.
Ru often claim that particular opinions critical of certain Russian actions or 
even of authors of media reports, in which those opinions were presented, 
are subjective.
Finally, an editorial note can claim that the author of the article presents 
certain opinions, but readers of the media in which the article was origi-
nally published do not agree with those opinions. In such a case, the website 
publishes not only the article itself, but also some of the comments posted 
on the website of the media, where the original article was published. For 
example, when commenting on the interview of former Polish army officer 
Roman Polko, originally published in the Polish media ‘Do Rzeczy’, editors 
45 “Le Figaro (Frantsiya): Pribaltika  – Soldaty NATO Na Pervoy Linii Oborony Ot 
Rossiyskoy Ugrozy [Le Figaro (France): The Baltic States  – NATO Soldiers on First 
Line of Defense against Russian Threat; – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, September 30, 2020, 
https://inosmi.ru/politic/20200930/248220688.html.
46 “Ilta-Sanomat (Finlyandiya): Poluchit Li Finlyandiya Pomoshch v Sluchae Napadeniya 
Rossii? [Ilta-Sanomat (Finland): Will Finland Get Support in Case of Russian Attack? – In 
Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, February 27, 2020, https://inosmi.ru/politic/20200227/246938714.
html.
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of the website wrote, “General Roman Polko, in an interview with a popular 
weekly, praises the US decision to place the command of the US 5th Army 
Corps in Poznan. He says that even Finland can now sleep peacefully – 
aggressive Russia will be wary of attacking it. The readers are not enthusias-
tic, as they have different opinions.”47 Editors of Inosmi.Ru often stress their 
comments, preceding translated interviews posted on the website of military 
officers or NATO civilian officials, and thus the opinions presented in those 
interviews are biased thanks to their official status.
The use of the term “aggressive Russia” in the above-quoted editorial 
note allows a placing of it into a separate category of editorial notes – those 
that hyperbolize Western critique of Russian actions. Such editorial notes 
aim to convince the readers that such emotionally charged assessments of 
the Russian actions, which in practice can only rarely by found in Western 
media when it comments very exceptional Russian actions, are commonly 
in use in the West when discussing Russia. By doing so, those editors want 
to convince their readers that a narrative similar to the equation of Russia to 
Mordor is dominant in Western media discourse while not in public opin-
ion in Western countries where many people allegedly view Russia posi-
tively. They want to convince the readers that certain interest groups in the 
West, for example, have created the narrative such as those discussed in 
Tsygankov’s book, which has been translated into Russian.48 They want to 
convince the readers that most reports published in Western media of any 
Russian action are influenced by that narrative, and due to that, Western 
media perceives all Russian actions negatively regardless of intentions and 
outcomes of those actions.
Following the title of Tsygankov’s book, the editors of Inosmi.Ru 
often use the word “Russophobic” when commenting on critical opinions 
expressed in translated articles that the website posts. For example, when 
commenting on the report on Russian military exercises that took place in 
Northern Caucasus in September 2020 originally published by Le Figaro, the 
editors of the website wrote, “The exercises of the Russian army look like a 
show of strength in the face of NATO.”49 How else? We defend our borders 
47 “Le Figaro (Frantsiya): Bolshie Rossiyskie Ucheniya Na Kavkaze [Le Figaro (France): 
Large Russian Exercises in the Caucasus; – in Russian]”,” Inosmi.Ru, September 28, 2020, 
https://inosmi.ru/politic/20200928/248203783.html.
48 Andrei Tsygankov, Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
49 “Le Figaro (Frantsiya): Bolshie Rossiyskie Ucheniya Na Kavkaze [Le Figaro (France): 
Large Russian Exercises in the Caucasus; – in Russian]”.”
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and security, which was appreciated by the military inspectors of Germany, 
Denmark, France, and Romania. But the main thing for the author is to 
convey to the readers a Russophobic attitude.” The editors of the website 
attribute the authors, whose translated articles the website posts, a usage of 
emotionally charged terms such as the Kremlin’s “occupation” of Europe50 in 
an attempt to demonstrate that the use of such terms is the norm in Western 
media, even if such terms do not appear in the original article.
Conclusions
Russian perceptions of Western critique of its actions, including foreign 
policy actions, is ambivalent. Many Russians use the West and Europe as 
a reference group, they look for Western assessments of Russian actions, 
and when they cannot find such assessments easily, they start to demand 
it. The website Inosmi.Ru, which provided with empirical evidence prov-
ing grounds for the conclusions of this paper, was founded exactly in order 
to satisfy that demand. On other hand, many Russians, who read Western 
assessments of Russian actions, approach such assessments sceptically. 
Though Russian discourse contains elements that help justifyg arrogance 
toward peoples and countries of Asia and Africa, which can be qualified as 
Orientalist, the discourse contains elements that allow for an ignorance of 
Western critique by means of perceiving it as based on arrogance towards 
peoples and countries of non-West, which is allegedly a characteristic of 
Westerns elites.
That arrogance, many Russians believe, makes representatives of Western 
elites ground their assessments of Russia’s actions, as well as of actions of 
other non-Western countries, on stereotypes rather than facts. This is clearly 
seen in the website Inosmi.Ru, which belongs to the state-owned Russian 
media holding Rossiya Segodnya that also owns such Russian mass media as 
the RT and the Sputnik. Unlike RT and Sputnik, which are mostly targeted 
on foreign audiences, over half of readers of Inosmi.Ru come from Russia, 
though slightly under half of other readers are Russophobic residents of 
foreign countries. The website publishes many translated articles originally 
published in Western media that contain critical assessments of Russia’s 
50 “National Review (SShA): Vladimir Putin Beret Evropu v Kol’tso [National Review 
(USA): Vladimir Putin Surrounds Europe; – in Russian],” Inosmi.Ru, March 20, 2020, 
https://inosmi.ru/politic/20200320/247090687.html.
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actions. However, each translated article is preceded with an editorial note 
advising readers about alleged shortcomings of particular translated arti-
cles; this paper benefited from the results of qualitative content analysis of 
those editorial notes. In particular, it found that sometimes those editorial 
notes attempt to devalue the critique contained in the translated articles, but 
sometimes, to the contrary, they attempt to hyperbolize the critique.
 The hyperbolization of critical assessments of particular actions can 
be regarded as another tactic aimed at devaluing them, similar to a decon-
struction of such arguments behind such assessments or to attacking those 
expressing them. On other hand, exercises in this hyperbolization, many of 
which can be found among the editorial notes presenting translated articles 
posted at Inosmi.Ru, demonstrate that many Russians refer to self-Oriental-
ism as a strategy to cope with Western critique of their country. While some 
Russians tend to downplay the differences between their country and the 
West, arguing that most of Russia’s actions are not fundamentally different 
from Western similar actions, other Russians tend to exaggerate these dif-
ferences. That inversion contributes to formation of the narrative in Russian 
discourse on the West that contains elements helpful in justifying its arro-
gance toward the West. That arrogance rests on the assumption of Russian 
superiority, which was forged in the fire of the hardships that Russians have 
suffered throughout their history, from which the assumed tendency, popu-
lar among Western elite is to perceive Russia as a kind of Mordor plays an 
important role.
104 NIKITA LOMAGIN
Where People Stand: Public Attitudes in Russia towards 
the West
Professor Nikita Lomagin  Nikita LOMAGIN
Abstract 
This paper aims to analyse public attitudes in Russia towards the United 
States, European Union, and NATO in the period following Russia’s incor-
poration of Crimea, the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and the follow-
ing war of sanctions. Polls show serious shifts in Russian popular attitudes 
since 2014. The country was able to withstand different external shocks, 
including the sanction regime. Mass surveys also show that the Russian 
people have acquired a sense of self-confidence due to the perceived growth 
of the military might of the state. Those two factors might serve as a new 
foundation for potential rapprochement with the West. Moreover, COVID-
19 and other unifying threats have also contributed to these changes in 
public attitudes. Russian leaders (and official mass media) have also called 
for cooperation with the West in fighting these common problems. Thus, 
mass surveys indicate that the siege mentality in the minds of the people has 
begun to fade, and more and more Russians tire of this confrontation. As per 
NATO, the Alliance’s unpopularity is largely determined by the unpopularity 
of its strongest member state – the United States. 
Key words: Russian popular opinion, WCIOM, Levada-Center, the Pew 
Research Center, the West, United States
Introduction 
As already observed, “Understanding Russian public opinion is not simply a 
matter of popularity; it is a matter of global security.” While scholars of inter-
national relations continue to debate the causal connection between public 
opinion and foreign policy, the intensification of anti-Western rhetoric that 
has emerged in Russian public discourse since 2014 holds important and trou-
bling implications for the future of international relations in Europe.1 
1 Bret Shafer, “Ally or Adversary? Public Opinion of NATO in Post-Soviet Russia,” USC 
Center on Public Diplomacy, 2016, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/student-paper/ally-
or-adversary-public-opinion-nato-post-soviet-russia. 
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One dimension of NATO’s so-called ‘dual-track approach’ to Russia today 
is dialogue in order to meet a number of common problems and threats 
such as terrorism, arms control, non-proliferation, pandemics, and climate 
change.2 Indeed, cooperation with Russia is essential if the United States 
and the EU are to mitigate those threats and achieve stability and security in 
Europe and the Middle East. In sum, both global and regional stability heav-
ily depends on relations between Russia and the West. In the past, US inabil-
ity to successfully address Russian concerns has inflamed Russian phobias 
over NATO, which is viewed in Moscow as one of Washington’s key foreign 
policy tools. In the case of Ukraine, the West’s overtures to the opposition in 
Kiev in 2014 directly or indirectly contributed to the crises over Ukraine.3 
This paper aims to analyse public attitudes in Russia towards the United 
States, European Union, and NATO in the period following Russia’s incor-
poration of Crimea, military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, and the follow-
ing war of sanctions. The sources for this paper come from a combination 
of three types of surveys conducted by the official Russian agency WCIOM 
(Russian Public Opinion Research Centre), an independent agency Levada-
Center registered in Russia as a foreign agent, and the Pew Research Center. 
These three polls perfectly complement each other. The Pew provides two 
vital pieces of data. The first one covers the issue of Russia’s perception about 
its global status since 2014, and the second one focuses on Russians’ take on 
NATO. Polls by WCIOM and Levada-Center do not duplicate each other but 
rather shed the light on the same issues at different periods. 
‘Hot Potatoes’ in Relations between Russia and the West 
About ten years ago, one British diplomat came to conclusion that there are 
several fundamental reasons of mistrust between Russia and the EU/the West. 
First, the legacy of the past colours the relationship. Second, we are paying a 
price for disappointed expectations on both sides – expectations that arose 
through naivety, ignorance, and a lack of understanding, which Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn once called “the clash of illusory hopes against reality.” Third, 
there are genuine and substantive differences of interest and policy between 
2 “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” NATO, 25 November 2020, https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-
Uni.pdf 
3 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions 
That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014.
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Russia and EU (NATO enlargement, energy security, ex-Soviet space, etc.). 
Fourth, the conflict of values is an obstacle to partnership. Fifth, differences 
have been played up for reasons of domestic politics and this happens on both 
sides. All of these aforementioned challenges originate in elite perceptions and 
mainstream mass media coverage from both sides. 
It is safe to say that fundamentally not too much has changed for 
better over the last several years. In fact, wars over history have only been 
enhanced. They were triggered by two anniversaries – the 80th anniversary 
of the beginning of WWII and the 75th anniversary of the end of WWII. 
Other attempts by Warsaw and some other states to initiate a blame game 
against the Soviet Union, to revise the results of the Second World War, and 
attempts to remove monuments to liberator soldiers have been met with a 
strong response from the Kremlin. 
In so doing, President Putin published an article in the National Interest 
about “the real lessons” of the 75th Anniversary of the Second World War.4 
In late November 2020, the Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoigu 
referred to WW2 in response to his German counterpart Annegret Kramp-
Karrenbauer’s remarks that “it was necessary to talk with Russia from a posi-
tion of strength.” Shoigu advised Kramp-Karrenbauer to turn to her grand-
father, “Who will tell you what it is like to talk to Russia from a position of 
strength… It will take [Germany] a hundred years or even longer to pray for 
sins that your ancestors have committed,” Shoigu said.5 
The hopes in the West that Russians would easily reject great power 
status have also failed. Quite contrary, according to a Pew Research Center 
survey of 2018, people in Russia stand out for being much more likely to say 
their country is playing a bigger role in world affairs than are people in other 
countries. For example, 72 percent of Russians said their country is playing a 
more important role in the world today than it did a decade ago. This com-
pares with a median of 42 percent across the 25 other countries surveyed.6 
4 “Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II.” National 
Interest, 18 June 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-
75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982. 
5 “Shoigu reacted to the “attacks of a primary school student”,” Tekdeeps, 29 November 29 
2020, https://tekdeeps.com/shoigu-reacted-to-the-attacks-of-a-primary-school-student/ 
6 A variety of factors may be behind how people feel about their own country’s rising 
or falling importance on the global stage. Those who are more optimistic about their 
national economy think their country’s role in the world is growing. See Laura Silver, 
“Russians, Indians, Germans especially likely to say their countries are more globally 
important,” Pew Research Center, 12 November 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/11/12/russians-indians-germans-especially-likely-to-say-their-countries-
are-more-globally-important/. 
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As far as Western sanctions are concerned, the vast majority of Russians 
(87 percent) believe that they did not create significant problems for them 
and their families. This was the highest indicator since the spring of 2014 
when first sanctions were introduced, according to Levada Center. The min-
imal share of those who did not face with problems because of sanctions was 
registered in January 2015 (57 percent).7 
It might indicate that Russians will hardly agree with the role of ‘norm-
taker’ in their relations with the West be it military and non-military secu-
rity, or energy, or developments in the common neighbourhood.
As far as values are concerned, going beyond lessons of history, President 
Putin referred to patriotism and collectivism of the Soviet people as one 
of the decisive factors in their fight against the Nazis in his article in the 
National Interest. 8 
In another speech on countering the Coronavirus, he spoke of those 
who were against restrictions and believed that the main thing is to save the 
economy. Putin compared such thoughts with the idea of natural selection. 
He turned to literary examples and recalled the story of Jack London’s ‘Law 
of Life’ – where the tribe abandoned their old who had become a burden. 
Children left their parents to the mercy of wild animals, leaving them to die.
“And the old father, left alone by the fire, believed and hoped to the end 
that his sons would return after him. Can you imagine for a moment what 
you can do with our parents, with our grandparents, as in this story? I will 
never believe in it, this is not our genetic code,” Putin concluded.9
The emphasis on the Russian ‘genetic code’ referred not only to the local 
COVID-19 deniers but also to those in Russia who view the West as a role 
model. During the first half of 2020, Russian official mass media has cov-
ered in detail the ‘every nation for itself ’ policy in combating the pandemic 
in Europe in the place of a well-expected solidarity within the EU and the 
West in general. 
7 “Bolshinstvo rossiyan ne chuvstvuet problem ot zapadnyh sanktsij” Levada Center, 17 
March 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/03/17/bolshinstvo-rossiyan-ne-chuvstvuet-
problem-ot-zapadnyh-sanktsij/. 
8 According to mass surveys, today Russians view patriotism threefold. First, patriotism is 
primarily related to love for homeland; 85 percent of Russians consider the opposite thing 
as unpatriotic. Second, over the past two years, the share of those who link connections 
with other countries to the lack of patriotism has increased. Third, 23 percent of Russians 
consider it unpatriotic to express an opinion that runs counter the official stance. See 
“Russians Explained What They Mean By Patriotism,” VCIOM, 20 February 2020, 
https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1749. 
9 “Совещание с руководителями субъектов Федерации по вопросам противо дейст-
вия распространению коронавирусной инфекции,” President of Russia, 28 April 2020, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63288. 
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It was supposed to demonstrate the impotence of the EU, United States, 
and NATO to meet this new challenge when the Western states and insti-
tutions were put under stress. Moreover, the media’s focus on individual-
ism and the lack of decent social protection for old and poor has aimed at 
showing the West’s hypocrisy about human rights and equal opportunities 
in getting minimal medical services. Alas, Russia and the bulk of Western 
countries see each other through the prism of the ‘Significant Other,’ i.e., the 
actor against whom they build their own identity.
The United States as the ‘Significant Other’
There is a powerful point in the literature on contemporary Russia-US rela-
tions that from the second US war against Iraq onward, the United States 
has become the ‘Significant Other’ for the Russian elite. Moreover, Russia’s 
reaction overall to US foreign policy reflects growing concerns about 
Washington’s unilateralism and a lack of respect to international law that 
fuelled feelings of insecurity. Putin’s 2007 speech in Munich mirrored the 
whole spectrum of the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction with the United States. The 
global economic crises that originated in Wall Street have undermined yet 
another significant pillar of the US popularity across the world, including in 
Russia. In the eyes of many Russians, the United States ceased to be immune 
to tectonic economic shocks. Moreover, it was the main cause of them. 
The ‘limited partnership’ under the Obama administration has pro-
duced some tangible results, but it did not change significantly attitudes 
towards Washington either in the Kremlin or among ordinary people.10 The 
Snowden case and the crises of Syria practically ruined the atmosphere of 
‘reset.’ Emerging competition over Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 was 
just the last increase in growing discontent between the two sides. 
The contemporary Russian foreign policy concept reads, “The attempts 
made by Western powers to maintain their positions in the world, includ-
ing by imposing their point of view on global processes and conducting a 
10 US forces and supplies could pass through Russian airspace on their way to Afghanistan; 
US President Barack Obama announced that the United States was dropping the Bush 
Administration’s plan to build a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe; the United 
States and Russia agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In addition, Russia finally 
joined the WTO. Later, in 2015, the Iranian nuclear deal was made when the crises over 
Ukraine overshadowed Russia’s relations with the West. 
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policy to contain alternative centres of power, leads to a greater instability in 
international relations and growing turbulence on the global and regional 
levels. The struggle for dominance in shaping the key principles of the future 
international system has become a key trend at the current stage of interna-
tional development.”11
Thus, although there are some experts who believe that 2014 was the 
turning point in US-Russia relations, Russians stopped loving the United 
States long before crises over Ukraine. In fact, there were several occasions 
in late 1990s and early 2000s when US popularity in Russia has been as low 
as in 2014 when Washington imposed sanctions on Moscow. 
Changes in US popularity in Russia have been registered since late 1980s 
when the United States became the focal point of many sociological surveys 
in Russia. According to the Levada Center, until the financial crisis of 1998, 
the number of Russians who viewed the United States positively was in the 
range of 75 percent (in the early 1990s) and 67 percent (December of 1998). 
A twofold decline of positive attitudes towards the United States took place 
after NATO’s bombings of Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 (33 percent). 
The rise of sympathies for the United States occurred after the terrorist 
attacks in September 2001 (70 percent). The Iraq War (2003) resulted in 
decline of popularity of the United States in Russia with only 27 percent of 
those who viewed the United States positively. The outbreak of the financial 
crises in 2008 reduced the share of those with good perceptions about the 
United States to 23 percent.12 
Similar trends were traced by the sociologists in terms of public atti-
tudes in Russia towards the European Union, albeit positive sentiment 
toward united Europe was higher than those toward the United States. As 
per NATO, the alliance remains very unpopular in Russia. In 2007, there is 
only 30 percent of survey respondents in Russia who have a favourable opin-
ion of NATO, but in 2015, the situation changed. According to the Spring 
2015 Global Attitudes Survey, 50 percent of the Russians viewed NATO as 
a major threat, 31 percent as minor threat, 10 percent not as a threat at all 
11 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, 30 November 2016, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_
documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. 
12 “Отношение к странам,” Levada Center, 2020, https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/
otnoshenie-k-stranam/ 
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while 8 percent did not have an opinion.13 In 2019, only 14 percent of survey 
respondents in Russia had a positive opinion of the alliance.14
Four years of the Trump administration have not substantially changed 
Russia’s perception about the United States, though there were some hopes 
for improvement in bilateral relations and even ‘a deal’ with Washington in 
2017. With time, those hopes evaporated which demonstrate mass surveys 
on Russia-US relations by VCIOM, 2016-2019.15 
By the end of 2019, an overwhelming majority of Russians (85 percent) 
viewed current Russia-US relations as negatively as a year ago (86 percent 
in 2018). Russians tend to see the bilateral relations as “tense” (52 percent), 
“chilly” (20 percent) or “hostile” (13 percent). At the same time, 52 percent 
of respondents considered that Russia should strengthen cooperation with 
the United States in the realm of security. 
There was a general opinion that more attention should also be paid 
to culture (47 percent) and political ties (45 percent). The least important 
area of cooperation was education (39 percent); one-third of Russians (30 
percent) thought that nothing should be changed and 17 percent said that 
cooperation in this area should be cut. Compared with 2018, the number of 
Russians who believed that the bilateral cooperation across all areas should 
be intensified has decreased.
More than half of Russians were indifferent toward President Donald 
Trump. 53 percent of Russians expressed such views (an all-time high). 
Almost every second Russian considered that no changes were expected 
in Russia-US relations (47 percent); this share has increased by 10 per-
centage points over a year (37 percent in 2018). The share of those who 
expected positive changes was almost equal to the share of those who saw 
the future more negatively (19 percent vs 20 percent). However, the number 
of Russians with positive views was 8 percentage points higher in 2018.
According to another report by VCIOM in late October 2019, the list of 
the least friendly states included the United States, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom. Since December 2018, the share of Russians who say that there is 
13 “Half in Russia Say NATO Is a Major Military Threat,” Pew Research Center, 8 June 
2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-
ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/russia-ukraine-report-16/ 
14 “Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g. NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States,” 
Pew Research Center, 9 February 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/
nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/ 
15 “All quiet on the Western front,” WCIOM, 18 November 2019, https://wciom.com/index.
php?id=61&uid=1724 
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a real military threat to Russia has decreased by 12 percent (31 percent). The 
highest levels of threat reported by Russians were recorded in April 2018 
(50 percent), which might have been shaped by the introduction of new 
anti-Russia sanctions and a conflict with the United Kingdom (Skripal case). 
The number of those who say that nothing poses a military threat to 
Russia has increased from 53 percent in 2018 to 61 percent in 2019. The 
United States is perceived as a key potential source of military threat to 
Russia. Nevertheless, the share of those who think so significantly decreased 
in October 2019 compared to the January measurement (53 percent; 65 
percent in January 2019). Besides the United States, the top two countries 
which posed a threat includes Ukraine (26 percent; down 19 percentage 
points compared to January 2019) and China (7 percent; down 7 percentage 
points).16
2020: An Unexpected Thaw?
The January 2020 mass survey did show that Russians feel somewhat worse 
about China because of the pandemic, though sympathy to this country 
remains rather high (65 percent versus 72 percent in November 2019) while 
their attitudes towards the West substantially improved. According to the 
Levada Center, two thirds of respondents are in favour of partnership with 
the West, and 61 percent of them believe that the West has no reasons to 
fear Russia. 
Sociologists are sure that the peak of the anti-Western sentiment has 
passed and Russians are tired of confrontation. They understand that spend-
ing on guns simply means having less money for butter, i.e., healthcare, edu-
cation, and social support. That is why this readiness to normalize relations 
with the West substantially increased. Survey data shows that 42 percent of 
respondents feel positively about the United States (17 percent increase from 
January 2018) and 49 percent sympathize with the EU (against 32 percent in 
January 2018, see Table 1). 
16 “Friends Or Enemies,” WCIOM, 28 October 2019, https://wciom.com/index.php?id= 
61&uid=1719. 
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Table 1. General Opinion in Russia towards the European Union, 2018–2020 
Jan.18 Feb.19 May19 Aug.19 Nov.19 Jan.20
Very good 3 5 4 5 7 5
Somewhat good 29 37 33 45 45 44
Somewhat bad 33 30 30 23 24 26
Very bad 13 15 14 11 10 11
Do not know 22 13 19 17 15 15
In 2020, only 3 percent of respondents viewed the West as an enemy, 16 
percent regard the West as adversary. 67 percent believe in partnership and 
11 percent even in friendship with the West (see Table 2). 
Table 2. What is the West to Russia? Mass Survey, 2016–2020
There are different views on Russian relations with the West. What is your opinion on how 
Russia should treat the West? 
May 16 Jan.17 June18 Jan.20
As enemy 7 8 5 3
As competitor 24 31 16 16
As partner 55 43 61 67
As friend 4 7 8 11
Do not know 7 7 8 4
Refused to respond 3 5 2 1
At the same, 52 percent share the opinion that Russia should be vigilant 
towards NATO while 44 percent sense that Russia has no reasons to be fear-
ful. In this regard, it seems that some impact on this trend was made by dis-
content within the alliance symbolically presented by the President Macron 
saying that NATO is ‘becoming brain-dead.’”17
17 The French president has warned European countries that they can no longer rely on 
America to defend NATO allies. “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death 
of NATO,” Macron declared in an interview with The Economist. Europe stands on 
“the edge of a precipice,” he says, and needs to start thinking of itself strategically as 
a geopolitical power; otherwise, we will “no longer be in control of our destiny.” See 
“Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead,” The Economist, 7 
November 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-
warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead. 
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At the same time, this mass survey shows that there is an increasing share 
of people in Russia who do not regard the country as a European one. In late 
2019, only 37 percent of respondents viewed Russia as the European country 
(against 52 in August 2018) while 55 percent of respondents believed that 
Russia was not a European state (against 36 percent in August 2018). Of 
course, data on ‘Europeaness’ of Russians can vary substantially from region 
to region and across different age groups.18 
The Future is Gloomy
The 2020 US elections had a negative impact on the attitudes of the Russian 
public towards the United States. In August 2020, there were 42 percent of 
those who felt positively about the United States and 46 percent who felt 
negatively. In late November, 51 percent of Russian respondents described 
it negatively, and 25 percent said their take on the US was ‘very negative’ 
(see Table 3).
Table 3. Russian Public Opinion of the United States of America, 2020
  01.2020 08.2020 11.2020
Very good 4 6 5
Somewhat good 38 36 30
Somewhat bad 28 26 26
Very bad 18 20 25
Do not know 12 12 14
Thus, Russians are very sceptical about the future of US-Russian relations 
under the Biden administration. Bad memories about the Obama-Biden 
anti-Russian policy in 2014–2016 are rather vivid amongst both the Russian 
18 Sociologist Natalia Zubarevich divides Russia into four main subgroups: 1) big cities 
(36 % of population – middle class and internet users); 2) medium size cities, including 
mono-towns (25% of population; less developed and hit by the crises); 3) province 
(agrarian areas, small towns (38%); 4) North Caucasus, Tuva and Altai (6% of popula-
tion; instability and high unemployment; main recipients of federal transfers). In 
general, Zubarevich sees Russian politics through the prism of competition between 
developed cities and backward province whose population share is still larger. See Natalia 
Zubarevich. “Chetyre Rossii,” Vedomosti, 30 December 2011, https://www.vedomosti.ru/
opinion/articles/2011/12/30/chetyre_rossii. 
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elite and public. It seems Washington will continue to support Kiev  – 
politically and diplomatically as well as militarily. Thus, a major irritant 
in US-Russian relations will continue to exist. As Dmitri Trenin observed, 
“In Russian eyes, the most dangerous element of US policy has been 
Washington’s support for Ukraine’s NATO membership... Fears of the dan-
gers associated with NATO’s eastern enlargement are probably exaggerated, 
but they remain an article of faith within the Russian security and military 
communities, where memories of Hitler’s surprise attack of 1941 live on.”19
Mass surveys reflect such a mood among vast majority of Russians. In 
2016, 46 percent of respondents believed in improvement of relations with 
Washington, while in November of 2020, only 12 percent are optimistic. 
Moreover, during elections in the United States, more than one half of the 
Russian respondents viewed the United States negatively. Contrary to the 
same period in 2016, there is an increase in those who share positive views 
about the United States. In November 2020, there were 35 percent of such 
respondents, while in 2016 there was only 28 percent.20 This means that the 
window of opportunities for improvement in Russia-West relations remains 
open. In sum, despite the existing sanctions regime, there is a shift in public 
opinion in Russia in favour of better relations with both the European Union 
and the United States, albeit that most Russians believe that relations with 
America will get worse under the Biden administration. 
Mass surveys indicate that the siege mentality in the minds of the people 
is fading and more and more Russians tire of this confrontation. What might 
be seen today as ‘rapid’ changes in public attitudes in Russia are not so rapid 
at all. On the one hand, we see serious shifts in general mind sets of Russians 
since 2014. The country was able to successfully withstand different exter-
nal shocks, including sanctions. Polls also show that the Russian people has 
acquired a sense of self-confidence because of the growing military might 
of the state. Those two factors might serve as a new foundation for poten-
tial rapprochement with the West. Moreover, COVID-19 and other unify-
ing threats also contribute to the change in public attitudes. Russian leaders 
and official mass media also call for cooperation with the West in fighting 
common problems. 
19 Dmitri Trenin, “The World Through Moscow’s Eyes: A Classic Russian Perspective,” The 
Foreign Service Journal, 3 March 2020, https://carnegie.ru/2020/03/03/world-through-
moscow-s-eyes-classic-russian-perspective-pub-81203. 
20 “Otnosheniya s SSHA pri dzhozefe Bajdene,” Levada Center, 1 December 2020,
 https://www.levada.ru/2020/12/01/otnosheniya-s-ssha-pri-dzhozefe-bajdene/. 
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As per NATO, the Alliance’s unpopularity is largely determined by the 
unpopularity of its strongest member state – the United States. In addition 
to this, NATO lacks what Joseph Nye characterized as ‘soft power’ – a cate-
gory which can be attributed to certain group of states that are attractive and 
influential because of their highly developed economy, superb universities, 
and rule of law (the case of the United States) or welfare system and great 
culture (‘old’ Europe). NATO has none of them. 
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Abstract
In the past several years, Putin and the Russian Federation have abused the 
absence of global leadership, the lack of coherent rules or global order, and 
other possibilities to utilize its power and advantages in areas of strategic 
interests. This paper provides a succinct overview of these claims, as the 
West has normally assigned Russia failures, embarrassments, or miscal-
culations in these fields. For example, the situation in Ukraine, in Syria, 
crackdowns against political opponents, or the relationship with the former 
President of the United States, Donald. J. Trump, are cited. Inside of Russia, 
these particular campaigns are nonetheless considered as victories in for-
eign relations. Nevertheless, the author delivers an outlook within which 
these Russian activities abroad are explained in relation to certain caveats or 
results. The Kremlin’s actions do receive calculated responses, but the West 
must be ready to endure this revisionist Russia in the long term, but this 
might not comply with the traditional international relations principles or 
understandings – but rather a vision or ideas inside of Kremlin. 
Key words: Russia, power, decline, complete victory, superpower, defeat, 
Nazi, Stalin, politics, policymakers, understanding, Western actions, Russian 
counteractions 
Costs and Benefits
In September-November 2020, fighting resumed between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s role in 
the renewal of the conflict – its precursors, its course, and its eventual reso-
lution – was the subject of widely varying assessments. Early commentary 
spoke of Russia’s “error”, “embarrassment”, “miscalculation” and “failure”,1 
1 Jamie Dettmer, “Did Russian Miscalculation Spark Nagorno-Karabakh Flare-Up?,” VOA 
News, 22 October 2020, https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/did-russian-
miscalculation-spark-nagorno-karabakh-flare; Neil Melvin, “Russia’s Reach Exceeds Its 
Grasp Over the Karabakh Conflict,” RUSI Commentary, 20 October 2020, https://rusi.
org/commentary/russias-reach-exceeds-its-grasp-over-karabakh-conflict.
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and suggested it showed that “Moscow is almost not reckoned with, it 
appears like a declining power.”2 By the time Russia eventually succeeded in 
brokering a lasting ceasefire in November, these comments had largely been 
replaced by talk of Russia’s “complete victory”3 – and those dissenting voices, 
which had suggested that the episode was indicative of Russia’s weakness 
and decline that and Moscow faced further trouble ahead, were reduced to 
a minority.4
However, the trajectory of these appraisals of Russia’s success or fail-
ure, depending not only on the course of events but also at times on their 
authors’ appreciation of Russia as a whole, followed an entirely familiar pat-
tern. Over the years, Russia’s actions have caused some pundits to declaim 
confidently that “This is a huge success for Moscow” at the exact same time 
as others explain that “This is an enormous setback for Russia.” And in most 
cases, early predictions of severe consequences for Moscow from a perceived 
misstep turn out to be misguided, and the long-term reveals a Russia that is, 
if not undamaged, then at the very least undeterred. Even in military con-
flicts, where the result might be expected to be incontrovertible, “in some 
cases, Euro-Atlantic observers see defeats where the Russian view is more 
ambiguous – or may see victory.”5 
If we leave aside the influence of partisan commentators writing accord-
ing to their own predilections, one core reason for this repetitive pattern 
is that Russia follows strategies that some Western analysts like to think 
are self-defeating but which in fact achieve acceptable results according to 
Moscow’s own calculus. Russia having a distinctive perception of benefits 
compared to costs is nothing new. The achievements most revered in Russia 
2 Mansur Mirovalev, “What role is Russia playing in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?,” 
Al-Jazeera, 19 October 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/19/is-russia-
reduced-to-a-secondary-role-in-nagorno-karabakh. 
3 Anders Åslund, “Putin’s Karabakh victory sparks alarm in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, 11 
November 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-karabakh-
victory-sparks-alarm-in-ukraine/; Mike Eckel, “As Guns Fall Silent In Nagorno-Karabakh, 
There’s One Winner In The Conflict You Might Not Expect,” RFE/RL, 10 November 
2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/as-guns-fall-silent-in-nagorno-karabakh-there-s-one-
winner-in-the-conflict-you-might-not-expect/30940966.html. 
4 Mark Galeotti, “Russian Ceasefire Deal in Nagorno-Karabakh Marks Slow, Painful 
End of Empire in the South Caucasus,” The Moscow Times, 10 November 2020, https://
www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/11/10/russian-ceasefire-deal-marks-slow-painful-
end-of-empire-in-the-south-caucasus-a72001; Thomas de Waal, “A Precarious Peace 
for Karabakh,” Carnegie Moscow Centre, 11 November 2020, https://carnegie.ru/
commentary/83202. 
5 Andrew Monaghan, “From Victory to Defeat: Assessing the Russian Leadership’s War 
Calculus”, Russia Research Network, undated.
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come at appalling costs, which for other countries would result in a far more 
ambivalent assessment of their value. Peter the Great modernised Russia and 
turned it into a contemporary great power at the cost of enormous suffer-
ing borne by the Russian people. Stalin defeated Nazi Germany and turned 
Russia into a superpower, by means including enslaving or murdering mil-
lions of its citizens, while leaving millions more on the brink of starvation. 
When it comes to foreign policy too, the objectives and methods of 
Russian state and non-state actors can at times be hard to understand for 
Western observers. Russian actions can at times seem incompatible with 
rational state policy. Often, the rationality gap arises because Russia is oper-
ating within an entirely different framework of statecraft and assumptions 
about international relations from Western liberal democracies. 
In order to explore this gap, this paper will consider a number of case 
studies  – Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine and Syria and non-
military attacks on the societies and political processes of Western states – 
to identify common themes and draw conclusions from them about the 
nature of success or failure for Russia, how that may differ from European 
or North American perceptions, and most importantly how this contributes 
to Russian actions continuing to surprise the West. 
Russia and Ukraine
The most vivid expression of this divergence, still highly topical at the time 
of writing, is the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s seizure of Crimea and assault 
on eastern Ukraine were launched in response to a notional threat that was 
imperceptible other than to Russia itself; very few in the West could predict 
the conflation of Ukraine seeking a closer relationship with the EU with 
imminent NATO control of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol. As 
Russia’s countermeasures unfolded, Western responses continued to be 
driven by a misguided assessment of Russia’s motivations. 
In early 2014, US President Barack Obama repeatedly offered Russia 
“off-ramps” to de-escalate the confrontation over Ukraine; an entirely futile 
effort since Russia would have no need for or interest in a route out of a situ-
ation that was developing entirely in its favour.6 The key dissonance between 
6 Walter Russell Mead, “Russia Blows Past Obama’s ‘Off Ramp,’” The American Interest, 
6 March 2014, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/03/06/russia-blows-past-
obamas-off-ramp/. 
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Obama and Putin – and one that lies at the root of a wide range of other 
miscalculations of Russia’s intent – lay in the perception of war. For Obama, 
and for many other Western leaders, it was axiomatic that a state of hostili-
ties must be as undesirable to Russia as it was to the West. For Russia, the 
hostilities were a means to an end and a necessary one after other means 
were exhausted. This greater acceptance of armed conflict as a means to 
resolve interstate policy clashes is a recurring feature in Russian calcula-
tions; as observed by experienced Russia-watcher Kadri Liik, “war and revo-
lution are not inimical to Moscow if they follow paths Russian policymakers 
understand and even support.”7
Russia has successfully leveraged this differential between its own and 
Western attitudes to conflict to cement in place its gains from armed inter-
ventions. In a pattern repeated in Georgia in 2008, or Ukraine and Syria 
in the last six years, Russia has co-opted Western leaders to impose on the 
victims of its aggression ceasefire agreements drafted in Moscow with terms 
that constrain the victim while allowing the aggressor, Russia, continued 
freedom of action (while in the case of Ukraine even denying it is even a 
party to the conflict). Be it Nicolas Sarkozy in the case of Georgia,8 Francois 
Hollande and Angela Merkel for the Minsk agreements on Ukraine,9 or 
former US Secretary of State John Kerry with successive ceasefires in Syria,10 
in each case, the driving objective of the Western dignitary involved has 
been to stop the fighting. Russia thus succeeds by virtue of pursuing a dif-
ferent aim; while the West wants to prevent or end conflict, Russia wants to 
secure advantage in it.
As the Ukraine conflict wore on, assessments of the longer-term conse-
quences for Moscow also arrived at differing conclusions withi and with-
out Russia. Former US Ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul argues, “It 
is hard to make the case … that intervening in Ukraine has strengthened 
Russia’s long-term national interests or power in the international system. 
The West imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on numerous 
7 Kadri Liik, “How Russia is winning at its own game,” European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 29 October 2020, https://ecfr.eu/article/upheaval-in-belarus-and-nagorno-
karabakh-how-russia-is-winning-at-its-own-game/. 
8 “The Nature of the Georgian Ceasefire,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, 
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 13 August 2008.
9 James Sherr, ‘Geopolitics and Security’, in The Struggle for Ukraine, Chatham House, 
August 2017, 11–13.
10 Keir Giles, “What Russia Learns From the Syria Ceasefire: Military Action Works,” 
Chatham House, 3 March 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2016/03/what-russia-
learns-syria-ceasefire-military-action-works .
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Russian individuals and companies. Starting in the third quarter of 2014, the 
Russian economy contracted for nine consecutive quarters.”11 But a detailed 
assessment published in 2017 found that worsening international attitudes 
toward Russia were not a significant consideration, and that economic 
damage – in part due to sanctions but primarily triggered by a major fall in 
the price of oil, the key driver for Russia’s economy – was tolerable. In fact, 
“despite the rational assessment that Crimea was a major policy mistake... 
for Putin it constitutes an already fundamental pillar of his legitimacy,” and 
furthermore in Russia, the “newfound feeling of being a great power [can] 
compensate for a lack of economic success, or civic freedoms and a sense of 
future prospective”.12
Russia and Syria
Russian actions in Ukraine were driven by overriding national objectives, 
which Russian foreign policy analyst Dmitry Suslov summarises among 
others as “preventing post-Soviet countries from joining other economic 
and security orders”, “maintaining Russia-centric economic and security 
orders in its neighbourhood,” and “taking an active and permanent part 
in global decision-making.”13 In Kadri Liik’s assessment, “if judged against 
these criteria, Moscow is doing well enough, at least at the moment.”14 
If measured by Dmitry Suslov’s first two objectives, Russia is “doing well” 
not only in Ukraine but also by providing carefully calibrated support to 
President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, facilitating his continuing grip 
on power in exchange for as yet unspecified concessions, while stopping 
short of an armed intervention that would risk solidifying Belarusian senti-
ment against Russia following the pattern set in Ukraine.15 Success in the 
11 Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign 
Policy,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Fall 2020), pp. 95–139, https://doi.org/10. 
1162/isec_a_00390. 
12 Anton Barbashin, “Crimea In Conclusion: A Successful Failure,” in Olga Irisova, 
Anton Barbashin, Fabian Burkhardt, Richard Martyn-Hemphill, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz 
(editors), “A Successful Failure: Russia After Crime(a),” The Centre for Polish-Russian 
Dialogue and Understanding, 2017.
13 Dmitry Suslov, speaking at NATO Defense College online event, 18 November 2020.
14 Kadri Liik, “How Russia is winning at its own game,” European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 29 October 2020, https://ecfr.eu/article/upheaval-in-belarus-and-nagorno-
karabakh-how-russia-is-winning-at-its-own-game/. 
15 Steven Pifer, “Is Putin about to make a costly mistake in Belarus?,” Brookings Institution, 
28 August 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/28/is-
putin-about-to-make-a-costly-mistake-in-belarus/. 
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third aim includes, by any objective measure, the results of Russia’s military 
intervention in Syria from October 2015 onwards. Here too, both the short- 
and long-term objectives of military action were misjudged abroad, leading 
to Western predictions of disaster for Russia, most popularly through being 
bogged down in a “quagmire” along the lines of Vietnam or Afghanistan.16 
But both Russia’s desired end state for Syria, and the means Russia found 
acceptable to get there, were misconstrued abroad. Just as in Ukraine, Russia 
intervened in Syria to stop a deteriorating security situation getting rapidly 
worse – in this case, the prospect of Western intervention to force the out-
come of the civil war, with what Russia saw as potentially catastrophic con-
sequences as demonstrated in Libya four years before.17 Once that immedi-
ate objective was met, and Syria was preserved as a state and the immediate 
threat of destabilising collapse was averted, Russia began to reap a range of 
second-order benefits. 
Syria became the proving ground for an intensive programme of test-
ing Russia’s armed forces under operational conditions, including their 
organisation, their logistics, their weapons systems, and their people. In 
the process, and especially when employing weapons systems that were not 
obviously suitable for the task at hand in order to assess their performance, 
Russia demonstrated a greater tolerance of risk of failure in testing and 
experimentation than would be typical for Western militaries where mis-
takes would have led to a much greater political cost. This applied in equal 
measure to the widely derided deployment of the aircraft carrier Admiral 
Kuznetsov to the Eastern Mediterranean in late 201618 and the disastrous 
consequences of allowing the Wagner private military company to join prep-
arations for an attack on US-backed forces near Deir ez-Zor in February 
2018.19 For any Western country, the mass casualties incurred in the latter 
16 Howard LaFranchi, “One year on, Russia’s war in Syria is hardly the predicted ‘quagmire,’” 
The Christian Science Monitor, 22 August 2016, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Foreign-Policy/2016/0822/One-year-on-Russia-s-war-in-Syria-is-hardly-the-predicted-
quagmire. 
17 Keir Giles, “The Turning Point For Russian Foreign Policy,” U.S. Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute, May 2017.
18 Ben Ho Wan Beng, “Assessing the Admiral Kuznetsov Deployment in the Syrian 
Conflict,” Real Clear Defense, 22 November 2016, https://www.realcleardefense.com/
articles/2016/11/22/assessing_the_admiral_kuznetsov_deployment_in_the_syrian_
conflict_110373.html 
19 Piotr Żochowski, Krzysztof Strachota, and Marek Menkiszak, “Russian losses near Deir 




incident could have led to severe consequences up to and including trig-
gering a withdrawal under domestic political pressure; however, Russia is 
subject to an entirely different set of pressures and constraints. 
Even the extent of the destruction in Syria caused by the war can be 
assessed differently. Barack Obama is reported to have asked, “What is 
it that Russia thinks it gains if it gets a country that has been completely 
destroyed as an ally that it now has to perpetually spend billions of dol-
lars to prop up?”20 However, this is to ignore the precedent of Chechnya, 
where vast subsidies from Russia’s state budget for reconstruction and the 
maintenance of a feudal leader are considered preferable to the alterna-
tive of continuing instability. In addition, according to Japanese researcher 
Hiroshi Yamazoe, “a development that was advantageous to Russian diplo-
macy emerged… While Russia’s military operations may have created new 
humanitarian issues, countries in the West are also beginning to take Russia 
into consideration as they move to draw up policies on dialogues toward 
ending the war in Syria and countering terrorism.”21
Finally, Western assessments also pointed to the potential difficulty 
Russia would face extricating itself from Syria at the end of its commitment 
there, based on the experience of Western military interventions that need – 
even if they are not always provided with – an exit strategy. Here too, pro-
jecting Western objectives onto Russia can be misleading. As British analyst 
Rod Thornton notes, talk of extrication overlooks the simple fact that the 
Russian presence is fully intended to be a long-term, or ideally permanent, 
project.22
Russia and Murder
Consideration of intervention in Syria leads naturally to an area of warfight-
ing where Russia is regularly accused of carelessness, incompetence, or 
casual brutality – namely its approach to collateral damage and fatalities 
among non-combatants. These accusations do not mean that Russia sets no 
20 Quoted in Derek Chollet, “The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and 
Redefined America’s Role in the World,” PublicAffairs, 2016, 172.
21 Hiroshi Yamazoe, “Russia’s Involvement in the Issue of Syria,” National Institute for Defense 
Studies (Japan), December 2016, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/
pdf/2016/briefing_e201612.pdf. 
22 Rod Thornton, “The Russian Military Commitment in Syria and the Eastern Mediter-
ranean,” The RUSI Journal, 17 October 2018, 30–38, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/03071847.2018.1529892. 
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value on human life, either of the adversary, of civilians, or of its own sol-
diery. Nonetheless, this value has a different relative weight when compared 
to other considerations of fighting and winning wars. 
At the height of the Russian and Russian-backed air offensive in Syria, 
US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley asked, “How many more 
children have to die before Russia cares?”23 – but the question missed the 
point. The perception that Russia lacks consideration for collateral damage 
and civilian casualties is based on a false premise; both of these are essential 
elements of Russian policy, aimed at terrorising the enemy and their civil-
ian support base into submission as rapidly as possible in order to bring 
the conflict to a successful conclusion and restore or impose order. When 
considering the results of Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Libya, one Russian argument is that Moscow’s approach is the more moral 
one, since the result of crushing the will to resist is swiftly delivered peace 
and stability as opposed to enduring chaos and destabilisation.
This is not a new phenomenon; Russia has always been considered 
careless with the lives of its soldiery, and callous with the lives of the civil-
ian population among whom it fights. Incidents during the campaigns 
in Chechnya are held up as examples of senseless inhumanity. The even-
tual condition of Chechnya – terrorised but stable – compared to its role 
throughout the first half of the 1990s as a centre of lawlessness that itself 
spread terror throughout southern Russia provides a case study where the 
end is considered, as a rational judgement rather than an automatic assump-
tion, to justify the means. This provides context for Russia’s operations in 
Syria, where the means to achieve objectives are repellent to Western sensi-
tivities but entirely logical to Russian commanders and leaders. 
Similar considerations surround Russia’s campaign of assassinations 
at home and abroad. The fact that some state murders abroad have been 
detected and exposed has been cited as evidence that the Russian intelli-
gence agencies are lacking in competence and expertise. Again, this may 
be measuring success by the wrong criteria. According to an authoritative 
US assessment, “exposure is not a failure if the attack succeeds in conveying 
Russia’s ability and willingness to carry out targeted attacks.”24 In addition, 
the prominence of apparent failed attacks in public knowledge of Russian 
23 Speaking at an emergency UN Security Council meeting on 5 April 2017. Video available 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSweWsZlHDs. 
24 Andrew S. Bowen, “Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
24 November 2020, 11, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46616. 
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activities obscures the number of attacks that are unknown because they 
were successful. Russian political figure Aleksei Navalny survived an assas-
sination attempt in August 2020 because the pilot of the flight he was on 
decided to land immediately; Sergei and Yulia Skripal survived in March 
2018 because they fell ill in a public place instead of in their own home 
where the deadly agent had been applied. In both cases, had the victims 
died as intended, it is far less likely the cause of their death would have been 
detected – leaving open the question of how many other individuals have 
been successfully targeted with Novichok or other means without it coming 
to public notice.25 
Murders carried out by the Russian state using less exotic methods can 
also achieve acceptable results despite detection and exposure of the mur-
derers. In early 2004, former Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was 
assassinated by Russian intelligence officers in Qatar using a car bomb.26 
The officers were arrested and convicted by the Qatari authorities, in a move 
which for most countries would be considered a severe diplomatic setback. 
Russia, however, achieved its objectives with few adverse consequences, even 
to the intelligence officers involved; returned to Russia with the expectation 
that they would serve their sentences in a Russian prison, the murderers 
were instead immediately released.27 More recent Russian operations have 
incurred no consequences at all for Moscow, as in the case of the Russian 
and Russian-backed targeting of British humanitarian James Le Mesurier 
resulting in his death.28
Russia and Donald Trump
Overt or covert armed force is of course only one of the many tools at 
Russia’s disposal for resolving foreign policy challenges. In the period since 
2014, Russia’s reinvigorated programme of subversion of democracy has 
25 “Navalny Poison Squad Implicated in Murders of Three Russian Activists”, Bellingcat, 27 
January 2021, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2021/01/27/navalny-
poison-squad-implicated-in-murders-of-three-russian-activists/
26 “Ex-Chechen president dies in blast,” NBC News, 13 February 2004, https://www.
nbcnews.com/id/wbna4261459#.XpbYYsgzbDc 
27 Sarah Rainsford, “Convicted Russia agents ‘missing,’” BBC News, 17 February 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4275147.stm. 
28 “The Times view on the death of James Le Mesurier: Assad’s Nemesis,” The Times, 
13 November 2019, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/2f9b9ba8-0582-11ea-a54d-
e177f6bc2c05. 
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targeted elections and political processes in an impressive array of countries. 
Some of these attempts at malign influence failed, and in other cases, the 
effect of Russian interference is unquantifiable, sometimes because – as in 
the case of the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK – there has been no politi-
cal will to look too closely at whether it was effective.29 However, Russia’s 
most spectacular success in this domain came against the greatest prize of 
all, the presidency of the United States. 
At the time of writing it is still not possible to say with certainty whether 
President Donald Trump was pursuing Russian policy objectives for the 
United States during his term of office consciously, or unwittingly and 
through coincidence. The consistency with which his words and actions 
furthered long-standing Russian aims from before his inauguration to the 
dying days of his presidency makes the coincidence argument – the notion 
that Trump’s own preferences, preconceptions, and whims just happened 
to precisely match the long-standing objectives of Russia – difficult to sus-
tain. Whatever the actual weight of impact of Russia’s attack on the US 
democratic process in 2016 relative to genuine domestic political factors, 
the return on investment for the resources expended by Moscow has been 
immeasurable. 
At the strategic level, Moscow’s wish list for the United States includes a 
number of long-term aspirations that have been constant for decades, both 
in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, which were probably considered beyond 
reach until Trump attempted, with varying degrees of success, to enact 
them. These included (with examples): reducing the US role in providing 
European security (as with the strategically and logistically inane order to 
draw down the US presence in Germany);30 further weakening Transatlantic 
links and undermining faith in US security commitments (as with ceding 
space in north-east Syria to Russia,31 or the blocking of defensive measures 
against Russia under different pretexts – linking defensive aid to Ukraine 
to undermining Joe Biden, or diverting defensive spending earmarked for 
eastern Europe to Trump’s wall project); reducing the effectiveness of the 
29 David Walsh, “Russia report: UK ‘actively avoided’ probing possible Moscow meddling 
in Brexit vote,” Euronews, 22 July 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/21/russia-
report-findings-of-long-awaited-probe-into-russian-inference-in-uk-politics-release. 
30 Isla MacRae, “Trump and DoD clash over US troop withdrawal from Germany,” 
ArmyTechnology, 31 July 2020, https://www.army-technology.com/features/trump-and-
dod-clash-over-us-troop-withdrawal-from-germany/. 
31 Ben Hubbard, Anton Troianovski, Carlotta Gall, and Patrick Kingsley, “In Syria, Russia Is 
Pleased to Fill an American Void,” The New York Times, 15 October 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/10/15/world/middleeast/kurds-syria-turkey.html. 
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US Intelligence Community (passing classified information to adversaries, 
and causing suppression of intelligence reporting on Russia);32 and show-
ing the United States, as opposed to Russia, as an enemy of Islam (through 
hostile rhetoric and direct action including travel bans).33 Other, less specific 
aims furthered by Trump included challenging and undermining Western 
liberal values, eroding US world leadership and global respect, weaken-
ing US society and undermining social cohesion, hastening the arrival of a 
post-truth, post-fact information space and discrediting independent media, 
and – importantly – seeing Russia treated as a partner and equal, satisfying 
Moscow’s perpetual status anxiety. 
Sceptics note that not all of Trump’s actions were to Russia’s benefit and 
argue that if he were knowingly working on behalf of Russia, he could have 
gone even further. But the examples often chosen to support this line of 
thinking do not stand up to close scrutiny. It is true that Trump did not pro-
vide Russia with sanctions relief or recognition of Crimea as part of Russia; 
neither of these would have been within his ability to deliver. Other exam-
ples of Trump being “tough on Russia”, like the development of the sanc-
tions regime and of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) intended to 
bolster the conventional defence of Europe, represent initiatives that began 
under the preceding Obama administration and continued under their own 
momentum, despite rather than because of the Trump White House. 
A rare instance of assertive action against Russia by the Trump adminis-
tration – the expulsion of Russian diplomats in solidarity with the UK after 
the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal – presents the exception 
that proves the rule; Trump was reportedly enraged when he discovered the 
extent of the measures he had approved.34 This, in turn, highlights the real 
limitations of what Trump could achieve on behalf of Moscow, as he was 
prevented from further excesses by those democratic checks and balances 
that survived his administration and by officials at all levels of government 
who continued to work on behalf of US national interests even when this 
clashed with the wishes and instructions of the White House. 
32 Natasha Bertrand and Daniel Lippman, “CIA clamps down on flow of Russia intelli-
gence to White House,” Politico, 23 September 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/
2020/09/23/cia-russia-intelligence-white-house-420351 
33 “Timeline of the Muslim Ban,” American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, https://
www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban. 
34 Pat Ralph, “Trump was reportedly furious that his administration was portrayed as tough 
on Russia after expelling diplomats from the US,” Business Insider, 16 April 2018, https://
www.businessinsider.com/trump-wanted-to-expel-fewer-russian-diplomats-2018-4. 
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Russia and Disinformation
At a lower level of ambition, Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns 
against Western countries also give rise to mixed and sometimes misguided 
conclusions as to their impact and success. 
In the early stages of renewed interest in Russian subversion campaigns, 
the emphasis in assessing their effectiveness in Western countries rested on 
whether they were capable of changing the minds of significant numbers of 
the target population in support of a distinct political goal. Where this could 
not be demonstrated, it was tempting to conclude that Russia’s efforts were 
ineffective. However, metrics fixated on specific short-term goals were not 
suitable for assessing long-term Russian campaigns not tied to specific events. 
Taking the longer view requires recognising that subversion is a pro-
cess rather than an event, and considering long-term trends, for example, 
what is normal in the information space in English-speaking countries in 
2020 compared to 2015. This comparison reveals spectacular change in an 
astonishingly short time. Assisted by the policies and algorithms of social 
media platforms, Russia has ridden and accelerated trends of fragmenta-
tion, distrust, and the spawning of alternative realities – and is now joined 
by a wide range of foreign and domestic imitators who choose to emulate 
Russian tactics for their own political ends, amplifying the damage done. 
The focus on measurable outcomes from Russian actions also overlooks 
the pattern of activities that may not have a specific political objective but 
are aimed simply at causing harm – or are carried out on what 1950s CIA 
reports referred to as an “experimental or irritational basis.”35 Russia is alert 
for any weakness or vulnerability that it can exploit to inflict damage on 
Western countries because in a zero-sum view of security, anything that 
weakens them means that in relative terms Russia is stronger. Racial fric-
tion is an enduring soft target for subversive activity in the United States, 
and with or without a global pandemic, it suits Russia to have its adver-
saries facing a public health crisis caused by malign influence campaigns 
undermining vaccination programmes.36 In some cases, including failed or 
35 “Supplement To The Daily Digest,” CIA, 28 January 1952, cia.gov/library/readingroom/
docs/CIA-RDP79T01146A000700190001-5.pdf. 
36 Lucy Fisher and Chris Smyth, “GCHQ in cyberwar on anti-vaccine propaganda,” The 
Times, 9 November 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/gchq-in-cyberwar-
on-anti-vaccine-propaganda-mcjgjhmb2; “Protests in Europe as a consequence of 
COVID-19 related disinformation,” GLOBSEC, 25 November 2020, https://mailchi.mp/
globsec/democracyandresilience15-1?e=3d5bba5760. 
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successful attacks on the Olympic Games, it can be hard to discern any 
motivation for attacks beyond pure spite and malice from Moscow.37 
Outlook
Russia’s successes are not entirely without caveat or qualification. Its actions 
in Ukraine, for instance, have succeeded in focusing the West’s attention on 
Russian assertiveness and how to counter it, triggering new deployments, 
and spending on defence within NATO and beyond.38 The United States, 
despite the influence of President Trump, has in some instances successfully 
exercised deterrence of Russia through cyber and other means.39 Murders by 
the state at home and abroad, successful or not, have led to countermeasures 
against Russia, especially in the case of the Skripals where the limited release 
of information by the British government allowed media organisations to 
investigate further, leading eventually to the exposure of entire cohorts of 
Russian intelligence officers.40 Russia’s persistent state behaviour is that of 
a habitual offender, who accepts detection as an occupational hazard and 
appears to accept consequences and countermeasures in the same business-
like manner. 
There are no simple answers, and often no single answers, as to why 
Russia takes any given action. Objectives can be multiple, flexible, and 
incomprehensible by Western measures of success. As part of this, Russia 
may not be succeeding by Western criteria. However, those are not the cri-
teria that will determine Russia’s future courses of action. For as long as 
its interventions achieve the desired effect at costs considered acceptable, 
Russia will see little cause not to continue them.
37 “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of 
Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace,” US Department 
of Justice, 19 October 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-
charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and. 
38 Tom Rogan, “Russia reaps whirlwind with massive Swedish defense spending boost,” 
Washington Examiner, 19 October 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/
russia-reaps-whirlwind-with-massive-swedish-defense-spending-boost. 
39 Ellen Nakashima, “Fewer opportunities and a changed political environment in the U.S. may 
have curbed Moscow’s election interference this year, analysts say,” The Washington Post, 
17 November 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-failed-
to-mount-major-election-interference-operations-in-2020-analysts-say/2020/11/16/ 
72c62b0c-1880-11eb-82db-60b15c874105_story.html 
40 Thomas Claburn, “What could be more embarrassing for a Russian spy: Their info 
splashed online – or that they drive a Lada?,” The Register, 5 October 2018, https://www.
theregister.com/2018/10/05/russian_gru_agents_car_database/ 
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It follows that Western assessments of the courses of action Russia might 
consider in any given situation have to be grounded in the Kremlin’s view 
of the world, as opposed to what is taken for granted in the Euro-Atlantic 
community. This involves abandoning normal assumptions of international 
relations and adopting instead Russia’s premise that the West is engaged in 
a long-term campaign against it, and therefore Russia must wage a strug-
gle in every available domain to pre-empt that and inflict damage on its 
notional adversaries at each opportunity where the costs and consequences 
will outweigh the benefits. Nonetheless, it is specifically an understanding of 
Russia’s distinctive metrics of what constitutes success, failure, or an accepta-
ble medium that would allow Russia’s foreign partners to more effectively tilt 
the scales of Moscow’s risk-benefit calculus, reducing the perceived benefits 
or increasing the perceived risks to deter unwelcome action by the Kremlin. 
The natural result would be a relationship with Moscow that is more stable, 
predictable, and safe. 
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Abstract 
The current study analyses the complicated outlook for Russia’s military 
industry in relation to global competition, focusing on external and sys-
tematic variables in a medium-term perspective. In general, global trends 
in the growth of innovation, shrinking budgetary funding because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and the importance of normative limitations in the 
use of some weapon systems will not strengthen Russia’s position in global 
arms market, but, however, there are also aspects that might work in Russia’s 
favour. The central issue here is whether a lack of innovation and invest-
ments as well as the pressure of international sanctions can be compen-
sated by other factors like the drop in prices for older military equipment, 
generous loans, quick deliveries, the support of special forces that comes 
alongside the delivery of Russian military equipment, and the former reli-
able partnerships that date back to the Soviet era.
Key words: Russian military industry, Western sanctions, clients, technology
Introduction
The article discusses the complicated outlook for the Russian military indus-
try in global competition with a focus on external and systematic factors in 
a mid-term perspective. In general, global trends in innovation and moral 
limitations will not strengthen Russia’s position in global arms market, but 
there are also aspects that will work in Russia’s favour. First, as long as Russia 
succeeds in keeping numerous military conflicts ongoing in the territories 
of its long-term clients and partners from Syria to Ukraine, there will be a 
demand for Russia’s military products there, and in these cases, a lack of 
innovation does not play a significant role. Russia might keep some of its 
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strategic partners despite tighter competition in the global arms market by 
offering ability special deliveries in terms of speed (Turkey) and manning 
(Syria), functional need for alternatives to NATO standards (Turkey), and 
generous loan options (Egypt, Syria, and some former Soviet Republics). 
Additionally, existing logistical and service capabilities play a critical role in 
keeping Soviet arms trade partnerships alive. Despite economic limitations, 
Russia has also been able to challenge and overcome Western and Chinese 
expectations with a range of ultimate weapons prototypes that would be 
ready for mass production for its own army and allied forces. In this aspect, 
investments in the military industry and new technologies are also aimed at 
creating a deterrence against possible Russian opponents and competitors in 
the global arena. The last central variable for the Russian military industry is 
how they will be able to survive, adapt, or even stay innovative while being 
targeted by numerous sanctions that restrict it from certain technological 
components that the Russian arms industry is unable even to duplicate or 
replace with Chinese alternatives. 
Previous studies focusing on the Russia’s military industry conducted 
by the RAND Corporation, SIPRI, Chatham House, the Jamestown Foun-
dation, Sendstad1, Borshchevskaya,2 and Conolly that have analysed Russia’s 
strategic role in the global arms market have offered a lot of inspiration and 
guidance for this current article. Different from these studies, the current 
research focuses solely on the prospects for the future of Russia’s defence 
industry in the global arena with a focus on the dynamics of external fac-
tors and changes in the external environment that could potentially have 
a significant impact on the competitiveness of Russia’s defence industry in 
the mid-term. In more detail, this study will examine how three develop-
ments in the global arms market could affect the future of Russia’s defence 
industry. The first of these developments is the increasing efforts countries 
are making to modernize their weapons systems and to improve and pro-
duce advanced generation weapons, the second is the changing profile of the 
main arms importers vis-à-vis their intentions to become arms exporters in 
the future, and the third and final aspect is the growing political-ideological 
and technological polarization of the global arms market. 
1 Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic 
and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia,” Chatham House Research Paper, 
March 2017.
2 Anna Borshchevskaya, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 
Russia in the Middle East, 2017, 15–16.
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Is There a Demand for Quantity or Innovation?
Clients and demand for modern weapon systems remain, as all global mili-
tary powers make significant efforts to modernize their national weapons 
systems and to develop and initiate serial production of advanced next gen-
eration weapons. The United States devotes much attention to moderniza-
tion programs in various military areas, including the modernization of its 
nuclear force, layered missile defences, capabilities to enhance close combat 
lethality in complex terrains, and other areas, referring to the 2018 National 
Defence Strategy of the United States.3 The same applies to Russia, whose 
national state armament program for 2018–2027 is oriented towards the 
modernization of its equipment and surplus of nuclear weapons.4 Moreover, 
Russia’s political and military leaders often like to publicly boast about the 
development of new military technologies. In this sense, visible military 
innovation with ostentatious presentations for internal and external audi-
ence has always played an important role for Russian (and Soviet) political 
leaders. 
Other than the United States and Russia, the world’s second-largest arms 
importer in 2019, India has announced a plan to modernize its armed forces 
within the next five to seven years.5 Other large arms importers, like China, 
either have already made successful efforts in producing modern weaponry, 
or, like Saudi Arabia, have called for military transformations. Most of them 
still have an interest in certain Russian technologies or weapon systems at 
least in the short term.
Thus, a country’s ability to develop and produce modern weapons sys-
tems seems to have gained an even greater weight due to increasing market 
demands, making it necessary for countries and national defence industries 
to consolidate defence sector resources, to devote greater attention to R&D 
activities and to spend more money on military innovation. According to 
3 The Department of Defence, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the 
United States of America,” 2018, 6–7. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, accessed 22 April 2020.
4 See, e.g., Richard Connolly, Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s New State Armament Pro-
gramme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027,” 
Chatham House Research Paper, May 2018. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/publications/research/2018-05-10-russia-state-armament-programme-connolly-
boulegue-final.pdf , accessed 22 April 2020.
5 Press Trust of India, “India to spend a whopping USD 130 billion to modernise forces,” 
The Economic Times, Defence, 10 September 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/news/defence/india-to-spend-a-whopping-usd-130-billion-for-military-
modernisation-in-next-5-7-years/articleshow/71053542.cms, accessed 22 April 2020.
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SIPRI experts, large US companies are already merging to be able to pro-
duce next-generation weapon systems that would give them an advantage 
in winning governmental military contracts.6 Furthermore, in many coun-
tries, defence-related R&D expenditures are considered the main channel 
through which governments shape innovation. For example, Enrico Moretti 
and co-authors argue that defence research is not mainly motivated by eco-
nomic goals but instead is the most effective channel for the federal gov-
ernment to affect the direction and speed of innovation in the economy. 
Based on data of defence-related R&D spending, they demonstrate that an 
increase in the R&D spending of a government increases the private sector 
research spending as well and has a significant effect on both a country’s 
total factor productivity and economic growth overall.7 In this respect, R&D 
investments, including military research, should be one of the key priorities 
of those countries who want to maintain a competitive edge. In this light, 
the countries that are not allocating resources in R&D, including defence-
related research, are automatically placed at a competitive disadvantage both 
militarily and economically. 
Second, some main arms importers globally have decreased their arms 
imports in recent years. SIPRI data indicate that in 2014–2018, Chinese and 
Indian arms imports have decreased compared to the period of 2009–2013.8 
Simultaneously, China has steadily increased its arms export over time as 
well and has widened the variety of weapons that the country is exporting. 
Furthermore, military experts estimate that the Chinese defence industry 
is among the largest national arms industries in the world.9 This refers to 
the country’s successful efforts in building a large and competitive domestic 
defence industry that is able to provide advanced weapons and technolo-
gies also for its army going forward. Instead of being an important market 
6 SIPRI, “Global arms industry rankings: Sales up 4.6 per cent worldwide and US companies 
dominate the Top 5’, SIPRI press release, 9 December 2019. https://www.sipri.org/media/
press-release/2019/global-arms-industry-rankings-sales-46-cent-worldwide-and-us-
companies-dominate-top-5, accessed 22 April 2020.
7 Enrico Moretti, Claudia Steinwender, and John Van Reenen, “The intellectual spoils 
of war? Defense R&D, productivity and international spillovers,” NBER Working Paper 
Series, No 26483, November 2019. https://eml.berkeley.edu/~moretti/military.pdf, ac-
cessed 22 April 2020.
8 World Economic Forum, ‘International Security: 5 charts that reveal the state of the 
global arms trade,’ 14 March 2019. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/5-charts-
that-reveal-the-state-of-the-global-arms-trade/>, accessed 22 April 2020.
9 Nan Tian and Fen Su, “Estimating the arms sales of Chinese companies,” SIPRI Insights 
on Peace and Security, No 2020/2, January 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/
files/2020-01/sipriinsight2002_1.pdf, accessed 22 April 2020.
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for arms exporters, China is becoming a strong new competitor amongst 
the current arms exporters. Although the recent decrease in arms imports 
in India might be related to delays in deliveries from foreign suppliers as 
argued by SIPRI,10 India has nonetheless recently set an ambitious aim to 
become a global arms exporter and to double its defence exports in the next 
five years.11 
Furthermore, the world’s largest arms importer in 2019, Saudi Arabia, 
has set an objective for 2030 to manufacture more military equipment 
domestically to create more jobs locally and keep more resources within 
the country, referring to the national strategy paper Vision 2030: Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. The long-term aim of the country is to localize over half of 
the national military equipment spending by 2030. This would be a signifi-
cant step forward, given that today, only two percent of defence spending of 
Saudi Arabia is spent domestically, and there are only seven companies and 
two research centres in the defence sector of Saudi Arabia. According to the 
national strategy document, Saudi Arabia has already started to develop less 
complex industries that provide spare parts, armoured vehicles, and basic 
ammunition and is soon expected to expand in higher value and equipment 
that is more complex.12 
Overall, it is likely that both the changing profile and the reorientation 
of some arms importers to arms exporters could mean that the current 
arms exporters soon might find themselves in a situation where they have 
to search for alternative trade partners instead of well-known large export 
markets, even competing with them for market position. 
Third, some evidence suggests that the global arms market is polariz-
ing, both from technological and political-ideological (including growing 
moral considerations) viewpoints. The United States is the top military 
power in the world both technologically and in quantitative terms. Other 
countries lag far behind. According to SIPRI data, there were about 42 
American companies listed in the Top 100 arms producing and military 
10 “Global arms industry rankings: Sales up 4.6 per cent worldwide and US companies 
dominate the Top 5,” SIPRI press release, 9 December 2019, https://www.sipri.org/media/
press-release/2019/global-arms-industry-rankings-sales-46-cent-worldwide-and-us-
companies-dominate-top-5, accessed 20 April 2020.
11 Aditya Sharma, “India seeks shift from buying weapons to exporting them,” Deutsche 
Welle, 5 February 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/india-seeks-shift-from-buying-weapons-
to-exporting-them/a-52270331. 
12 “Vision 2030: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” 2016, 48, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en, accessed 
20 April 2020.
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services companies13 and the share of the United States of total Top 100 
arms sales was 59 percent in 2018.14 Only 27 out of the top-100 companies 
are located in Europe, accounting for a quarter of total top-100 arms sales. 
Ten companies ranked in top-100 operate in Russia, accounting for 8.6 per-
cent of the total.15 Thus, the United States clearly dominates in global arms 
market today. The increasing polarization between the United States and 
the other countries is reflected also in the dynamics of the arms exports. 
For example, while from 2009–2013 US exports of major arms were about 
12 percent higher than that of Russia, in 2014–2018, it was already 75 per-
cent.16 Furthermore, experts argue that in recent years, the United States has 
further solidified its position in the global arms market as an exporter of 
advanced weapons like combat aircraft, short-range cruise and ballistic mis-
siles, and guided bombs.17 However, while the United States seems to fur-
ther strengthen its dominant role as a top arms exporter globally, there are 
numerous countries that prefer to buy arms from other countries than the 
United States (or are rejected by the United States from export), either for 
economic, political-ideological, or security reasons. From the recent past, 
Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chávez, could be highlighted as a 
good example of a political-ideological motivation to rely on Russian mili-
tary technology and support. Today, Belarus, Armenia, and Syria prefer to 
import arms from Russia instead of other countries for political, economic, 
logistical, and technical reasons, having decades-long experience with han-
dling and servicing, supported by large reserves of spare parts. 
Growing polarization is closely related to arms embargos and tar-
geted sanctions are already shaping the future of the global arms market 
both directly and indirectly. In a direct way, arms embargos and sanctions 
are expected to halt the transfer of weapons to armed combatants to end 
military conflict more quickly. If this does prove to be the case and these 
13 Chinese companies were excluded from the list due to the lack of data.
14 Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Pieter D Wezeman, 
and Siemon T. Wezeman, “The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services 
companies, 2018,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, December 2019, 2–4, https://www.sipri.org/sites/
default/files/2019-12/1912_fs_top_100_2018.pdf , accessed 20 April 2020.
15 Ibid., 4–6.
16 Pieter D. Wezeman, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Nan Tian, Siemon T. Wezeman, 
“Trends in international arms transfers, 2018,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2019, 3, https://
www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf , accessed 20 April 2020.
17 “Global arms trade: USA increases dominance; arms flows to the Middle East surge, says 
SIPRI (2019),” SIPRI press release, 11 March 2019. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-
release/2019/global-arms-trade-usa-increases-dominance-arms-flows-middle-east-
surge-says-sipri, accessed 20 April 2020.
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military conflicts cease, the arms exports to all parties in such a conflict 
should be affected as well. 
However, academic assessments of arms embargoes are not so unani-
mous about this issue. Some researchers have pointed to success stories, e.g., 
that of Angola in 1993–2003,18 while others are convinced that, in practice, 
arms embargoes have mostly shown poor results because of malevolent dis-
tributional effects and difficulties in effectively curtailing the arms flow.19 
Indirectly, targeted (technological) sanctions are expected to hinder a coun-
try in realizing its military aims due to knowledge- and technology-based 
limitations. In this way, arms embargos and targeted sanctions clearly affect 
the outlook of those countries, sectors, and enterprises that are subjects to 
sanctions. 
Why Should Russia be Concerned about these Recent 
Developments?
There are three main reasons why the Russian defence industry should be 
concerned about recent developments in global arms market. First, assum-
ing that R&D investments, including defence-related research expenditures, 
are important to maintain a country’s competitive advantage both militar-
ily and economically, Russia is automatically placed at a competitive disad-
vantage compared to its main political and military opponents. Although 
Russia is among the ten countries that invest the most in R&D in absolute 
terms (see Figure 1a), its main political opponents like the United States 
and China are far ahead of Russia. In 2017, the gross domestic expendi-
tures on research and development (GERD) of Russia in PPP amounted to 
approximately 42 billion USD, compared to 543 billion USD in the United 
States and 499 billion USD in China.20 Next to that, among the top ten 
global arms exporters Russia’s GERD as a share of GDP is clearly lower (see 
Figure 1b). Furthermore, the share of military R&D has been constantly 
low in Russia’s military expenditures (about 5 percent of the country’s total 
18 Michael Brzoska, “Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes,” Peace Economics, 
Peace Science and Public Policy, No 14, 2008.
19 Dominic Tierney, “Irrelevant or malevolent? UN Arms Embargoes in Civil Wars,” Review 
of International Studies, No. 31, 2005.
20 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Science, technology and innovation: Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D (GERD),” GERD as a percentage of GDP, GERD per capita and 
GERD per researcher, 2020, http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SCN_
DS&lang=en, accessed 20 April 2020.
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military expenditure) over the last two decades compared to other expendi-
ture categories like expenditures of personnel, and operation and mainte-
nance.21 Research and innovation in Russia, including military research, is 
challenged by the ageing of R&D workers as well as by inadequate linkages 
between country’s higher education system and the labour force demand of 
the companies operating in the defence sector.22 As a balancing argument, 
the purchasing power of the USD in the Russian military industry is by far 




































































Figure 1a: The gross domestic expenditures on research and developments (GERD) 
in PPPS (in USD) of the countries that invest the most in R&D, 2017*
Note: *Data for India are for 2018, as information about 2017 was missing in the 
database.
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2020), Science, technology and innovation: 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD), http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=SCN_DS&lang=en.
21 Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Brian Nichiporuk, Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces, RAND 
Corporation, 2019, 11–12. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_
reports/RR2500/RR2573/RAND_RR2573.pdf , accessed 20 April 2020.
22 Richard Connolly and Ceclilie Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter. The Strategic 
and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia, Chatham House, 2017, 24–25, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-
russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf, accessed 20 April 2020.

















































































Figure 1b: The gross domestic expenditures on research and developments (GERD) 
as a percentage of GDP of Top 10 arms exporters in the world, 2017*
Note: * Number in the brackets reflects country’s position among the Top 10 arms 
exporters.
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2020). Science, technology and innovation: 
GERD as a percentage of GDP, http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode= 
SCN_DS&lang=en.
In 2019, Russia ranks only 46th among the 129 countries in the Global 
Innovation Index, which measures national innovation capabilities. The 
rankings of other Top 10 arms exporters are higher and most of them are 
far ahead of Russia, like the United States that ranks third, the Netherlands 
fourth, the United Kingdom fifth, Germany ninth, Israel tenth, China 14th, 
and France 16th. Only Spain and Italy lag somewhat behind the other top 
exporters but are still ahead of Russia with ranks of 29 and 30, respective-
ly.23 A similar gap between Russia and other top arms exporters can be 
observed when the rankings of other innovation indices like the Global 
Competitiveness Index and the index of the World Economic Forum are 
compared. As compensatory argument, the Global Innovation Index does 
not include the input from Russia´s top-secret military laboratories and 
technologies, not yet revealed to the public. Additionally, Russian military 
scientists are often also restricted from publishing their research results in 
open sources and academic journals.
23 “Global Innovation Index (GII) 2019,” World Intellectual Property Organization, section 
Ranking, 2019. <https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2019/, accessed 20 
April 2020.
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Assuming that both the level of R&D expenditures and military research 
remains as moderate as it is in Russia in 2020, the country most likely will 
continue to ‘modernize’ its old systems and to upgrade them with new fea-
tures instead focusing on completely new solutions. As a result, the Armata 
T-14 tank and Su-57 fighter will not appear in their expected quantities for 
at least the upcoming 3–5 years and will be replaced by latest upgrades of the 
T-72 (T-95) tank and Su-27 (Su-35) instead. 
Although the country has made visible progress in areas like air defence, 
cruise missiles, electronic warfare, and radars, Russia seems not to have 
the economic potential to make a major leap forward in general terms to 
gain comparative advantage in regards to the other top five leading arms 
exporters. 
Second, the fact that China and India are currently decreasing their 
arms imports to increase domestic military production and to become 
arms exporters in the future could have a particularly negative impact on 
the Russian defence industry. India and China have been the main export 
markets for Russian defence companies for more than two decades, followed 
by Algeria, Vietnam, and Egypt.24 Over the last decade, Russia’s arms export 
to India and China (as the country’s share in total arms export of Russia to 
those five countries) has decreased (see, Figure 2). Military experts argue 
that this could be linked to China’s and India’s attempts to buttress their 
domestic defence industries and to the increasing competition for the Indian 
arms markets between Russia, the United States, Israel, and France.25 Next 
to this and despite smooth cooperation, Russia and India have recently had 
some disputes about the development of the fifth generation stealth fighter 
Su-57 that could preclude growing tensions in the former long-term part-
nership. India was the co-developer of the Su-57 alongside the Russians, but 
the country has recently cancelled cooperation with Russia due to concerns 
about the inadequate performance of the Su-57 engines and poor stealth 
characteristics,26 as well as Russia’s unwillingness to share the source code 
24 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, TIV of arms exports from Russia, 2000–2019: Figures 
are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in millions,” SIPRI, 2020, http://
armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php, accessed 20 April 2020.
25 Sergey Denisentsev, “Russia in the Global Arms Market,” CSIS, August 2017, 19. https:// 
csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170816_Denisentsev_Russia 
GlobalArmsMarket_Web.pdf?VHDgCY.h54QWJm1lPCa2w1Lc.BjElJH, accessed 20 April 
2020.
26 “Russia offers India co-development of stealth fighter, submarine,” The Week Magazine, 
10 July 2019. https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2019/07/10/russia-offers-india-co-
development-of-stealth-fighter-submarine.html, accessed 20 April 2020.
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of Su-57’s flight computer and mission software with India.27 Thus, it seems 
that military cooperation between Russia and India is nowadays not as 
healthy as it was over the last two decades and that Russia might not have 
high-level technology to sell to India anymore. As a balancing argument, in 
terms of latest air defence systems and fighters, neither China nor India are 
not able to copy the Russian technologies and search for alternatives from 
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Figure 2: Country’s share in total arms export of Russia to Algeria, China, Egypt, 
India and Vietnam from 2000–2018 
Source: author’s calculations based on SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2020). 
TIV of arms exports from Russia, 2000–2019: Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator 
Values (TIVs) expressed in millions. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/
export_values.php.
Should Russia lose its main arms export markets in India and China, it 
would be a serious blow to Russia’s defence industry, particularly being 
aware that international competition is tightening in other highly relevant 
27 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia offers India its Su-57 stealth fighters (again),” The Diplomat, 
16 July 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/russia-offers-india-its-su-57-stealth-
fighter-again/, accessed 20 April 2020.
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export markets from Russia’s perspective, such as German and French com-
panies that are increasing their sales to Egypt. Not only in Egypt but in other 
North African countries as well, Russia still has a visible advantage in light 
of upcoming procurements because of long term partnerships, preexisting 
logistical support, and predeployed Russian equipment (which mostly inte-
grates only with Russian own military production).
Furthermore, it could have negative impact on Russia’s economy in 
general as the defence industry and arms export is an important source of 
revenue for the Russian economy. It is little wonder then that Russia uses 
every opportunity to praise and demonstrate its weapons around the world 
to attract both old and new customers and to create an image of itself as a 
reliable supplier and strategic partner with whom it pays off to have special 
long-term relations. Moreover, Russia’s recent efforts to keep close contacts 
with India, to develop joint projects,28 and to find flexible solutions on how 
to make it possible for India to pay for Russian weapons29 are actually more 
important than appears at first sight.
Third, as long as Russia is aggressively pushing for its global ambi-
tions, the future of Russia’s defence industry remains highly vulnerable to 
international sanctions. The impact of the embargo of Western countries 
and Ukraine on the import and export of arms and related materials and 
components to and from Russia in association with the conflict in Ukraine 
is an example of this. Gressel (2020) argues that before the West imposed 
sanctions on Russia in autumn 2014, Russia regularly turned to the Western 
European countries to import machine parts and dual-use items due to the 
lack of domestic production, but after the implementation of Western sanc-
tions, Russia had to face serious constraints in its supply chain. As a result, 
Russia switched to Chinese machinery, but turning to lower-quality parts 
and items has recently caused some accidents like the fire on the Russia’s 
research submarine AS-31 as well as has hindered Russia in the initiation 
of the serial production of new “wonder weapons” as some key subcom-
ponents and precision machinery were missing and could not be replaced 
28 Rosoboronexport, “Rosoboronexport to organize display of 1,000+ pieces of Russian 
military hardware at Defexpo India 2020,” Press release, 3 February 2020, http://roe.ru/
eng/press-service/press-releases/rosoboronexport-to-organize-display-of-1-000-pieces-
of-russian-military-hardware-at-defexpo-india-20/, accessed 20 April 2020.
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by lower-quality Chinese products.30 Russia has domestically initiated an 
import substitution programme; however, the country even lacks a modern 
machinery base to produce replacement for the items previously acquired 
from the Western countries.31 In addition to this, restrictions on the exports 
from Ukrainian firms to Russia have caused shortages of air-to-air missiles, 
helicopter engines, heavy airlifts, and gas turbines for naval ships.32 This 
problem is probably going to grow as many Ukrainian companies that spe-
cialized in components needed by Russian military industry are not only 
blocked by sanctions but also going out of business (like Antonov). Thus, 
potential embargos and targeted sanctions clearly affect the outlook of 
Russia’s defence industry, should they remain subjects to sanctions in the 
future. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that embargos and sanctions 
will be even more imposed on political-ideological reasons. The way in 
which the United States has recently threatened, e.g., Turkey and India, to 
impose sanctions for their military transactions with Russia (and partially 
has even imposed them for a short period) could be taken as a clear sign in 
this direction. 
Will Special Deliveries, Beneficial Loan Deals, Existing 
Logistical Solution, and Decades-Old Soviet Partnerships 
buy Peace of Mind for Russian Military Industry?
All three general developments, such as the growing trend towards greater 
military innovation, the change in the profile and reorientation of some 
main arms importers, and the growing political-ideological and technologi-
cal polarization will not help Russia to strengthen its current position in the 
global arms market. As Western sanctions have shown, Russia lacks inno-
vation and is therefore unable to domestically produce certain high-level 
components that are critical to begin any serial production of the country’s 
30 Gustav Gressel, “The sanctions straitjacket on Russia’s defence sector,” ECFR 
commentary, 13 February 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_
sanctions_straitjacket_on_russias_defence_sector, accessed 20 April 2020.
31 Richard A. Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu, “Defence industries in Russia and China: players 
and strategies,” EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2017, 15. https://www.iss.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_38_Defence-industries-in-Russia-and-
China.pdf, accessed 20 April 2020.
32 Richard Connolly, Ceclilie Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic 
and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia,” Chatham House, Research 
Paper, March 2017, 25.
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military inventions that could, in turn, take the potential of Russia’s defence 
industry to the next level. The situation becomes even more critical for 
Russia in the longer term, as according to estimates, Russia’s defence exports 
has already reached a plateau and would be extremely difficult to transcend 
in normal circumstances.33 The fact that Russia is already losing its position 
in big markets like China and India should make Russia even more worried 
because it could mean than Russia is not only losing its two biggest arms 
export markets, but it is likely that in the mid-term Russia has to face strong 
competition from China in other countries that have previously imported 
arms from Russia. In more detail, as argued by Borshchevskaya (2017), one 
of the advantages of why some countries have preferred to buy arms from 
Russia instead of, e.g., the United States or the Western European coun-
tries, is that Russia does not restrict its clientele by setting limitations or 
preconditions, such as the prohibition of secondary arms sales, the prereq-
uisite to improve human rights in the importing country, or other restric-
tions. Until now, Russia has offered several advantages to its partners, e.g., 
to Iran, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya in the form of better negotiating 
terms, loans, and quicker deliveries that have made it more beneficial for 
them to import arms from Russia instead of other countries.34 However, it 
is likely that China could take over some of Russia’s market share, keeping in 
mind China’s military ambitions to strengthen its position in the global arms 
market and the country’s ambition to increase its political power globally. 
In this light, Russia should be clearly worried about maintaining its current 
position in the international arms market and should not even dream about 
being a military power centre and main source of military innovation in the 
global arena. 
However, next to these disadvantages are also several advantages that 
stem from the same factors and changes in the external environment that 
could work in Russia’s favour. First, although Russia is mostly unable to start 
serial production of its newest military inventions and designs, such as third 
post-war generation tanks, next-generation amphibious assault ships, and 
so on, the country clearly does its best to sell its second-best options in the 
33 Richard A. Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu, “Defence industries in Russia and China: players 
and strategies,” EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2017, 16, https://www.iss.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_38_Defence-industries-in-Russia-and-
China.pdf, accessed 20 April 2020.
34 Anna Borshchevskaya, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 
Russia in the Middle East, 2017 https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-
arms-sales-middle-east/, accessed 20 April 2020.
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market, for example, selling upgraded models of Mig 29/31 instead of Su 35. 
Thus, as long as conventional conflicts break out around the world, there 
also exist clients for a large variety of Russia’s “classical” weapons such as the 
AK-47, T-72, Tunguska air defence, and Mig-29 fighters, which are quite 
simple but cheap and easy to handle. In this light, it is clearly in Russia’s 
“best” interest to keep the international security environment unstable 
and the conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and other countries or regions ongo-
ing. From the perspective of Russia’s defence industry, as long as there is a 
need for brutal force and a demand for Russia’s military weapons exists, its 
primitiveness in innovation does not play a significant role. Even without a 
qualitative leap in military innovation in Russia that is most likely not going 
to take place in the coming years, Russia’s defence industry might still have 
better prospects for the future than initially expected because Russia’s new 
arms export markets will be in conflict zones that are often initiated or co-
initiated by Russia itself.
Another potential advantage for the Russia’s defence industry is related 
to so-called path dependence. If somebody has purchased your weapons, 
they also depend on your supplies like ammunition, spare parts, and train-
ing. Similar to other Great Powers, Russia offers to its partners combined 
services referring to the combination of Russia’s military weapon systems 
and mercenaries – or even regular forces, as was the case in Syria. This 
allows Russia, first, to make more money, second, to avoid the spread of its 
technology and, third, to gain political control over conflicts. In this light, 
as Russian mercenaries are better trained and prepared to work with the 
modern weapon systems of Russia, it also allows the country to make better 
marketing for Russian products because of the better results in the battle-
field. To quote Vladimir Putin: 
“Syria is not a shooting range for Russian weapons, but we are still using 
them there, our new weapons. This has led to the improvement of modern 
strike systems, including missile systems. It is one thing to have them, and 
quite another thing to see how they fare in combat conditions.”35 
In conclusion, traditional supply and service chains are definitely cheaper 
and safer to keep operational than to change in order to create a new supply 
chain. Switching fully to another supplier in the middle of a conflict or after 
a decade-long confrontation is clearly not an option in this respect. Thus, 
the structure of the global arms market in terms of who is selling to whom 
35 Vladimir Putin, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” Kremlin, 18 June 2018, http://en. 
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57692, accessed 19 February 2020.
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might not change as dramatically as could be initially assumed. However, 
the question remains whether Russia will be able to fulfil its promises to the 
market with real deliveries or depends solely on the performative contract 
signing without real serial production capabilities.
Conclusion
According to Western indicators, the outlook for the Russian military indus-
try is worsening in upcoming years, as the visible innovation level is worse 
than that of Spain and R&D investments in nominal levels are lagging far 
behind the five main global weapon exporters. Russia is also suffering from 
an inability to deliver already agreed quantities to India and Egypt, forcing 
those countries to find partners elsewhere. In many cases, well-known Russian 
industrial companies like Sukhoi and Uralvagonzavod are unable even to fulfil 
the demand of their own defence ministry. In this aspect, sanctions targeted 
against Russian military industry already have visible and disturbing effects 
which are only about to grow in upcoming years. 
However, at least in 2020, the Russian military industry is far from 
collapse as there are also several aspects in favour of the Russian military 
industry. First, there are traditional clients from all over the world asking 
for upgraded Soviet classics: the AK-47, T-72 tank, Su-27/29 fighter, Mi heli-
copters, and the Tunguska and Shilka air defence systems. These are cost 
efficient and simple, and the clients know how to handle them and have 
necessary spare parts. Russians on the other hand know the needs of clients 
and are ready to credit them for the sake of maintaining long-term partner-
ships. In many cases, deals are softened with generous loan conditions. For 
numerous clients from Syria to Afghanistan, it has also been important that 
next to weapon systems, Russia is ready to deliver both regular forces and 
mercenaries to bring out of the best of exported weapons. 
Cooperation and ideological partnership is also an important variable for 
Russia when choosing whom and what to sell. Russian political and ideolog-
ical leaders see Western powers led by the United States under the umbrella 
of NATO as a global anti-Russian alliance that needs to be balanced with its 
own allies and military agreements. Allies need modern weapons, and once 
they begin to use Russian weapons, they depend on these supplies and in 
many cases even cannot use these weapons against Russian assets. 
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Finally, yet important, there are clients who do not want to buy or cannot 
get the necessary weapon systems from other providers (mostly US com-
panies) or are directly interested to use procured weapon systems against 
United States and its allies. As there are not many neutral weapon exporters 
available, Russian is often seen as next best option. Beginning with Russian 
air-defence systems (like Turkey, Libya, and many others), these clients soon 
find out that it is reasonable to use also Russian planes and helicopters with 
Russian ammunition. 
Under the mentioned circumstances, Russian willingness to continue 
export is also fully understandable, as there are not too many other Russian 
industrial products for which demand is much higher than the Russian abil-
ity to put them to market and receive hard currency and ideological partner-
ship in exchange. 
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Abstract 
The unravelling of the liberal order, past failures of American leadership, 
and growing anxiety over the rise of China give Russia real opportuni-
ties to carve out a role in global governance. But it is unclear whether the 
Kremlin possesses the wisdom to exploit these circumstances. The signs are 
mixed. On the one hand, Putin continues to pursue anachronistic ideas of 
great power-centred, ‘multipolar’ governance. On the other hand, there are 
modest signs of a new internationalism, as Russian foreign policy becomes 
more diversified and inclusive. Putin’s overriding aim remains the same: to 
position Russia as an independent centre of global power. To achieve this, 
however, the Kremlin cannot rely on the usual levers of Russian influence 
and the missteps of others. It will need to rethink its approach toward inter-
national order and what it takes to be a major power in the 21st century 
world. 
Key words: word order, multipolarity, tripolar, the United States, Russia, 
China, power vacuum, centre of power, great power, decline, partnerships, 
exceptionalism 
Introduction
A global order in flux presents Russia with significant risks but also real 
opportunities. The unravelling of the post-Cold War liberal order, the fail-
ures of US leadership, and growing international anxiety over the rise of 
China give Moscow scope to carve out a niche in 21st century global gov-
ernance. But does Putin – or a hypothetical successor – possess the wisdom 
and foresight to make the most of the chances offered by circumstance? Will 
the Kremlin temper its historical sense of entitlement with self-awareness, 
flexibility, and pragmatism?
The signs so far are mixed. Putin’s recent statements point to business as 
usual. His call at UNGA 75 for a G-5 summit that would reaffirm ‘the key 
principles of behaviour in international affairs’ suggests he has learnt little. 
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The implicit premise underpinning this scheme is that ‘the great powers 
decide, the others abide’ – a throwback to the 1815 Congress of Vienna and 
the 1945 Yalta Conference. 
At the same time, there are some small indications that Moscow rec-
ognizes that a global order based on such antiquated principles may not 
be achievable or even to Russia’s advantage. With the United States likely 
to remain the leading global power for at least the next decade or two and 
China’s further rise seemingly unstoppable, Russia could become steadily 
marginalized unless it finds new ways to make itself relevant. That means 
a rethinking not just of its approach toward global governance but also of 
what it takes to be a major power in the 21st century.
Russia and the Liberal Order
Russia’s intellectual and psychological journey from traditional conceptions 
of ‘greatness’ and ‘great power-ness’ (derzhavnost) promises to be bumpy. 
Many in Moscow believe it was the biggest loser from the ‘new world order’ 
that emerged after the end of the Cold War. Initial hopes that Russia might 
be recognized as an equal partner to the United States were soon dashed. 
Instead, it became an economic mendicant while its geopolitical weight 
diminished drastically. NATO’s eastward enlargement underlined the extent 
of Russia’s strategic decline and, in the eyes of many, disgrace. 
Viewed from the Kremlin, the post-Cold War order merely confirmed 
long-standing truths, such as ‘the weak get beaten’ – an axiom of Stalin, later 
repeated by Putin. Its message of positive-sum cooperation glossed over the 
reality that the West, and the United States in particular, was as engaged as 
ever in the pursuit of selfish national interests. Unlike China, whose devel-
opment benefited hugely from US global leadership and Western-driven 
globalization, Russia derived little apparent advantage from this new world.
During the heyday of the liberal international order in the 1990s, Russia 
lacked the ability to challenge this, not least because it was preoccupied 
with its own domestic problems. Regrettably, Western policymakers mis-
took Russian weakness for agreement. They believed Moscow had come to 
accept the virtues of the rules-based order, signing on to the ideals of liberal 
democracy and internationalism while abjuring great power and imperialist 
ambitions. 
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This illusion was short-lived. By the early 2000s, the Kremlin was vis-
ibly turning away from the liberal order – first, in response to the 2003 Iraq 
invasion, then to the Orange Revolution, and especially following misguided 
attempts to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. For Putin, Russia’s eco-
nomic recovery gave him the means and the confidence to consolidate his 
political authority, project Moscow’s influence in the post-Soviet neighbour-
hood, and reassert Russia as a major international actor on his terms.
Lately, Putin has exulted in the troubles of liberalism and the liberal 
order – even more so since these have been largely self-inflicted. His dec-
laration in a 2019 Financial Times interview that liberalism was ‘obsolete’ 
reflected a conviction that a global order based on its values and principles 
was defunct. With Transatlantic relations at their lowest point since the Suez 
crisis of 1956 and the concept of a united Europe ‘whole and free’ ever more 
tenuous, the way appeared open to more congenial visions of global order.
The Concert of Great Powers
Moscow sets great store by a ‘multipolar order’ or ‘polycentric system of 
international relations’. With the end of US ‘hegemonism’, power has become 
more diffuse and is now distributed among several centres of regional and 
global power. Any viable vision of global order must therefore reflect these 
realities. 
The Kremlin’s emphasis on great power-centred governance has its ori-
gins in the 19th century Concert of Europe. The composition of a modern 
‘Concert’ would obviously differ from that of 200 years ago, but the under-
lying principles would remain the same. State-actors, the major powers 
above all, would be the building blocks of the international system. Global 
order would function on the basis of a natural equilibrium – the balance 
of power  – between them. They would pursue their national interests 
but remain mindful of the sensitivities of their peers, and they would not 
impinge on each other’s sovereignty. 
Multilateral organizations and agreements would have a place in this 
imagined world, but it would be tightly circumscribed. They would supply 
a legitimating framework to support the authority of the major powers. In 
Moscow’s vision of global order, there is no room for the application of uni-
versal values or for supranational institutions to exercise independent influ-
ence. The distinction between power-based and rules-based governance 
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would be moot. Power and those who exercise it determine the rules. 
Smaller states are rule-takers. Everything else is decoration.
Over the past two decades, Putin has flirted with various models of great 
power-centred order. Besides the Concert, he has expressed considerable 
admiration for the achievements of Yalta, which was a tripolar (or two-and-
a-half polar) strategic accommodation between the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom. The ‘membership’ criterion of a notional 
Yalta 2.0 would be stringent: the capacity to pursue a fully sovereign foreign 
and defence policy, a standard met only by the United States, China, and 
Russia – the ‘Big Three’ of our time. 
Of course, a Yalta 2.0 is a non-starter. The rapid deterioration of 
US-China relations during Trump’s presidency has made the prospect of 
bipolar confrontation much more likely than a trilateral accommodation. 
While Joe Biden’s election as American president may ease US-China ten-
sions, his view of Russia as a threat to international order makes a Yalta-type 
grand bargain highly improbable.
Putin’s G-5 proposal is just the latest version of the Concert model. It 
looks to turn the clock back – not to Yalta 1945, but to the signing of the 
UN Charter in San Francisco later that year. Global order would centre on 
the Big Five as they were then – including the United Kingdom and France, 
but not Japan, Germany, or India. It effectively ignores power shifts in the 
last seven decades, and instead invests the five Permanent Members of the 
Security Council (P-5) with a timeless legitimacy.
The Use and Abuse of Multilateralism
A great power-centred view of global order does not sit well with Putin’s 
public commitment to the ‘democratization’ of international relations, based 
on the ‘equality of sovereign states.’ It is also inconsistent with sentiments 
he voiced at UNGA 75: ‘the UN should not grow stiff, but evolve in accord-
ance with the dynamics of the 21st century and … the modern world that is 
becoming more complicated, multipolar and multidimensional.’
The Kremlin has attempted to square the circle by raising Russia’s mul-
tilateralist profile. In the first instance, this means emphasizing the formal 
primacy of the United Nations in global decision-making. It also involves 
upping the level and quality of Russian participation in multilateral bodies 
across the board. In November 2018, Putin attended the East Asia Summit 
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(EAS) for the first time. He has become more active within the G-20 frame-
work. And in January 2021 he participated at the Davos Forum after more 
than a decade away. Such activism aims to communicate the message that 
Russia is a good international citizen – an increasingly important considera-
tion given the deterioration of Moscow’s relations with the West.
Nevertheless, Russia remains a reluctant multilateralist. Its refusal to 
entertain meaningful reform of the UN Security Council testifies to a belief 
that the circle of real decision-makers should be kept as exclusive as pos-
sible. This is not just a matter of practicalities, but also of symbolism. Putin 
has set himself firmly against any moves to weaken or qualify the power of 
the veto, or even to extend it to others. For it is precisely this privilege along 
with strategic (nuclear) parity with the United States that the Kremlin sees 
as placing Russia at the top table of global decision-making. (Conversely, it 
matters relatively little that Russia’s share of global GDP is a measly 2–3 per-
cent.) For Moscow, the appearance of power is as important as its substance; 
in fact, the first frequently makes the second.
While Moscow pays lip-service to the importance of multilateral coop-
eration and its institutions, it regards these as an addition to, and not a sub-
stitute for, the primacy of the great powers. The distinction between form 
and substance is likewise evident in post-Soviet regional structures such 
as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU). These bodies exemplify Moscow’s ‘pseudo-
multilateralism’ – they are nominally multilateral, but in practice Russia-
dominated and driven. They advertise a post-imperial Russia, committed to 
developing cooperation with its former subject republics on a qualitatively 
different basis. But in fact they are intended to perpetuate its strategic pri-
macy in the post-Soviet space – this time through indirect control rather 
than direct rule.
The Exceptionalist Gene
For the Kremlin, the modalities of global order are secondary to the over-
riding goal of maximizing Russia’s international status and influence. Thus, 
Moscow seeks to maintain the UN Security Council in its existing form 
because it is a reliable mechanism for achieving this very purpose. Reform, 
on the other hand, would introduce a major element of uncertainty and even 
jeopardy. 
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The ceaseless quest to advance Russia’s international position is not moti-
vated by self-interest alone, but also by messianic zeal and a sense of history. 
As the journalist Konstantin von Eggert once quipped, ‘all peoples think 
they are unique, but Russians think they are more unique than the others.’ 
The exceptionalist gene rides strongly in the character of Russia’s rulers, not 
least Putin. It manifests itself in various ways, above all in the conviction 
that Russia is a timeless great power. This self-appointed status transcends 
the swings of success and failure. One of the (many) mistakes of Western 
policymakers in the 1990s was to think that Russia’s economic and geopoliti-
cal misfortunes would lead it to rethink its destiny and to become a ‘normal’ 
country like others. Instead, they discovered that ‘normal’ and ‘great power’ 
are synonymous in Russian political consciousness – in bad times as well as 
good.
Russian exceptionalism has been stoked further by the spectacle of ram-
pant American exceptionalism. From the 2003 Iraq invasion to the excesses 
of Donald Trump, the United States has appeared to operate on the basis 
that, in a rules-based international order, rules are for other countries to 
follow. Ironically, Russia agrees with the unspoken premise that those who 
can, make and break the rules. While it has condemned Washington’s ‘uni-
lateralist’ behaviour, it has also been quick to grasp the upside; American 
exceptionalism makes it easier for other major powers to justify their own 
actions. To employ a crude analogy, for every Kosovo there is a Crimea, for 
every Iraq a South Ossetia. In the world of great powers, exceptionalism for 
one means exceptionalism for all.
Russia’s self-perception as a great power brings with it the belief that it 
possesses certain ‘natural’ rights and privileges. The most important is the 
right of sovereignty, defined principally by the rule that other states and 
multinational institutions cannot interfere in Russia’s domestic affairs. 
Another important ‘right’ is that of a sphere of influence or interests. Just 
as the United States dominates the Americas and China much of East Asia, 
so Russia claims a legitimate droit de regard over the post-Soviet space. This 
does not mean a right of conquest or occupation, but that its interests and 
sensitivities deserve special ‘respect’ from other parties. A third aspect of 
Moscow’s sense of entitlement is the belief that Russia, as a great power, has 
a reasonable right of involvement in any issue or region around the globe. It 
may not always follow through on this, but that is its decision to make and 
not anyone else’s.
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Russia in the New World Disorder
It follows from such feelings of exceptionalism and entitlement that Putin 
and the political elite see Russia as an independent centre of global power. 
At various times, it might lean toward Europe, the United States, or China. 
But at no stage does it commit itself irrevocably to one side, for to do so is to 
sacrifice its own autonomy. In recent times, there has been much specula-
tion about an emerging Sino-Russian alliance, encouraged from time to time 
by Putin himself. Yet this is not a realistic prospect. Although the Kremlin 
has relished playing on the insecurities of Western leaders such as Trump 
and French President Emmanuel Macron, it knows that such an alliance – in 
the unlikely event Beijing were interested – would constrain its freedom of 
manoeuvre, especially as the Sino-Russian relationship becomes ever more 
unequal.
True independence is predicated on strategic flexibility and breadth of 
choice. So, while Putin prizes the Sino-Russian partnership, he has increas-
ingly diversified Russia’s relations across Asia, reached out to Europe, and 
cultivated a personal rapport with Trump. He has also been careful not to 
hitch Russia to Beijing’s agenda or take on burdensome security commit-
ments. For example, he has adopted a neutral position on the question of 
Chinese participation in future multilateral arms negotiations and sought 
to keep Russia out of escalating US-China tensions in the western Pacific.
In an ideal world, Russia might aspire to play the role of balancing or 
‘swing’ power between the United States and China. But in the current dis-
aggregated environment – what might be described as a new world disor-
der – this is fantasy. Maintaining foreign policy independence, however, is 
feasible. A post-hegemonic system, where there is no clear leader or unify-
ing (‘universal’) set of norms, enables Russia to promote its interests and 
‘play the field’.
Indeed, Moscow is arguably the chief beneficiary of today’s new world dis-
order, with its ambiguities, power vacuums (‘blank spots’), and blurring of 
boundaries. For such circumstances tend to have an equalizing effect, helping 
to mask Russia’s relative weakness in key areas – economic development, tech-
nological advancement, political institutions, social infrastructure, and soft 
power. In a more ordered and predictable environment, the vast superiority 
of the United States and China in most dimensions of power would be clearer. 
However, in a world of volatility and confusion as exemplified by the chaotic 
international response to the coronavirus pandemic, Russia can feed off the 
failures and shortcomings of others. 
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The Future – Stretching the Possibilities
The question is whether this essentially parasitic approach to international 
engagement is sustainable. Russia has benefited until now from the disrup-
tion of the Transatlantic alliance, catastrophic US decision-making, and 
America’s plummeting reputation. Equally, it has been fortunate that Xi 
Jinping has badly mismanaged the international politics of China’s rise – to 
such a degree that Beijing, not Moscow, is now regarded in many capitals as 
the existential threat to global order.
That may be about to change. Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential 
election heralds a new era of US internationalism, but also one tempered 
by greater self-awareness and inclusiveness. Transatlantic relations will get 
a shot in the arm while America’s alliances in Asia will likewise be boosted. 
The election of Biden also improves the chances of US-Chinese cooperation 
in certain areas, such as combating climate change, even as their strategic 
rivalry endures. 
In these revised circumstances, simply not being the United States or 
China will hardly be enough if Russia is to avoid becoming marginalized. 
Moscow will have to raise its game instead of relying on the ineptitude of 
others. It will need to demonstrate an ability to pursue a constructive inter-
nationalist agenda of its own and not just to obstruct, spoil, or destroy the 
ambitions of its competitors and enemies. It will come under growing pres-
sure to give substance to its rhetoric about multilateral governance and the 
‘democratization’ of international relations.
All this will be immensely challenging, both in terms of developing con-
crete policies and altering the basic mind-set of Russian decision-making. Is 
Moscow up to the challenge? How and where can it make a positive differ-
ence? Will it be able to ensure that Russia remains an important player in a 
dynamically evolving international context?
The temptation for the Kremlin is to keep to what it has been doing: 
maintain strategic and tactical flexibility; portray Russia as a committed 
multilateralist and good international citizen; and talk up its traditional 
strengths as a member of the UN P-5, a nuclear superpower, and a leading 
energy exporter. However, such a response not only represents a failure of 
imagination; it will scarcely be viable beyond the short to medium term.
If Russia is to be a real player in a world increasingly shaped not by the 
usual great power ‘virtues’ but by advanced technologies, climatic shocks, 
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and the information revolution, it will need to adapt accordingly. For the 
new global order is one that will require not just new skills but also fresh 
modes of thinking. The great powers will play key roles in this world. But 
the meaning of ‘greatness’ itself will be fundamentally transformed.
156 FRASER CAMERON
Perceptions of Russia’s Pivot to Asia
Dr. Fraser Cameron     Fraser CAMERON
Abstract 
Military adventurism in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were the two 
critical junctures for the Russian Federation in its relationship with NATO 
and the European Union. The Kremlin made its message crystal clear: stay 
away from the near abroad, as it is perceived as Russia’s sphere of influence. 
As relations have continued to deteriorate, Russian pundits have sought new 
and different partnerships across wider Eurasia. Despite Russia’s role as a 
strategic partner and a major military power, not all partnerships especially 
in Eurasia are straightforward. Contraposed against Moscow’s interests in 
such partnerships, this article investigates the prospects for cooperation with 
China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, India, and South East Asia. In conclu-
sion, this article delivers a succinct overview on how Putin and Russia is 
perceived in different parts in Eurasia. 
Key words: Russia foreign policy, China, Japan, Korean peninsula, South 
East Asia
Introduction
As Russia’s relations with the West soured over its invasions of Georgia and 
Ukraine, President Putin started a slow but steady pivot towards Asia. This 
resulted in a significant deepening of the strategic partnership with China 
and an increase in trade, albeit from a low base, with China and other Asian 
partners, notably in the fields of energy and arms sales. But Russia has made 
little progress in strengthening its political ties in the Asia-Pacific region 
despite its membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and its partnership 
with ASEAN. In Central Asia, it has adopted a defensive posture seeking 
to limit China’s influence while participating in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Initiative (SCO). It has also had scant success in attracting new Asian part-
ners for the Eurasian Economic Union.
Overall, Asian countries have been sceptical about the Russian pivot, 
mainly because they view Russia as too closely tied to China. Most are 
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doubtful of the added value of closer links. They are also aware that the 
United States is opposed to increased Russian influence in the Asia-Pacific 
and have no wish to upset Washington. 
Although over 70 percent of Russian territory is in Asia, its leaders, 
whether during the Czarist period, under Soviet rule, or today, have never 
considered the country predominantly Asian (most Russians live in the West 
of the country) Throughout history, Russia has looked down on Asian cul-
tures, a feeling that has been reciprocated on the Asian side. Despite sanc-
tions, more than 50 percent of Russian exports (overwhelmingly oil and 
gas) still go to Europe. Moscow has traditionally looked West for political, 
economic, and military influence. To the East (and South), it has largely 
adopted a defensive posture seeking to ensure that its lengthy borders were 
not threatened by a potential adversary. Less than 10 percent of the popula-
tion live in Siberia and the Russian Far East where the infrastructure and 
communications lag way behind that in European Russia. 
The 1905 naval defeat by Japan, its limited involvement in Asia during 
the Second World War, and the disastrous Soviet involvement in Afgha-
nistan from 1979 onwards did little for Russia’s image in Asia. For most 
Asians, Russia rarely impinges on their lives. It is not regarded as an attrac-
tive place to do business, nor a centre of innovation, nor a tourist destina-
tion, nor a country to send their children for education. Few Asians learn 
Russian or take an interest in Russian culture. As elsewhere, Russian soft 
power comes up short.
Moscow’s Motives
Western sanctions against Russia following the occupation of Crimea was 
the major reason for the Russian pivot to Asia, although Putin had started 
his wooing of China years before. Moscow noted that nearly all Asian coun-
tries refused to go along with the US-led sanctions on Russia and hoped 
that increasing trade and securing finance and technology from Asia would 
mitigate the impact of the sanctions.
Russia also aimed to be an actor in the Asia-Pacific arena, to be closer 
to the strategic competition between the US and China and if possible, seek 
advantage. Although rarely discussed in public, there was also the assess-
ment that, in the longer-term, China was likely to pose a significant threat 
to Russia. It was not forgotten in Moscow that the two countries had fought 
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a war over disputed territory just 50 years ago. Many Russians are also wor-
ried at the growing Chinese presence, legal and illegal, in the Russian Far 
East. For these reasons, a closer relationship with the world’s second biggest 
economy with many shared political interests was thus very much in Russia’s 
national interest.
Knowing the country’s willingness to use armed force, Asians may have 
paid more attention to Russia if it had increased its forces in the Asia-Pacific 
region. However, growth in military capabilities in the past decade has been 
modest and its forces are no match for those of the United States (or indeed 
China) in the Asia-Pacific.
China 
Russia’s engagement with China has been aptly described as ‘an alliance of 
convenience.’ Both share an antipathy to what they call American hegemony 
and liberal interventionism. They have taken common positions on sev-
eral foreign policy issues, ranging from Iran and Syria to North Korea and 
Venezuela. China has become Russia’s main trade partner and there are 
increasing joint military exercises, including in North East Asia, which are 
viewed as a threat by Japan. Moscow and Beijing seem to have reached a 
modus vivendi in Central Asia and the Arctic. The two partners meet in the 
BRICS, the SCO, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the EAS, and other fora 
as well pursing an active bilateral visits programme. 
There is little doubt, however, who is the senior partner. China’s economy 
is more than eight times the size of Russia’s, and the gap is likely to widen 
further in coming years. This must be galling to the Russian elite who now 
must accept, for the first time in modern history, the primacy of China.
The relationship with China is viewed as a personal triumph for Pre-
sident Putin and as he (and Xi) are likely to be in their current positions for 
many years, it is unlikely that they will allow relations to deteriorate. Putin 
and Xi have met more times than any other two major world leaders but 
this level of interaction has not led to any significant increase in people to 
people contacts. Transport links are limited and Russians and Chinese still 
prefer to send their children to be educated in the West rather than in each 
other’s countries.
China views Russia through different prisms. Above it all, it remains 
aghast that the Communist Party allowed the Soviet Union to disintegrate. 
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There is a small industry in Chinese think tanks that continue to analyse the 
reasons for the failure of the Soviet Union to maintain control of the coun-
try. Such a failure is the worst nightmare scenario for the CCP. The lessons 
learned by President Xi and the CCP are the importance of party vigilance 
and discipline. Western liberal thoughts are to be countered and eradicated. 
The Chinese can travel, start a business, and make money – but they cannot 
challenge the authority of the Party.
President Xi respects the efforts and partial success that Putin has had 
in restoring Russian prestige and influence. Nonetheless, China does not 
want Russia to play a bigger role in Asia unless it keeps to the Beijing line, 
whether on the South China Sea, Taiwan, or the Korean Peninsula. 
For Russia, China is now the leading trade partner, but for China, 
Russia lags in 14th place – behind even Thailand and Malaysia. There is 
significant cross-border trade in Siberia but elsewhere little Chinese invest-
ment. In 2018, Chinese FDI was a mere $1 billion. As one Chinese official 
remarked to this author, ‘Russia is not a major player in global finance, trade 
or technology.’ 
China has been ready to buy more Russian oil and gas, albeit on favour-
able terms, and is a selective purchaser of Russian arms. Chinese firms have 
also increased their penetration of the Russian market in high tech, (includ-
ing 5G), shipping, and even oil technology. 
In terms of popular views of Russia, there is little coverage of Russia in 
the media. There are almost no Russian films or plays in theatres, and few 
people study Russian. Academics and intellectuals do not look to Moscow 
for ideas. 
Most Chinese were also annoyed that Russia chose to close the border 
with China at the end of January 2020 due to fears about the spread of the 
COVID-19 virus. Chinese social media had many comments about racial 
stereotypes as travellers from Europe were not stopped entering Russia until 
the end of March. Politics and economics are likely to trump social concerns 
and if, as likely, China emerges stronger from the pandemic, it could lead to 
a further boost in trade relations.
Japan
Japan’s views on Russia remain coloured by the Soviet occupation of the 
Kuril Islands in the final days of the Second World War. Japan also must set 
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its relations with Russia against the background of its vital security alliance 
with the United States and its efforts to contain the rise of China. 
With the departure of Prime Minister Abe, Russia has probably lost a 
golden opportunity to improve relations with Japan. Abe visited Russia 
more than a dozen times during the past eight years, put forward plans for 
closer economic ties, agreed to only limited sanctions after the occupation of 
Crimea, and displayed considerable flexibility in seeking an agreement over 
the occupied territories. Despite his relentless optimism, Abe was constantly 
rebuffed by Putin, and it is likely that his successor, Suga Yoshihide, will not 
pursue ties with Russia with the same eagerness. 
Most Japanese analysts view Russia as little more than China’s junior 
security partner in Asia. Bilateral trade has not exceeded $30 billion annu-
ally, and in 2018, it was only about $20 billion. As in the rest of Asia, there is 
little popular enthusiasm for Russian language or culture. 
The Korean Peninsula
Russia is viewed with suspicion in South and North Korea. South Korea had 
hopes that Russia might be a moderating influence on the nuclear ambitions 
of the DPRK. However, Seoul recognised that if China failed to stop the 
DPRK from developing a nuclear capacity, there was little Russia could do 
to prevent such a development.
Russia’s relations with the DPRK remain limited. The DPRK leadership 
shares China’s horror at the way the CCCP collapsed. Under Putin, Moscow 
has done little to boost trade or investment with the DPRK. There have been 
spats over illegal fishing and Moscow even expelled North Korean workers 
following a UNSC resolution.
Moscow played no part in the Trump-Kim talks on denuclearization. 
South Korean analysts assess that Russia, like China, prefers the current 
status quo to unification, which would likely be achieved on South Korean 
terms and lead to an increase in US influence in the region.
South Korea has attempted to develop its economic links with Russia, 
including cooperating in energy and infrastructure projects in Siberia. 
Nonetheless, this ‘New Northern Policy’ has made little progress with most 
Korean companies reluctant to engage in what one businessman described as 
the ‘Wild West of Siberia.’ The two sides have agreed to explore a possible FTA. 
Trade between the two sides has increased to a modest $25 billion in 2018.
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Throughout the Korean Peninsula, there is little interest in Russian 
culture.
India
Russia is viewed slightly more positively in India, which is the largest market 
for Russian arms exports and a significant customer of civilian nuclear reac-
tors and technology. There are also no bilateral difficulties. New Delhi, like 
Moscow, opposes Western liberal interventionism, supports the idea of a 
multipolar world, and has criticised the imposition of sanctions against 
Russia. Moscow helped India join the SCO and partners with New Delhi 
within the BRICS.
India also recognises that it is unlikely to receive support from Russia in 
its intermittent border conflict with China. Russia has also developed closer 
ties to Pakistan, India’s number one adversary. India, meanwhile, has joined 
forces with the United States (and Japan and Australia) in efforts to counter 
China in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
Apart from arms sales and some limited energy projects, trade between 
India and Russia is stagnant. As elsewhere in Asia, there is little appetite for 
Russian culture.
South East Asia
Leaders in South East Asia are also sceptical about the Russian pivot despite 
Putin hosting a meeting of ASEAN leaders in 2016 to boost relations with 
the 600m population bloc. Both sides agreed on the goal of building a stra-
tegic partnership and an action plan to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, 
and crime as well as expanding trade and investment. Although there has 
been an expansion of arms sales and some limited energy cooperation with 
individual members of ASEAN (mainly Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar), 
both sides have been disappointed with the overall results. 
Despite its desire to join organisations such as the EAS and partner with 
ASEAN, Asian diplomats note that South East Asia is not a priority for 
Russian foreign policy. South East Asia tends to take a backseat not only 
to China, but also to Japan, the Korean peninsula, and India and Pakistan. 
Nor – according to officials in the ASEAN secretariat – is Russia helpful in 
boosting the standing of ASEAN as a regional security provider and pillar 
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of the existing multilateral system. They accept that Russia is not going to 
side with ASEAN countries in their territorial disputes with China or to join 
them and the United States to contain the expansion of Chinese influence 
in the region. 
And despite the rhetoric about a strategic partnership, Russia prefers to 
pursue its interests in the region through bilateral ties. Like the US, and to 
some extent the EU, it acknowledges that ASEAN is primarily a talk shop 
incapable of taking decisive action due to divisions among its members. 
Trade remains low amounting to a mere $19.2 billion in 2018. Vietnam 
is Moscow’s main trading partner in the region but trade with Russia is less 
than 5% of Vietnam’s trade with China. Russian FDI in ASEAN countries is 
less than $10 billion, while the latter’s FDI in Russia is less than $5 billion. 
Several South East Asia countries, with bigger defence budgets, have bought 
substantial arms purchases from Russia, which tends not to ask intrusive 
questions about human rights. 
Russia has considered joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), but no agreement has been reached. It only has two 
bilateral FTAs, with Vietnam and Singapore. 
Conclusion
Neither Russia nor Putin have a strong reputation in Asia. In a 2017 Pew 
survey of views on Russia, only 41 percent of those polled in six Asian 
countries had a favourable view of Russia. Only around a quarter in Japan 
(25 percent) see Russia in a positive light while 49 percent in India have a 
favourable opinion.
Most Asian countries have remained sceptical about Russia’s pivot to 
Asia largely because there has been little substance behind it and Russia has 
focused almost exclusively on China. This is widely recognised throughout 
the region and makes it difficult for Russia to deepen its relations with other 
Asian powers. Russia’s overall trade with Europe has remained considerably 
greater than that with Asia – and there is more interest in Russian culture 
and language in Europe than in Asia. If Russia is perceived to be hanging 
on to the coattails of China, it is doubtful that views of Russia in Asia will 
change.
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Abstract 
At times, the Russian Federation remains a hostage of its past. Soviet Russia 
might have stripped the empire of its name, but it maintained and fostered 
its rather expansionist and exceptionalist gene. As such, the Soviet Union 
subjugated multiple states to the its east and launched an ideological contest 
played out through more than five decades until its collapse. At the collapse, 
even if multiple newly independent states were coping with similar chal-
lenges and reborn Russia, some aspects remained different. As the genea-
logical descendent of the Soviet Union, the extended time Russians spent 
under communism became a key part of historical memory. There was yet 
the attraction of imperial grandeur. The West presented the end of the Cold 
War as a mutually beneficial outcome, but for many Russians, it represented 
a humiliation through the loss of imperial greatness, dominance, and ter-
ritories. This paper will explain how Russia copes with these past challenges 
under Putin and what is probable in the future. 
Key words: Russia, communism, great power, ideology, Putin, Navalny
On 22 August 1991, I came back home in the evening after a hectic and 
exciting day at my newspaper office. The hard-line Communist coup had 
just collapsed, Boris Yeltsin was in full control in Moscow, and sensational 
news was breaking nearly every minute. There was joy in the air after what 
seemed to be a decisive victory of the democratic forces in Russia. 
I found my 67-year old mother sitting in front of the TV, which was 
showing what immediately became an iconic moment of that historic 
August. In front of the KGB headquarters on the Lubyanskaya Square, the 
crowd was pulling down a statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the dreaded head of 
Lenin’s Cheka, the Soviets’ first but by no means last secret police organisa-
tion. When they finally managed to hook Dzerzhinsky’s bronze figure with 
a crane and lifted it off the pedestal, tears appeared in my mother’s eyes. I 
asked her, ‘Why are you crying? This is such a happy moment!’ She replied, 
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‘Because I realised that in all my life I only had two truly happy days – one 
when you were born and today!’ 
I immediately understood my mother. She could never forget how the 
NKVD arrested my grandfather in front of her when she was thirteen years 
old and how he returned from the GULAG ten years later, a broken and 
aged man with missing teeth and sheepish smile, how other relatives ‘dis-
appeared’ never to be heard from again, how they ‘confiscated’ the family 
belongings, and how she never got a place in the university – being the 
daughter of ‘enemy of the people’. That day we thought everyone in Russia 
felt as we did – relieved, elated, and looking forward towards a brighter 
future. The following 29 years showed, we were wrong – and in the clear 
minority among Russians. It was never as clear as today with Vladimir Putin 
having ruled the country for twenty-one years already – and counting. 
There are many reasons why Russia’s post-Communist experience was so 
disappointing and led to Putin’s authoritarian rule. Some point to the reluc-
tance of President Boris Yeltsin in dismantling the Soviet-era bureaucracy, 
including the KGB. Others suggest it was the hasty and corrupt privatisation 
scheme of the 1990s that was designed to introduce capitalism but instead 
robbed tens of millions of their jobs, created an oligarchy, and laid the foun-
dations of the ugly modern day Russian state capitalism. 
All of this is true. However, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic States also had residues of Communist bureaucracy. Some 
of the apparatchiks there became heads of state or government, such as 
Poland’s Alexander Kwasniewski, who brought his country into NATO and 
the EU, being one of the most memorable examples. They implemented pri-
vatisation schemes with different degrees of success, fairness, and resulting 
hardship for the population. However, none of them ended up where Russia 
did. 
To me, three factors made the key difference between Russia and its 
former satellites: time spent under the Communist rule, the lure of the 
Soviet imperial grandeur, and the West’s decision to present the end of the 
‘Cold War’ as a ‘win-win’ outcome. 
When I went on vacation as a child with my family and later as a young 
adult to what used to be then ‘the Soviet Baltic Republics’, it did not take 
long to discover that many local families we met held vivid memories of 
life before the Communist occupation – as well as painful and tragic ones 
of deportations and executions that followed Stalin’s invasion in 1940 and 
re-occupation in 1944. I remember once opening a cupboard in an Estonian 
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flat, which the family rented out, discovering a photographic portrait of the 
interwar President Konstantin Päts carefully attached to the back of the cup-
board so that only the owners could look at it. 
By the time Lithuania became the first Soviet Republic to proclaim the 
restoration of its independence in March 1990, there was still a significant 
number of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians who, although advanced 
in years, remembered life in the sovereign Baltic States. The same goes for 
Poland, Romania, or any other country of occupied Central Europe. That 
pre-Communist life may have been not prosperous or that the regimes in 
many of those states were authoritarian (mostly mildly) had become nearly 
irrelevant in the late 1980s to early 1990s. The living memories of grand-
mothers and grandfathers carried an important message – another life is not 
only desirable but is also practically possible. In Russia, hardly any family 
had any members alive that could have described what life was before the 
1917 Bolshevik takeover. The only memories that citizens of the Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic had were those of existence under the 
Soviet regime in its various iterations of cruelty. Private property, religious 
practices, and even normal social courtesies were nearly erased from the 
national consciousness after 74 years of Communism, a quarter of a century 
longer than in Central Europe and the Baltics.
The imperial hubris is a second factor that was – and still is – psychologi-
cally important to Russians. Lithuanians, Latvians, Poles, and Hungarians 
were shedding foreign occupation for the sake of their newly reconstituted 
nation states. The Russian people had nothing but the empire to fall back 
to in historical retrospectives stretching back for nearly 400 years. It was 
the Romanovs and then the Communists who provided Russians with an 
emotionally exhilarating combination of lordship over the others and mili-
tary might. In the late 1980s to early 1990s, most Russians in Russia proper 
were interested in shedding the Communist political and economic shackles 
and embracing the glamorised consumer culture of the West. Nonetheless, 
they were not ready for the collapse of a state which, as professor Geoffrey 
Hosking sharply observed, the Russians came to consider as ‘theirs’ by 
right.1 
In the understandable elation following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
and the nearly bloodless collapse of the USSR in 1991, the United States and 
their European allies failed to see historical differences that set Russia apart 
1 Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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from her Central European neighbours. The West promoted the narrative 
that the end of the Cold War was actually a victory for everyone, which was 
manifestly untrue – at least not in the short historical term. The Western 
side won, and the Soviet side lost in the conflict that consumed the world for 
the more than 40 years after the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, 
no one dared to say this at the time for the sake of keeping the tenuously 
shaky process of reforming Russia going. In hindsight, I think an honest 
admission of defeat may have served Russia better – as a reality check, a 
chance for contrition, and an invitation to a different future. Instead, the 
new leadership under Boris Yeltsin and its Western supporters maintained 
an illusion of a quick and painless transition to a democratic and prosperous 
future. They can hardly be blamed though. The danger of an anti-demo-
cratic revanchism seemed real in the 1990s. It looked too many as if Russia 
needed just a few years of hard transformation and democratic stewardship 
before it became an oversized version of the Czech Republic. 
These dreams were quickly shattered by the reality of economic hard-
ship, the collapse of what remained of Soviet industry and welfare, and a 
sudden burden of personal responsibility that fell on the Russians shoulders 
after decades of reliance on the state. In addition, they now had to treat the 
former imperial ‘subjects’ as respected citizens of new independent nations. 
30–40 years previously, the British and the French could sail away from 
India or Senegal and try to forget that they ever ruled them. This choice was 
not available to the Russians. Their empire was a huge land mass and all 
former ‘dependencies’ were as visible as before – but with newly found zeal 
for independence and frequently, grudges to be revealed and past scores to 
be settled with the former metropoles.
Russia’s imperial pushback did not happen immediately. In the 1990s, 
most Russians were preoccupied with survival in the new circumstances of 
wild capitalism and chaotic democracy. Things started to improve with the 
oil boom of 1999–2008. It was then, with salaries paid on time, new cars, TV 
sets bought, and new petrodollar-created jobs emerging on the market daily 
that Russians noted – ‘their’ empire was no more. They wanted again to feel 
mighty and feared by the world as it was in Soviet days. This was a delayed 
but not illogical reaction to the swift disappearance of the Soviet Union. The 
US-based emigre Russian historian Alexander Yanov was probably the first 
who predicted that this would happen in his 1993 article, later developed 
into a book called ‘After Yeltsin. Weimar Russia’. British journalist Bruce 
Clark followed it shortly with the book ‘An Empire’s New Clothes: the End 
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of Russia’s Liberal Dream’.2 At the time, many, including this writer, derided 
both professor Yanov and Mr Clark as ‘alarmists’. They were prescient where 
academics as well as most think-tankers, politicians, and I were wrong. 
Vladimir Putin came to symbolise the ‘revanchist’ or ‘post-Weimar’ 
Russia long before he invaded Georgia or grabbed the Crimea. Early on, his 
public persona caught the imagination of Russians because he looked and 
sounded ordinary – a post-Soviet (or rather former Soviet) man of a certain 
age, social habits, and prejudices. A vast majority of Russians saw him as a 
healthy and fit version of Ivan Petrovich, the dacha neighbour. They were 
glad to entrust the burden of taking big decisions to the man in the Kremlin 
in exchange of making them ‘great again’. This is still Putin’s main source 
of authority, if not legitimacy, and this is how he succeeded in making his 
administration a real government of Russia, suppressing independent media 
and turning state-owned enterprises like Gazprom, Rosneft or Rostech into 
sources of immense personal wealth for his ‘in-crowd’ of former KGB opera-
tives and their families. ‘The Putin majority’ continued to follow him even 
after the oil-fuelled prosperity of the early 2000s disappeared in the tumult 
of the 2008 world economic crisis. It forgave Putin his muzzling and even 
killing of political opponents, rampant corruption on all levels of govern-
ment, and rigged elections. Today this majority shrunk – maybe even sig-
nificantly – but it is still sizable. 
Putin uses ‘great power’ rhetoric to not only control and shape public 
opinion. His goal is much more ambitious – to give Russians a new identity. 
In this respect, even the high point of Putin’s domestic ‘glory’ – the annexa-
tion of Crimea in 2014 – takes second place to his systematic attempts to 
rewrite the country’s history so that his regime outlives him. He can laud 
the KGB chief Yuri Andropov one day and open a monument to the victims 
of Stalinist terror on the next. Many in Russia and in the West see it as a 
contradiction. 
It is not a contradiction, however, if one looks for answers not in offi-
cial pronouncements but in the output of the Kremlin’s sprawling propa-
ganda factory. It includes all major TV networks, film production (largely 
financed by the state), publishing projects, and – increasingly – social media. 
A popular 2018 mini-series called ‘The Demon of Revolution’ serves as a 
good example. Filmed by one of Russia’s most popular directors, Vladimir 
Khotinenko, it tells the story of the 1917 Russian revolution as part of a 
2 Bruce Clark, An Empire’s New Clothes: The End of Russia’s Liberal Dream (London: 
Vintage, 1995).
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Western plot to dismantle Russia. Weirdly enough, both Emperor Nicholas 
II and Vladimir Lenin come across as sympathetic, each in his own way 
a patriot of ‘his’ Russia. The foreigners, be it the Germans or the Entente 
allies, are invariably sinister, cynical, and cunning. Their Russian friends 
from the short-lived liberal bourgeois Provisional Government look naive, 
silly, and weak. Blasted by historians as an ‘ahistorical fairy tale’, the series 
boasts a strong, even charismatic performance by Russia’s leading stars to 
drive home important points: the West is Russia’s eternal enemy ready to 
betray it; any authority is legitimate as long as it is strong while weakness is 
the main crime in politics; all talk of democracy and liberty is nothing but 
a cynical cover for naked interests; true Russian patriotism means accept-
ing and obeying a strong political leadership, no matter of which political 
persuasion as long as this leadership keeps the country strong, whole and 
out of reach of the perfidious West. Countless other propaganda projects 
across the media spectrum relentlessly recycle these three points. For those 
who disagree with such a vision of the country’s past, present and future the 
Kremlin keeps the borders open. Many left, especially in the last ten years. 
A mix of co-optation, cynicism, and resignation is dominant among those 
who remained. 
This political narrative of the new ‘velikoderzahvnost’’ – ‘great power-
ism’ – to some extent affected even the Russian opposition. Most of its lead-
ers until recently tried to avoid or at least not go too deep into the critique 
of Putin’s foreign policy. They prefer to concentrate on systemic corrup-
tion, falling standards of living, and a housing crisis – anything but the war 
with Ukraine, reckless provocations against NATO, Russia’s isolation, and 
its abysmal relations with the United States and the European Union. Being 
too friendly to the West was perceived as a political handicap. Asked in 2014 
about his attitude to the annexation of Crimea, Alexey Navalny famously 
said that the peninsula ‘is not a sandwich to be passed around’ – meaning 
‘what’s done is done’. In what seems like a genuine change of attitude in 
2015 in an interview with a Moscow radio station, he condemned Vladimir 
Putin as a ‘war criminal’. The interview has been heavily edited.3 I remember 
this moment crisply; I was the one who conducted the interview and was 
fired because of a phrase that Navalny said live on air. The owner of the sta-
tion – one of Russia’s richest men – was afraid the Kremlin would punish 
or humiliate him. By making me redundant, he showed his loyalty to the 
3 “«Партия Прогресса Имеет Право На Участие в Выборах»,” Коммерсантъ, 2015, 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2804109.
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authorities and earned political absolution, which in Putin’s Russia is always 
provisional. Therefore, in some sense, the empire managed to strike back at 
me – although luckily it was nothing compared to what my relatives had to 
endure under Stalin. 
Will this tragic arc of Russian history change? Maybe. Putin has been 
around for twenty years. In an age of social media, fast technological change, 
and globalised entertainment, the Russian regime looks increasingly obso-
lete. More and more people, especially in the big cities, are getting bored 
with Putin’s image, his repetitive pronouncements, and artificial machismo. 
Recent findings by a group of researchers headed by economist Mikhail 
Dmitriev and psychologist Anastasia Nikolskaya seem to prove it.4 Their 
ongoing project analyses long-term trends in the Russian society over many 
years. In early 2010, Dmitriev and his colleagues were the only ones who 
predicted a wave of anti-Putin protests in Moscow in the winter-spring of 
2011–2012, provoked by the rigged State Duma elections. The group’s recent 
findings show popular mistrust of central authorities rising and citizens’ 
desire to self-organize growing, even in the poorer regions that are more 
dependent on the authorities’ handouts than Moscow or Saint Petersburg. 
There is also a visible shift in public focus from purely local problems (cor-
rupt mayors, rapacious development, social welfare inadequacy) towards 
bigger national issues like the future of federalism (which Putin all but liq-
uidated) and deficiencies of Russia’s political system. Russians are growing 
weary of the omni-powerful executive presidency and want the Duma to 
play a bigger role.
The group’s conclusion most unpleasant for Mr. Putin is that people 
are also tiring of the Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy. “More and more 
Russians want peace and normal relations with the outside world, including 
the West,” Mr. Dmitriev told me. “As far as I am concerned the so-called 
‘Crimean consensus’ is over,” he said, referring to the waving of nearly uni-
versal adulation of the regime that swept the country after Crimea was 
annexed. 
The main question is ‘What will eventually replace this regime?’ Ten 
or fifteen years ago, it was fashionable to cite Germany as a successful 
example of a nation coming to terms with its past and becoming peace-
ful and ‘normal’. Although few doubt the overall success of Germany’s 
4 “«На вопрос об отношении к власти люди все чаще отвечают матом». Эксперт 
Михаил Дмитриев об изменении общественных настроений,” The Insider, accessed 
November 27, 2020, https://theins.ru/opinions/the-insider/223648.
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transformation, it can hardly serve a model for Russia. Firstly, the Germans 
were defeated militarily; their country occupied and steered to denazifica-
tion, demilitarisation, and democratisation by the victorious Western allies. 
Secondly, with all due reference to Germany’s long romance with ‘blood and 
soil’ nationalism, the German Empire lasted only forty seven years, and the 
Nazi regime – a mere twelve, too short for a lasting overhaul of a national 
psychology, horrors of the two world wars and the Holocaust notwithstand-
ing. Crucially, as opposed to the Communists, the Nazis did not eradicate 
private property or religion – two important mainstays of individual auton-
omy. Thirdly, Germany’s ‘1968 generation’ forced their parents to face and 
own the country’s Nazi past only twenty years after the Third Reich col-
lapsed, when the memories were still fresh and relevant. 
All these conditions are lacking in Russia. For more and more young 
people, even the times of Gorbachev and Yeltsin are ancient history that they 
know little about. These youngsters lived all their life under Putin’s regime. 
Its efforts to shape the new Russian identity with the old 20th century neo-
Pagan worship of the ‘strong state’ also bore fruit. 
I think the transition from an empire to a nation state will take a much 
longer time than it took the Germans to change themselves and their coun-
try. Apart from the evident necessity of cleaner governance and democrati-
sation, this transition can eventually succeed on three conditions: resurrect-
ing and developing Russian federalism and local self-government; adopting 
a Russian equivalent of the US First Amendment, guaranteeing unrestricted 
civil liberties; plus making just, honourable, and lasting peace with Ukraine. 
The first proposition will lead over time to people getting used to managing 
their own lives without Moscow’s control. The second one will show that 
the government is not afraid of the people and of a long overdue frank and 
open debate about Russia’s past, present, and future. The last point, in my 
view, is of paramount importance. To accept responsibility and correct an 
injustice committed against Ukrainians will have a transformative effect on 
the Russian society. It will be very difficult, especially if giving back Crimea 
and accepting Ukraine’s desire to join NATO would be involved. Settlement 
with Georgia will have to follow suit and revive Russia’s relations with the 
neighbours and the world at large. ‘Self-respect’ and ‘trust’ are the key words 
for this revival. Atomised and cynical today, Russians will have to learn to 
trust each other and their neighbours. This would eventually make them 
respect themselves instead of seeking respect by humiliating others. It will 
be hard for the people of a former empire who over the last four hundred 
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years lived through serfdom, revolutions, a civil war, two world wars, and 
the GULAG. Today’s moral crisis perpetuated by the Putin regime is Russia’s 
biggest problem, and in some ways, it is more profound and more important 
than modernising the economy or holding free elections. Only overcoming 
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Abstract
The fact that Russia’s President has been living and working from a “bunker” 
for most of 2020 is emblematic of a regime in a straitjacket and of its inten-
tion to keep Russia’s people strapped into one too. The need to protect 
Vladimir Putin from COVID-19 is said to demand strict control over those 
hoping to see him face to face. The person however, who has shut Putin in 
both literally and figuratively is Putin, not a virus. The rest of us need to 
consider the possible consequences. This piece explores the reverberations 
of these consequences, providing insights as to the possibilities in Russia for 
2024 and beyond. 
Key words: Cold War, Putin, Russia, Spring 2012, Navalny, Russia’s scenarios, 
2024/2030
Background to January 2020
There can be no quarrel with the proposal that the outside world should 
deal with Russia “as it really is.” There are of course long running themes 
in Russian history, as there are in the history of other nations. Moreover, 
it is only common sense to try to deal with any country or international 
organisation as it really is, not as we might like it to be. But the catchphrase 
when used for Russia implies that there is a constant to which others must 
adapt by accepting the constraints arising from it, somewhat reminiscent 
of the fact that the United States, and other Western countries, had to take 
the Soviet Union and its interests as the leader of the Warsaw Pact into par-
ticular account during the Cold War. However, looking at the present day 
in patterns drawing on parallels with the Cold War is misleading. Today’s 
Russia’s belief in its equivalence – in justice – to the United States as a force 
in the world is as unrealistic as its effort to persuade itself that its history as 
the core of the Soviet Union is essentially honourable – with Berlin in 1945 
the proof.
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Transatlantic powers and international institutions have struggled to 
work effectively with Russia in efforts to mitigate periodic shocks through 
resets intended to promote mutual trust, which would include respect for 
the interests of the now separate ex-Soviet or ex-Warsaw Pact states in 
Europe. Putin’s election as President in 2000 was welcomed by most of the 
countries of the West with the belief that he might well prove to be an effec-
tive moderniser for Russia and at least to some useful degree a welcome 
colleague in the international field. There were however tangible signs from 
the beginning of the Putin era that the mutual understanding essential to 
mutual trust was not on offer. The new President’s guiding star was and 
remains securing centralised and personalised control of a Russia to be 
restored to what he and many Russians saw and see as its rightful position 
as a Great Power. Building a new Russia ruled by law under a government 
accountable to its people has not been party to this ambition. Restoring 
Moscow’s right to dominate its “near abroad” has.
The Soviet roots of the assumptions behind the policies of both Putin 
and his colleagues, including their attachment to ‘strategic resources’ being 
subject to the interests of the state, were clear from the early years of their 
rule. It was also obvious that while the USSR had a recognisable, if ineffi-
cient, economic and political system, Russia had yet adequately to develop 
its own. A broad summary of the way that the Russian state has developed 
over the last two decades would record the evisceration of its constitution-
ally defined autonomous institutions and its translation into a personalised 
autocracy. Such things as a legal system, business structures, Parliament, a 
federal system, a degree of regional governance, and political parties have 
gone through the same process of decay while increasing sums have been 
devoted to Russia’s security networks.
A second and parallel world has also grown into an essential element of 
the Russian state: a murky and deeply corrupted world with deniable but 
powerful structures within it pursuing their often-predatory interests while 
also acting as needed on government orders. The sacrifice of the institu-
tions of government, the subordination of the interests of the Russian people 
to the variable and often contradictory instructions of those that wield the 
power of force, the confusion and abuse inherent in governance by “under-
standings” not law binding high and low alike, and the suffocation of public 
debate have robbed Russia of the essential means of arriving at a common 
vision of its future and of the instruments needed to build it.
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Putin’s return to the Kremlin in May 2012 was and remains a defining 
moment in deciding Russia’s present condition. Dmitry Medvedev was never 
able to establish himself as President with the full power of that office, but 
Putin’s insistence in September 2011 that Medvedev give way to him to run 
as President in 2012 provoked significant and widespread street protests, 
nullified the uncertain moves Medvedev and President Obama had made 
towards a less strained US-Russian relationship, and demolished what had 
seemed to be moves agreed with then presidential candidate Putin towards a 
fresh if modest approach to Russia’s economic and by extension social devel-
opment over the next eight years. Conditions after the 2008 global economic 
crisis, which shook Russia severely, together with the growing realisation 
that oil and gas alone were not going to secure Russia’s future well enough, 
were stimulus for a rethink. However, Putin’s decision on returning to the 
Kremlin in 2012 was instead to clamp down domestically, to build up the 
state’s dominant role in directing the economy, and to press forward towards 
hegemony over Russia’s neighbourhood, bolstered by greatly enhanced mili-
tary might.
January 2020
There is, it seems to me, a clear link between what happened in 2012, and 
the “constitutional amendments” crudely enforced between 15 January and 
1 July this year – fear for the future. Whether he intended it or not, then 
President Medvedev had contributed while in office to a way of thinking 
increasingly shared with significant elements of wider official Russia, how-
ever tentatively, of a need for the country somehow to open up to new pos-
sibilities. Putin had little faith in Medvedev and a lively concern, fed by the 
scale of public unrest in the run up to the presidential election of spring 
2012, as to what might be the political consequences of even limited eco-
nomic or social reforms over the course of the next presidential term, from 
2012 to 2018.
He shared the proposition with a substantial quota of his closest col-
leagues, and the security organs in particular, that vigilant control of Russia’s 
citizens and their ideas was both needed and should be increased. That 
remained the case as Putin began his second consecutive term in the present 
cycle in 2018, then due to end with his replacement in 2024. The amend-
ments to the Constitution put as a single item to a “popular vote” spun out 
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over the week up to 1 July 2020 were not about “modernisation” but, cou-
pled with far reaching changes to voting rules and practices, designed to 
double down on the repressive system built up since President Putin’s return 
to the Kremlin in 2012.
Clearing the way for Putin to stay on as President after 2024 was a neces-
sary corollary to that essential aim. There appeared to be no way for him to 
move to another position while retaining ultimate control over the govern-
ment of Russia. He had not had a comfortable ride since 2018 and was losing 
popular trust but the 2024 question could not by 2020 be left open for too 
much longer without sapping his authority and that of others still then in 
charge. Such fears always concern autocratic regimes, but particularly so 
when as in Russia’s case no tried and tested means exist of transferring per-
sonalised rule from an entrenched leader to an agreed successor who might 
command the allegiance of the inner circle of power.
The Politburo, which chose the next Secretary General, has no equivalent 
in today’s Russia. The Russian Constitution speaks of contested elections 
but the officially accepted political parties that might in theory nominate 
presidential candidates lack credibility. The tandem option that worked in 
its way with Putin keeping Medvedev on a leash for an interim period would 
be hard to repeat this time, if only because Putin will be 71 by election time 
in 2024. To return after a six-year gap in 2030 would be impractical.
However, simply scrubbing the constitutional obligation for Putin to 
leave the Kremlin in 2024 has not put the succession issue into limbo; it 
has merely postponed it to an uncertain time. The system created under 
Putin has worked as it does with the public and its component operative 
parts because, like it or not, he is there, and seen as the necessary bulwark 
against the unknown. He protects the security organs for example in their 
corruption while they in return guard him and the system he oversees from 
the potential antagonism of the public at large. Protests as to individual con-
cerns have become regular across the federation, not just in the big cities.
Furthermore, fear of what might happen if discontent now focused on 
specific grievances were to broaden into a more general and active demand 
for change has so far inhibited that possibility. Something with at least the 
appearance of a more clearly articulated system of government, includ-
ing Putin, has had to be sought by the Kremlin; the constitutional changes 
imposed on Russia this year demanded it if they were to be given some sense 
of wider purpose and to provide cover for the envisaged interval between 
2024 and Putin’s eventual departure. Putin himself pointed out in response 
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to the last minute adoption by the Duma on 10 March of the annulment of 
his 2024 duty then to leave office that “I am convinced that a time will come 
when the supreme power in Russia, that of the President, will no longer be 
personified and will no longer be associated with a specific person” (Putin 
of course).
Frozen Anarchy?
There is a dismaying and ever narrowing circularity governing Russia’s evo-
lution over the Putin era, as though building ever-tighter defences against 
the inherent threat of change is the state’s first and overwhelming duty. The 
inevitable irony of the work being undertaken to construct the appropriate 
legislative framework to put the amendments to the constitution into prac-
tice is to build up the role of the President at the cost of further side-lining 
the already enfeebled other elements of the Russian state, judicial, legislative, 
security or executive as the case may be.1 The President in this case is how-
ever no abstract theoretical figure, but Putin – the guide to what the out-
come will be and its first enabler. What he does or fails to do will therefore 
shape what his successor or successors will one day inherit, whoever they 
may be, and whatever form their relationship with the Russian Federation 
may take.
The underlying purpose of reshaping Russia’s governing structures is 
intended to convey the message of their improvement and clarification so 
as to ensure their effectiveness for the longer term. The President of the day 
would be able to step back from day-to-day governance while still retain-
ing control. He (or in theory she) could structure decision-making between 
his subordinates on national priorities across branches of power and layers 
of the federation, the new united system of public power under the Great 
Presidency having suitably blurred or removed formal separations between 
different levels of the state.
It is difficult to imagine how such structures could possibly work as 
advertised, or even to be sure of what exactly they are supposed to mean 
beyond anointing the President with the power to do pretty much what-
ever he wants. Putin has his own practices and habits of mind but even 
he would require restraint and the confidence to allow his more important 
1 See Nikolai Petrov, Ben Noble, Fabian Burkhardt, Rebooting the State Council Increases 
Putin’s Power, 28.10, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/rebooting-state-council-
increases-putins-power 
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subordinates to develop their own approaches if a practice of giving them 
responsibility over broad areas that could be removed at a moment’s notice 
were made a long-term reality.
It would also need well-grounded confidence on Putin’s part that domes-
tic security would be sufficiently preserved. No eventual successor would 
have Putin’s acquired authority over Russia as he took office. The powers 
being handed to Putin by means of the further corrosion of Russia’s Basic 
Law read impressively enough in their way, but their passage has under-
mined the authority of the Basic Law itself and thereby that of the president 
and/or an eventual successor. In a country like Russia, where the rule of law 
is weak but the rule of governance is exercised top down, what seems to be 
autocratic power can when most needed prove to be impotence.
The marked increase in repression since the popular vote was engineered 
by 1 July to pass the constitutional amendments and allow the passage of 
legislation to implement it suggests that Putin is not altogether confident on 
the score of security. Measures have been taken to ensure that the Procuracy 
and the FSB are in safe hands from Putin’s point of view. It is not however 
clear how far Putin brought those among what used to be his principal con-
fidants on board with the changes he had in mind or whom he consults now.
Personnel changes are in progress to appoint or retain younger loyal, 
obedient, and expendable persons throughout the Federation to assist him 
in pursuing his purposes. Those appointed to the regions are sent to them 
as answerable to Moscow, rather than the inhabitants of the regions, whose 
ability to choose for themselves at the polls has been severely limited. The 
state Duma elections due next year, whether in the spring or the autumn, are 
of special concern to the Presidential Administration, and in particular need 
of rigging. The failed assassination on 20 August of Navalny was a notable 
instance of regime concern as to the threat of domestic unrest, although the 
shock of it was greater abroad than in Russia itself. 
There are other matters to be addressed before this change can be looked 
at as more than yet another vulnerable attempt to sustain the regime’s con-
trol over Russia by guarding itself against future risks. Such is at best a nega-
tive and self-serving ambition. It needs a sense of shared public purpose to 
sustain it. The other deeply corrupted Russia that has grown as a parallel 
reality over the last twenty years has been left untouched by “modernisa-
tion” in 2020. It is indeed more of a useful and evolving ally to the Kremlin 
than a matter seen by Russia’s rulers as needing to be addressed if Russia is 
to become more prosperous, content, and stable.
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There is nothing on offer or indeed in prospect that suggests that Putin 
or anyone else in power sees the virtue of even tolerating the possibility of 
public discussions as to options for fresh approaches to Russia’s problems, 
let alone discussions of such matters with the regime itself. The tensions 
between the Moscow based authorities and the regions forced for example to 
address the pandemic have been virtually ignored by Putin and his immedi-
ate circle. 2020 has not even resolved the question that provoked what was 
posed in January: How long will Putin stay and what will happen when he 
goes, on his feet or feet first?
2024/2030
The next few years being particularly unpredictable and the fact that the 
changes put through by Putin and his allies have increased rather than mod-
erated the fragility inherent in the way Russia is governed lead me to con-
clude with the notes below:
First, it is by no means a done deal that Putin or a designated succes-
sor will willingly be accepted by Russia’s people as all-powerful President in 
2024, let alone once more six years after that. But that is what the present 
authorities will wish to fix.
Second, if Putin remains in office or nominates and installs a pliant suc-
cessor in 2024, Russia’s overall prospects will remain flat. There have been 
no signs of fresh ideas being aired or even allowed to be put forward in 
regime-approved circles to improve Russia’s economic record or to make 
good to any significant extent the decorative elements included among the 
constitutional amendments promising fuller attention to the medical or 
other social needs of the population at large.
Third, it is conceivable that if a fresh regime-tolerated candidate is put 
forward and elected in 2024 he/she could revisit paths to a broader process 
of evolution for Russia, but that would be a long process and is unlikely to 
happen in the predictable future.
Fourth, the manner in which the Kremlin has asserted control of voting 
and managing its outcome is likely to build increasing resentment in Russia. 
Tensions between the federal centre in Moscow and the regions will prove 
difficult to manage.
Fifth, the viability of Putin’s long-term ambition to construct a special 
interest zone around Russia has come into question. The domestic euphoria 
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following Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 has faded. The Kremlin has 
alienated the great majority of Ukrainians since then, risks doing the same 
now to the citizens of Belarus and Armenia, and is having to live with 
the intrusion of Turkey in the South Caucasus. But Putin is still guided 
by his preoccupation with what he imagines were Soviet realities and 
achievements.
Sixth, the failed attempt to kill Navalny was a trigger for a previously hes-
itant Germany, and other countries in Europe, removing at least for now the 
supposition that Putin could be trusted and that some form of convergence 
between Russia and European states was practicable in time, as it seemed to 
be for West Germany in earlier years.
Lastly, and personally, the humiliation and in some cases the brutalisa-
tion of the Russian people inherent in the way they have come to be ruled, 
along with the apparent inability of their rulers however gradually to change 
it but instead repeatedly to reinforce it puts them on par with other kinfolk 
driven in the end to popular revolution. May they be spared that outcome.
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While the Baltic Defence College’s Conference on Russia is taking place for 
the seventh time this year, this work is the first ever issue of conference 
proceedings. In a sense, these proceedings functionally serve as published 
record of our international forum for discussing foreign, security, defence, 
and military policies of Russia from both Euro-Atlantic and Russian 
perspectives. 
However – and more importantly – this work acts as an important plat -
form for analysing the security challenges linked with Russia and the 
required responses of the Euro-Atlantic community to the complex chal-
lenges posed by Russia’s actions in the region and on a global scale. The 
goal of the dual format of the conference and its proceedings is to have a 
biennial rotation of topics by alternating the research focus between the 
Russian actions and threats from one hand and the responses of NATO and 
EU from the other hand. Accordingly, in 2021, the event and proceedings 
have emphasized the perception of Russia shared by NATO, the European 
Union, Russian pundits as well as the regional actors. The uniqueness of 
current volume is in ability to propose in equal measure pragmatic policy 
solutions, as well as academic ones, to those critical global issues. 
The inaugural 2021 iteration of the Conference Proceeding is discuss-
ing the broader theme of “Responding to Russia in a Multi-Threat World.” 
From the Euro-Atlantic side, special attention was paid to the efficiency 
of transatlantic deterrence of Russia and its importance for security in the 
wider-Baltic region, the multiple Russian hybrid actions of 2019–2021, the 
lessons learned from Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Belarus, and Armenia, and 
potential threats that might emanate from Russia’s military modernization. 
Thinking from the Russian side, elite and domestic discourses, popular per-
ceptions, and future potentialities are presented and synthesized within this 
wider paradigm. 
As such, these conference proceedings allow our multidisciplinary 
community of Russia experts to reflect on our own actions and responses 
to avoid the mistakes of the past, finding common ground for raising 
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international awareness about Russia and improving the quality of decision-
making and academic debates on those topics. During the conference and 
in these current proceedings, the organizers aimed to include as many high 
level and intense debate partners as possible. We drew our expertise from a 
broad range of disciplines and proficiencies, searching to provide the most 
holistic picture as possible of the opportunities, challenges, and hypothetical 
futures. 
Looking to the East from the West, the first section of our proceedings 
introduced views on and of Russia for a variety of Euro-Atlantic standpoints 
and contexts. First, we have the Baltic region, where Šrāders and Terry situ-
ate German historical parallels with the Baltic States in their future align-
ment. Next, Pagung showed that the rather incoherent Germany policy 
toward Russia will tend more and more toward containment rather than 
engagement. Cieślak and Śliwa then provide a dyadic dive into Polish 
elite and popular perceptions of Russia and what that can mean for future 
engagement. Binnendijk places the Baltic States within the context of 
NATO, stressing an optimistic trend of adaptation for the alliance in the 
future. Lastly, Jakniūnaitė and Šrāders and Gvineria present the nexus of 
the Baltic States, the West, and Russia with Belarus more widely, concluding 
that this current flashpoint of geopolitics and values nonetheless represents 
a point for further Baltic and Western unity, as well as an opportunity for 
engagement. 
By situating Western opinions and possibilities, we then move to Russia. 
First, Lanko discusses Russian discourses on Western responses to Russian 
actions, helping us to find more common ground for peaceful coexistence 
and cooperation with our neighbors in Russia. Then, Lomagin provides 
an overview of Russian opinions on the West more widely, concluding a 
nuanced range of possible cooperation between Russia and the West on 
issues that would affect both equally.
Giles refocuses logics around Russia’s success and failures, stressing that 
any analysis must consider Russia’s own set of metrics for success. Veebel 
then concludes that despite some fears, the best days for Russian military 
industry are over in high-end sector to the point that it may not be able to 
even meet domestic military demands due to ageing equipment. Widening 
the view once more, Lo paints a picture of the possibilities of Russia in a 
world order wherein conceptualizations of greatness have changed and con-
tinue to change. Cameron presents a pessimistic vision of Russia in Asia, one 
where Russia has not actualized itself as a Euro-Pacific power. Penultimately, 
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von Eggert examines Russia’s evolution into neo-imperialism and aspira-
tions of being recognized as a great power in constructing a new Russian 
identity under Putin, and what this could mean in the future. In conclusion, 
Wood traces development of the Putin regime, wherein the Russian presi-
dent has conceded to historical and structural conditions in order to keep 
his control over the state, contributing hypotheses for the coming decades.
In the forward of this work, we ask a question: “Is Russia a tentative 
partner or a strategic challenge for the West, or is it a historical phenom-
enon that cannot separate itself from demons of the past?” From these pre-
sented perspectives of the authors in this volume, we have seen a wide array 
of answers to this question that point us to different possibilities for the 
future – optimistic, pessimistic, and neutral. However, these possibilities 
only exist on paper for now. As the ink has now dried and the pixels are 
now fixed on the screen, it is now up to decision makers to choose which 
of these possibilities will become a reality. Let the ideas presented within 
these proceedings act as a map to help in furthering cooperation and mutu-
ally beneficial arrangements when possible and avoiding any conflicts and 
confusion when likely.
In conclusion, we can then provide an answer; it is better to let Russia 
just be Russia. Closer partnerships and stronger, clearer positions can avoid 
the resurgence of those demons of the past even more. As such, we should 
work together where possible and avoid unnecessary antagonism when 
possible. Thus, no regional or major power should challenge or provoke 
the present Kremlin, which is still the major military force but is increas-
ingly showing signs of economic weakness, political instability, obstacles 
for cooperation, and ideological pivots to the past. Instead, we must vigi-
lantly observe domestic conditions inside Russia and apply the best practices 
from the past – to tame potential consequences from domestic instability 
and simultaneously contain Russia. Such actions would include mounting 
defences against Russia’s adverse activities abroad by meddling politically 
into domestic affairs of foreign countries, includes the United States, mili-
tary activities return territories lost during collapse of the Soviet Union or 
the Russian Empire, or the revision of the rules based liberal world order, 
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